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Executive summary 
 
Background 
The Francis Report identified serious dysfunctions in the NHS and recommended 
fundamental culture change: ‘Aspects of a negative culture have emerged at all levels of the 
NHS system. These include: a lack of consideration of risks to patients, defensiveness, 
looking inwards not outwards, secrecy, misplaced assumptions of trust, acceptance of poor 
standards and, above all, a failure to put the patient first in everything done’ (Francis 2013a: 
1357). There was a multi-pronged response by government to the Inquiry Report and its 
recommendations. Trusts were required to act on a flurry of guidance, and comply with new 
legislative duties, such as the Duty of Candour, at the same time as getting to grips with 
fledgling commissioning bodies and a revamped care quality inspection process. The 
deteriorating finances of the NHS have also played into this turbulence, resulting in all acute 
hospital trusts boards being required to look for challenging efficiencies and savings each 
year since the Francis Report was published, at the same time as demand for services has 
grown  
The Department of Health, in its response to the Francis Inquiry, emphasised the critical role 
of the board: ‘The leadership of an NHS provider organisation is the job of the board of that 
organisation’ (DH 2014a). The key question which is faced by boards is how best to fulfil 
this role. 
 
Study aims 
This research explores what organisations have done to respond to Francis and the lessons to 
be drawn from our findings. The overall purpose is to help policymakers and practitioners to 
understand how leadership and governance of NHS trusts and foundation trusts can be 
improved, how this might enable better management of organisations and better staff 
engagement, and hence safer and higher quality care.  
The aims of the study were as follows: 
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1. To identify the different ways in which the boards of NHS acute hospital trusts and 
foundation trusts have sought to implement the recommendations on organisational 
leadership in response to the  Francis Inquiry Report in 2013 
2. To establish which policies and practices have resulted in improvements  
3. To explore the intended and unintended effects of implementing recommendations of 
the Francis Inquiry 
4. To examine the financial and non-financial costs of developing and implementing 
new policies, processes and actions   
5. To uncover the enablers and barriers in improving board leadership  
6. To advance theoretical understanding of effective healthcare boards 
7. To analyse and synthesise the findings to inform a set of practical and evidence-based 
learning points for boards  
 
Methods 
This was a mixed methods study, theoretically rooted and informed by a range of conceptual 
frameworks. First there was a scoping phase, in which we obtained accounts through single 
depth interviews with 13 national stakeholder representatives, and updated a literature review 
on healthcare board governance. Second, we carried out a survey of members of all NHS 
acute and specialist hospital boards in England, and obtained 381 responses covering 90% of 
all trusts. Third, we undertook case study research in six hospital trusts, including interviews 
and focus group discussions with patient, staff and board representatives, a survey of ward 
and departmental managers and observations of board meetings. A final phase synthesised 
the findings from the different lines of investigation.  
 
Patient and public involvement in the research 
Advice was sought from a patient leader, active in seeking to improve the organisation of 
services in her local area, in developing the research proposal. A particular feature of 
subsequent patient and public involvement in this study was the recruitment process to the 
14 
 
chair and lay membership of the advisory group. Expectations of the lay member role were 
outlined, and a call was issued inviting applications. The result was 18 expressions of interest 
including five applications for the lay chair position. The final PPI membership (which was 
increased from four to five as a result of the higher than anticipated interest) was decided by 
two members of the research team, through matching expressions of interest and experience 
against expectations of the roles, and an interview for the chair position. An external 
summative assessment of the PPI arrangements was provided by National Voices. This 
concluded that the approach taken was well-motivated, authentic and broadly fit for purpose. 
It had some impact on the conduct of the research; a small number of ways in which the 
partnering approach could have been strengthened were suggested, as well as 
recommendations for the wider health services research community for future studies. 
 
Equality and diversity 
We were mindful of the NHS Equality Delivery System, including the goal for more 
inclusive leadership. The national survey questionnaire covered all NHS and foundation 
trusts in England. We ensured that the catchment populations of the trusts chosen for case 
study analysis reflected as far as possible the diversity of the population of England, and we 
took the advice of our lay-led advisory group in the case study selection process. Likewise, in 
identifying people to be interviewed in both the scoping phase and in the course of the case 
studies, we ensured an appropriate mix of ethnicity, age, gender and people with protected 
characteristics. 
 
Key findings  
The scoping phase, national survey and case study findings indicated that: 
 
Board challenges 
 The main self-reported challenges for trusts are patient safety, finances, dealing with 
regulator demands, workforce shortages and, for some, poor relationships in the local 
health economy 
15 
 
 Patient safety is generally reported as a very high priority for boards 
 Long-term financial sustainability is also regarded as important, and the current 
access and finance targets environment can make it difficult to hold the line on 
maintaining quality and safety 
 Managing the demands of  multiple system regulators is sometimes experienced  as 
distracting from the strategic and monitoring tasks of boards 
 
Implementation of Francis policies 
 Some trusts have developed or revised a raft of policies, including the handling of 
complaints and serious incidents, listening to patients and staff engagement 
 Others reported that they already had policies in place 
 The impacts of these policies vary according to the emphasis placed on robust 
governance systems and processes 
 Policies and practices of listening to and acting on patient feedback are further 
advanced than partnering with patients to improve care 
 Duty of Candour is  reported to be well embedded and to have led to greater openness  
and patient confidence 
 Perceived variable quality of middle management and of ward and department level 
teamworking can act as a barrier to implementation of policies associated with Francis 
 
Board leadership and culture 
 Board members are exercising  leadership that is more visible to staff and patients  
 The emphasis on quality following Francis may have provided an opportunity for the 
leadership role, sphere of influence and profile of the chief nurse  to become more 
prominent  on some boards 
 A more stable board, with lower turnover, may help to facilitate acting in a more 
unitary way 
 A culture of quality and service improvement in acute hospitals is emergent and 
variable  
16 
 
 Higher CQC ratings (Good and Outstanding) for hospital trusts are related to higher 
self-reported  scores for emphasising all main board purposes including holding to 
account, supporting the executive team, building the reputation of the organisation, 
drawing upon the views of stakeholders and reconciling competing interests 
 
Implications of results for policy 
The Mid Staffs tragedy appears to have galvanised changes in the behaviours of NHS boards 
towards an increased focus on trying to improve patient safety, patient centred care, a culture 
of greater openness and staff engagement. The policy context since Francis has become more 
challenging, and this is affecting the ability of some boards to drive safe, compassionate and 
effective patient care.  Overlapping, voluminous and sometimes contradictory policy and 
guidance from central NHS bodies can also be an obstacle for some executives. 
 Further encouragement is needed to build a culture of quality improvement which pervades 
throughout hospitals, which encompasses the involvement of patients and public as partners, 
and which supports the capability and capacity of middle and first line management. 
We speculate that boards leading the more successful organisations may have a higher 
internal locus of control that is they operate on the basis that in addition to external 
commissioning, health system and regulatory pressures, they believe they can have a direct 
impact on patient safety and experience of care. 
 
Conclusions and areas for future research 
Francis has had an important impact on board priorities and on perceptions of culture change. 
Patient and staff engagement are a powerful lever for boards seeking to hold the quality and 
safety line. But growing financial, workforce and performance pressures may now threaten 
the pursuit of the quality agenda.  Central direction can be experienced more as a ‘throttle’ 
and pressure than in support of quality and safety, and  how to manage and maximise the 
value of multiple national edicts is a key challenge for boards and executive teams. 
We have concluded that enablers for improving board level leadership in acute hospitals 
include: 
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• Having a strong and effective human resource and organisational development 
function 
• In-house programmes to improve governance, quality, safety  and complaints 
handling 
• Sustainability and transformation plan-related work that  improves local  system 
relations 
• A board that is able to sustain (in the eyes of staff) reliable, consistent and clear 
messaging 
• A body of governors and patient representatives  (or similar for non-foundation trusts) 
who are engaged closely in trust quality and safety work 
• Using complaints and incidents as part of a wider programme of trust learning and 
review 
This latest evidence points to the potential value of a ‘restless board’ that seeks constantly to 
find out more, benchmark itself, do better, and check on prior concerns and actions. It also 
needs to provide stability and consistency of purpose in a turbulent and pressured NHS. And 
boards may do well to embrace the full repertoire of board purposes and mechanisms 
identified in prior research. 
We have conceived five main roles which are relevant for effective healthcare boards in the 
wake of Francis: board as conscience, sensor, diplomat, coach and shock absorber. These 
relate closely to the main board roles from the literature on board governance in relation to 
agency, stewardship, stakeholder, resource dependency and power, but are developed 
specifically to relate to the context and the pressures of the NHS in England since Francis.  
Future research would benefit from exploring the utility of these roles across different 
healthcare contexts. Further, the question of how boards can exhibit a greater internal locus of 
control, as policy entrepreneurs and implementers as opposed to policy victims, should be 
explored. Finally, given some concerns about the lack of progress in service improvement 
strategies that work in collaboration with (rather than in consultation with) patients, the 
dominance of experts on boards, and the disappointing data about a continuing lack of 
diversity, a third area for future research includes understanding the impact of the 
18 
 
composition of the board, including backgrounds, experiences and perspectives of board 
members.  
 
Dissemination  
There were a number of disseminations during the course of the study. During 2016, early 
findings were published in the Health Service Journal (Chambers et al, 2016) and presented 
at the Health Services Research UK (HSRUK) conference. In the first half of 2017 there were 
also presentations by members of the research team at the European Health Management 
Association conference, and at the biennial NHS Providers Quality conference.  
Finally, there were two presentations at the HSRUK conference immediately following 
submission of the report in July 2017. Plans are developing to formally launch the report, 
following approval of the final version. Articles for publication in leading international 
academic journals are also in preparation. 
Wider dissemination is planned for boards, policy makers, regulators and interested patients 
and public. Two events have been scheduled which will be hosted by the Health Foundation: 
a breakfast seminar in December 2017 and an afternoon publication launch event in January 
2018. Following recommendations by reviewers, there will also be a summary of the report 
coordinated by the lay members of the advisory group, highlighting findings of relevance and 
interest to patients and the public and this will be published and disseminated at the same 
time as the full report. The Health Service Journal has indicated keen interest in publishing 
headline findings ahead of the formal launch. Dissemination will include extracting messages 
for boards about how the proposed framework could support training and development of 
boards and new board members, and messages for regulators about focus and behaviours of 
national bodies that support and inhibit organisation improvement. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The aim of this study 
This research explores what organisations have done to respond to Francis and the lessons to 
be drawn. The overall purpose is to help policymakers and practitioners to understand how 
leadership and governance of NHS trusts and foundation trusts can be improved, how this 
might enable better management of organisations, better staff engagement, and hence safer 
and higher quality care. 
In 2014, the Department of Health issued a strategic research initiative on policy responses to 
the second Francis Inquiry Report, calling for proposals for a suite of studies to assess the 
impacts of new policies following the publication of the report in 2013. The projects 
commissioned include: (1) building a culture of openness in healthcare, (2) implementation 
and costs of policies for safe staffing in acute hospitals, (3) evaluation of patient safety 
collaboratives, (4) the effects of the CQC inspection and rating system on provider 
performance and (5) this one on board level leadership changes in acute hospitals. In relation 
to this last one, the Department of Health stated the importance of understanding if the 
increased focus on board responsibility and capability in the NHS, and the introduction of the 
Fit and Proper Persons Requirement for board level appointments, have worked to drive 
improvements in NHS leadership and the quality of care.  
In his public inquiry report, Robert Francis QC made it clear that the board of Stafford 
Hospital was primarily responsible for the failure of leadership that enabled poor standards of 
care to go unnoticed and unaddressed for so long. The Department of Health, in its response 
to the Francis Inquiry, emphasised the critical role of the board: ‘The leadership of an NHS 
provider organisation is the job of the board of that organisation’ (DH 2014a:76). The critical 
question faced by boards is how best to fulfil this role.  
A grant was awarded to a team led by the University of Manchester, also involving the 
University of Birmingham and the Nuffield Trust, for research that examines how hospital 
boards in England, in varying circumstances, have responded to the Francis Inquiry, and what 
they have done to improve  leadership, governance and culture. By identifying what boards 
have achieved in the pursuit of better management of their organisation, greater staff 
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engagement, safer and higher quality care, lessons will be drawn for use by policy makers, 
boards, patients, staff and the general public. A further aim is to contribute to theory about 
the characteristics of the effective healthcare board where there exist gaps in our knowledge, 
particularly in relation to board purposes and dynamics. 
 
1.2 Research objectives 
It was not within the scope of this research to shine a light overall on hospital quality and 
performance. Our general approach has been to explore the main themes on healthcare board-
level leadership, which came out of Francis and the many overlapping reports that ensued, 
rather than to track and follow the impact of each separate report. The six research objectives 
and associated supporting questions are therefore: 
1. To identify the different ways in which the boards of NHS hospital trusts and 
foundation trusts have sought to implement the recommendations on 
organisational leadership set out in reports following the publication of the 
Francis public inquiry. What actions have been taken in areas such as the conduct 
and content of board meetings, staff engagement, board members’ engagement with 
frontline care and staff, and organisational and board development? 
2.  To find out which mechanisms used by boards of NHS trusts and foundation 
trusts have led to reported improvements (or otherwise) in local organisational 
strategies, structures and culture, and the factors underpinning such progress. 
How far do the mechanisms reported reflect NHS Healthy Board principles and 
practices?   What do trusts report as being the impact of mechanisms put in place? 
How are trusts implementing the Fit and Proper Person’s Requirements? 
3. To explore the early intended and unintended effects of the different ways in   
which NHS hospital trusts and foundation trusts have sought to improve board 
and organisational leadership in response to Hard Truths and the Healthy NHS 
Board. How are trusts monitoring the effects of mechanisms designed to improve 
organisational leadership? Do they have any evidence of change? How do they assure 
the quality of such data? 
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4. To examine the financial and non-financial costs of developing and implementing 
new policies, processes and actions aimed at improving board and organisational 
leadership. How are trusts keeping a record of the cost of board and organisational 
development activities? Are initiatives regarded as an investment or a cost? What are 
the plans to sustain such investments? 
5. To explore the enablers of and barriers to implementing different approaches to 
board and organisational leadership. What are the local organisational inhibitors 
and enablers? How do they experience the external NHS culture of performance 
management and regulation?  
6. To analyse and synthesise the findings from this research to inform a set of 
practical and evidence-based learning points for boards. 
 
1.3 The scope of the study 
In order to address the research questions, the study progressed through four linked stages. 
Chapter 3 provides more detail on the research methods employed. First, there was a scoping 
phase of interviews with opinion leaders from patient groups, national regulators and experts 
in board leadership. This was accompanied by an updated review of the literature about how 
boards of healthcare organisations, through effective leadership, can influence the safety, 
effectiveness and quality of patient care. A stakeholder workshop reviewed the outcome of 
this phase and informed the design of the second - an on-line survey questionnaire of all NHS 
hospital boards in England, to find out what they have done to respond to Francis Report 
recommendations about governance and leadership, and their views on impact.  
This broad national picture was deepened in phase three through extensive field work in six 
case study hospitals. Interviews and focus group discussions were carried out with patient, 
staff and board representatives, and a survey undertaken of ward and departmental managers. 
A sample of board, governors and subcommittee meetings were observed and additional 
documentary analysis undertaken. 
The final phase, outlined in chapter 7, is the synthesis of the main findings across the 
different areas of investigation. 
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1.4 The structure of this report 
The study consists of four linked work packages, as described above, and the structure of this 
report mirrors these. Chapter 2 offers a resume of the background and the changing policy 
context for NHS leadership in acute hospitals, particularly in the years since 2013. Chapter 3 
outlines the methods chosen for answering our research questions, including our assessment 
of the strengths and limitations of the approach that we took. Chapter 4 summarises findings 
from our updated literature review and accounts of opinion leaders and stakeholders solicited 
in 2015 and 2016 (work package 1). Chapter 5 describes the results of our national survey of 
NHS board members undertaken in the spring of 2016 (work package 2). Chapter 6 outlines 
the findings from our in depth six case studies, for which fieldwork took place over a period 
of 12 months starting in spring 2016 (work package 3). Chapter 7 moves to an exploration, 
synthesis and discussion of the main themes that have emerged from our different areas of 
investigation, including development of theory about the dynamics of the effective healthcare 
board (work package 4). Finally, chapter 8 discusses the implications for policy, practice and 
recommendations for further research. 
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2 Background and policy context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the background to the publication of the 2013 Francis Report, and the 
subsequent policy developments. It also maps out the current broad policy and financial 
context within which acute hospital trusts, and the wider health and care sector, are operating. 
This chapter is divided into five sections as follows:  
1) The 2010 Francis Report and other inquiries into Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust 
2) The 2013 Francis Report, including the main themes 
3) The government’s response, including changes to CQC Inspection methods and 
legislative requirements 
4) Changes since 2013 in the funding climate facing the NHS 
5) Relevant policy developments since 2014 
The overarching objective of this research project is to understand the impact of the 2013 
report on the leadership of acute trusts in England. As will become immediately apparent in 
this chapter, the 2013 Inquiry Report was not a single or isolated event, but was situated in a 
web of linked policies, reports, initiatives and subsequent legislation (tables 1 and 2 below). 
To a lesser extent, the same is true of the report into the first independent inquiry into Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, published in 2010, which was accompanied by related 
pieces of work that would have been influential on boards, for example the publication of 
‘The Healthy Board’ by the National Leadership Council.  
Just as the subject matter of this research cannot neatly be isolated, the context in which the 
trusts have been operating has been evolving rapidly between the publication of the Francis 
Report and the period in which the national survey and case study fieldwork for this research 
was conducted: between January 2016 and April 2017. This includes major changes in the 
regulatory landscape, with the implementation of the Health and Social Care Act (2012), but 
also the financial environment, as historically low increases in NHS funding (in the wake of 
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the 2008 financial crisis) have collided with growing demand and cost pressures that have 
accelerated since 2013.  
 
2.2 The road to 2013: the first Francis Report and other inquiries into Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Trust 
The failings in care between 2005 and 2009 at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust were subject 
to multiple reports and investigations. The first national report was conducted by the 
Healthcare Commission and published in 2009 (Healthcare-Commission 2009)(see table1), 
and the Secretary of State for Health also commissioned reviews by two senior clinicians into 
aspects of care at Mid Staffordshire, before ordering a full independent inquiry chaired by 
Robert Francis QC. This was formally known as the ‘Independent Inquiry into care provided 
by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust’ (Francis 2010) but is often referred to as the 
‘first Francis Report.’ It was published in 2010, and in the same year other related reports 
were published by the Department of Health and other national bodies, including a review of 
Early Warning Systems (NQB 2010), also with recommendations, alongside other reports 
into the regulation of senior managers and the principles for good board leadership, known as 
‘The Healthy Board’ (NHSLA 2013). This phenomenon of multiple, overlapping reports with 
recommendations and guidance that existed in 2010 is also characteristic of 2013.  
 
Table 1: Reports and policies associated with the ‘first’ Francis Report 
    
Title  Body Date Content 
Investigation into Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
(Healthcare-
Commission 2009) 
Healthcare 
Commission 
17th March 2009 172 page investigation 
and recommendations 
for the trust 
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Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation 
Trust: a review of the 
procedures for 
emergency admissions 
and treatment, and 
progress against the 
recommendation of  
the March Healthcare 
Commission Report 
(Albertini 2009) 
Department of Health  
(Led by Professor 
George Alberti) 
commissioned by SoS 
and Monitor  
Based on three visits 
and interviews with 
staff 
29th April 2009 22 pages including 23 
recommendations 
Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation 
Trust: a review of 
lessons learnt for 
commissioners and 
performance managers 
following the 
Healthcare 
Commission 
investigation 
(Thomé 2009) 
Department of Health  
(Led by Dr Colin 
Thome 
Investigation of the 
role of the local PCTs 
and SHA 
commissioned by SoS 
April 2009 34 pages including 
recommendations 
Independent Inquiry 
into care provided by 
Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Trust (First 
Francis Report) 
(Francis 2010) 
Department of Health  24th February 2010 Two volumes: report 
and evidence (vol 2) 
18 recommendations  
Review of Early 
Warning Systems in 
National Quality 
Board 
February 2010  
26 
 
    
the NHS 
(NQB 2010) 
Advisory Group on 
Assuring the Quality 
of Senior NHS 
Managers 
(DH 2010) 
DH commissioned, 
PwC research (led by 
Ian Dalton) 
23th February 2010 37  pages including 10 
recommendations  
The Healthy NHS 
Board 
(NHSLA 2013) 
National Leadership 
Council (now NHS 
Improvement 
Academy 
First edition published 
in 2010, updated and 
republished in 2013 
54 pages of guidance 
on board functions, 
effective working and 
behaviours 
 
The 2010 Francis Inquiry: the ‘first Francis Report’ 
The 2010 Francis Inquiry received verbal and written testimony from 966 patients and 
members of the public and 82 members of staff. The evidence, much of it harrowing, was 
published alongside the final report, which contained 18 recommendations. Although the 
remit of this inquiry was confined to understanding the causes behind the events that took 
place inside Mid Staffordshire itself, it was written with a wider NHS readership in mind, 
particularly members of boards. In his introduction to the 2010 report, Robert Francis wrote: 
‘I suggest that the board of any trust could benefit from reflecting on their own work in the 
light of what is described in my report’ (Francis 2010: 3). 
The inquiry report gave an account of what went wrong inside the trust between 2005 and 
2009, and offered a diagnosis of the causes. The main findings are summarised below in box 
1. A primary finding was that the culture of the hospital had been allowed to evolve in a 
negative way, allowing instances of poor care, stifling efforts by staff and patients to report 
failures and undermining (or preventing) the leadership of the trust from perceiving the 
problems or taking action to correct them.  
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2.3 The 2013 Francis Inquiry Report 
The 2010 report flagged, but was not able to investigate, the failings beyond the trust itself, 
namely the role played by regulatory bodies, commissioners and the wider management 
system, locally and nationally. Four months after it was published, in June 2010, the 
incoming Coalition Government ordered a full public inquiry, under the remit of the Inquiries 
Act (2005), also chaired by Robert Francis QC. This second inquiry had a specific remit to 
examine this wider context, including: 
the operation of the commissioning, supervisory and regulatory organisations and 
other agencies, including the culture and systems of those organisations in relation to 
their monitoring role at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust between January 
2005 and March 2009 and to examine why problems at the Trust were not identified 
sooner; and appropriate action taken. (Francis 2013a: 16)  
Box 1: Main findings of 2010 Francis Inquiry on underlying 
causes of care failings 
• Inadequate numbers of staff and limited or no board oversight of 
staffing levels 
• Uncaring staff 
• Poor record keeping e.g. serious incidents, complaints not properly 
handled 
• ‘Forceful style of management’/bullying 
• Overly strong board focus on meeting targets 
• Disengaged consultant body 
• Lack of openness at board level [business conducted in private] 
• Overreliance on external assessment vs internal assurance 
• Dominance of finance at board level 
• Inexperienced NEDs 
• Board too distant from operational detail 
• Board overly focused on process not outcomes 
• Lack of public engagement 
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The inquiry sat for just over a year, and took witness statements and evidence, both oral and 
written, which were put into the public domain. The ‘Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry’ was published on 5th February, 2013. The three-volume 
report set out an analysis of what went wrong across all these bodies, and contained 290 
recommendations aimed at changing culture and practice at the Department of Health, the 
Care Quality Commission (CQC), Monitor, the General Medical Council (GMC) and the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC), in addition to local patient and public scrutiny 
organisations. 
Many of the recommendations also applied to boards of acute hospitals and to all those 
working in organisations providing services to patients. The executive summary of the report 
noted that the inquiry team received requests from ‘distressed members of the public’ about 
failings in other trusts, which were beyond the remit of the inquiry to investigate. 
 
Main themes in the 2013 Francis Report for acute trusts 
In his press statement at the release of the Francis Report, Robert Francis QC identified five 
main themes on which all NHS organisations needed to take action, namely: 
• Fundamental standards 
• Openness, transparency and candour 
• Nursing standards 
• Patient-centred leadership 
• Information (Francis 2013b)  
The next sections provide an overview of the recommendations that applied to the behaviour 
and action of those leading trusts. 
 
Fundamental standards 
The report found that quality standards that existed at the time of the Mid Staffordshire 
failure were confused, both in their objectives and their enforcement through regulation. 
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Many of the recommendations aimed to improve the quality of the standards themselves. 
Responsibility for developing and enforcing the recommended fundamental standards lay 
with national bodies rather than acute trusts; however, the report recommended that staff 
inside trusts should be willing to contribute to the development of such standards and comply 
with them (recommendation 11). Managers should insist that staff report failures and give 
feedback to staff in relation to any reports they make (recommendation 12). 
The Francis Report recommended that trust boards should also publish comprehensive 
reports about their organisation’s compliance with standards, including information about 
failures as well as successes (recommendation 37). In addition, foundation trusts should 
consider how to enable councils of governors to assist in the process of maintaining standards 
(recommendations 75 and 76). 
Recommendations 109–122 related to better handling of, and response to, complaints. Trusts 
should ensure that they respond to and learn from all complaints (regardless of whether they 
are subject to formal investigations). External bodies, such as commissioners, should also 
have access to detailed and timely information about complaints. Patients and families should 
have clear and multiple channels to both comment and complain during and after treatment. 
 
Openness, transparency and candour 
The Francis Report concluded that many of the failings in care in Mid Staffordshire were the 
culmination of a leadership culture within the trust that ‘lacked insight and awareness of the 
reality of the care being provided to patients. It was generally defensive in its reaction to 
criticism and lacked openness with patients, the public and external agencies’ (Francis 2013c) 
This lack of openness also characterised the conduct of some of the national managerial and 
regulatory bodies. 
Some of the recommendations under this theme required legislation or action at a national 
level (see below), notably the recommended statutory Duty of Candour on providers. 
Nevertheless, there was a general recommendation that every organisation, and everyone 
working in them, should be honest and open in their dealings with patients (recommendation 
173). Where a serious incident occurred, patients and their families should be given full and 
truthful answers to questions, as should regulators and commissioners (recommendations 
174–176). 
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Nursing standards 
The Francis Report identified low standards of nursing in Mid Staffordshire, including poor 
leadership and inadequate recruitment and training (Francis 2013c: 45). Recommendations 
included: 
• Employers assessing potential nursing staff values and attitudes towards patients 
• Better performance management of nursing staff – including patients’ assessment of 
nurses’ caring values 
• Ward managers being more hands-on and available to patients and staff, rather than 
office-bound 
• The development and use of measurements of the cultural health of the nursing 
workforce 
• A named ‘key nurse’ to coordinate care for patients 
The inquiry findings also drew attention to the impact of cuts to nursing staff in Mid 
Staffordshire, but the recommendations in the report itself avoided the development of 
minimum patient-to-staff ratios, instead recommending that the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) draw up evidence-based tools to establish minimum staffing 
levels for nursing and other clinicians (recommendation 23). 
 
Patient-centred leadership 
The Francis Report illuminated the role of poor-quality leadership, both within Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust and beyond. These leaders were focussed on the wrong 
objectives at the expense of patient care, isolated and inclined to ‘self-promotion rather than 
critical analysis and openness’ (Francis 2013c: 44). The report recommended the 
development of a code of practice and training for leaders, including those managing health 
care organisations. While the development of such codes, along with the recommended 
procedures for getting rid of those leaders who are not ‘fit’ for practise, lay outside the 
control of hospitals, many of the more general recommendations applied to values for all 
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those in leadership roles (executive and non-executive directors, and clinical directors and 
senior nurse managers) within hospital trusts. For example, all individuals working in the 
NHS should adhere to the values set out in the NHS Constitution, namely that ‘the overriding 
value should be that patients are put first’ (recommendation 4). 
 
Information 
The main recommendations that applied to provider organisations under this theme relate to 
having proper systems in place for the collection of real-time and accurate information about 
the performance of their services against the standards required, including at consultant and 
specialist team levels, and that this information should be made available to commissioners, 
regulators and the wider public, as appropriate. 
 
2.4 The government response to the 2013 Francis Inquiry Report 
In March 2013, the government published an initial response to the Francis Report, ‘Patients 
First and Foremost’ (DH 2013). It set out some immediate measures, for example adopting a 
rating scheme for health care providers (including hospitals) and setting up a chief inspector 
of hospitals and for other kinds of providers. At this point the government did not specify a 
list of actions that it expected hospital trusts to take, but the Secretary of State for Health 
wrote to the chairs of hospital boards asking them ‘to hold events where they listen to the 
views of their staff about how we safeguard the core values of compassion as the NHS gets 
ever busier’ (DH 2013: 6). The government also requested that trusts feed back on the 
outcomes of these listening events by the end of 2013 (Hunt 2013). 
A more comprehensive response, entitled ‘Hard Truths: The journey to putting patients first’, 
was published in November 2013. This was a huge, two volume document. The first volume 
(which ran to 137 pages) contained a summary of multiple government existing and future 
initiatives and local case studies that related to the broad themes of the Francis Report. The 
second volume, 250 pages long, contained a detailed response to each of the 290 
recommendations in the report, setting out the actions that the government would take in 
response to many (but not all) of the recommendations. These included:  
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  Requiring trusts to publish ward staffing levels monthly 
 Requiring trusts to publish complaints data quarterly  
  Legislation to create a Duty of Candour for providers and the development of a 
criminal charge of wilful neglect in the future (DH 2014a) (DH 2014b) 
The foreword to ‘Hard Truths’, written by Jeremy Hunt, the Secretary of State, encapsulates 
the tensions at the heart of the government’s response to the Francis Report. On the one hand, 
Hunt pays tribute to the dedication of staff and the importance of an open, learning culture, 
but on the other lays out the reality of much tougher inspection and more vigilance on the 
part of ‘the system’: ‘(W)hen things really go wrong, or on the rare occasions when leaders 
and Boards fail to show the integrity we all expect, the response will be to enable failing 
hospitals to be turned around and puts in place proper accountability, and, when necessary, 
criminal sanctions’ (DH 2014a: 3). 
The next sections set out the main contours of this ‘proper accountability,’ namely the 
tightened inspection regime, special measures, and the legislative outputs from Francis, 
namely the Duty of Candour and the Fit and Proper Person’s Test. 
             
Impact of Francis on the CQC: Inspection and enforcement 
In its own words, the CQC described the changes it had made to the inspection regime as 
‘radical’  in the wake of the Francis Report and the government’s ‘Hard Truths’ Report (CQC 
2015a). Central to these changes was the appointment of a chief inspector of hospitals, and a 
new inspection regime, which began in October 2013 and was completed for all acute 
hospital trusts by March 2016 (CQC 2016a). (All the case study trusts in our research had, 
therefore, experienced this new regulation regime). The new regime involved larger teams, 
with greater clinical and managerial expertise, as well as more extensive use of monitoring 
data. Trusts are now inspected across five domains: safety, effectiveness, caring, responsive 
and well led. The CQC now combines and publishes ratings with four performance levels: 
Outstanding, Good, Requires Improvement and Inadequate. 
According to the CQC’s handbook for providers, an inspection will involve a team of up to 
fifty people visiting the trust for between two and four days, collecting detailed information 
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from patients, staff, local members of the public, trade unions, local commissioning groups 
and local authorities (CQC 2015b).   
 
Well-Led 
Since 2014, the leadership of trusts have been assessed by the CQC according to five ‘key 
lines of enquiry’ on how well they are led. The Well-Led domain is defined by the CQC as 
‘(how well) the leadership, management and governance of the organisation assures the 
delivery of high-quality person-centred care, supports learning and innovation, and promotes 
an open and fair culture’ (CQC 2016b). At the time of writing, the CQC were revising the 
key lines of enquiry on the Well-Led (as well as the other domains) partly to bring 
themselves into alignment with the other regulatory bodies (formerly Monitor and the TDA, 
now NHS Improvement), which also assess the quality, financial performance and leadership 
of boards. The CQC’s current key lines of enquiry are summarized in box 2 below, each 
accompanied by between five and 11 detailed ‘prompt’ questions for the inspectors to ask of 
leaders, staff, patients and others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special measures  
In 2017, the CQC published a summary of the inspections carried out under the new regime 
since 2013, 136 non-specialist trusts and 18 specialist trusts (CQC 2017a). The report gives 
details of the 28 trusts that were put into special measures since 2013/14, including the 11 
Box 2: Key Lines of Enquiry for the Well-Led Domain CQC (CQC2017a)  
 Is there a clear vision and a credible strategy to deliver good quality? 
 Does the governance framework ensure that responsibilities are clear and that quality, 
performance and risks are understood and managed? 
 How does the leadership and culture reflect the vision and values, encourage openness 
and transparency and promote good quality care?   
 How are people who use the service, the public and staff engaged and involved? 
 How are services continuously improved and sustainability ensured? 
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identified by the Keogh Review in 2013 (table 2). According to the CQC, special measures 
are applied when a trust has been found to have serious failings in at least two of the five 
domains and ‘where there are concerns that existing management cannot make the necessary 
improvements without support’ (CQC 2017a: 97). 
The CQC recommends to NHS Improvement that a trust should be placed in special 
measures, triggering a process which includes the appointment of an improvement director 
and partnering organisation, and a review of the capability of the trust’s leadership. This 
review might include ‘changes to the management of the organisation to make sure that the 
board and executive team can make the required improvements’ (Monitor 2015: 5).  
Trusts have to report progress against the action plan every month, and are removed from 
special measures when re-inspection by the CQC of all, or targeted parts of the trusts’ 
activities have demonstrated improvement. According to the CQC, of the 28 trusts placed in 
special measures in the three years since 2014, 15 had exited, while 13 were still in special 
measures as of January 2017. The placing of a trust is special measures is done publicly, and 
covered by the local media. In 2017, in its review of acute trusts the CQC acknowledged that 
the imposition of special measures can affect the reputation of trusts, including its capacity to 
attract senior staff, but also states that existing staff were often ‘glad that the extent of the 
problems they face has now been recognised’ (CQC 2017a: 97).  
 
Duty of Candour 
Recommendation 181, for a statutory Duty of Candour for providers, became law on April 
1st 2015. The requirements of the Duty of Candour are contained in Regulation 20 (under the 
Health and Social Care Act, (2008)). Regulation 20 sets out the procedure to be followed by 
health care providers where any ‘unintended or unexpected’ incident had occurred which did, 
or could, have resulted in death, or severe harm, moderate harm or prolonged psychological 
harm to the service user, in the ‘reasonable opinion of a healthcare professional’ (CQC 
2017b). The Care Quality Commission, which assesses providers on the Duty of Candour, 
issued guidance in March 2015 which gave examples of the kind of incidents might require 
action (for example an unexpected death during surgery or injuries from treatment even when 
the patient recovers) and what sort of response would illustrate that the Duty of Candour had 
been complied with, including offering an apology and making sure everything was properly 
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documented (CQC 2015c). A core principle explained in this guidance was that hospitals 
(and other providers) needed to be open when things went wrong, and learn from mistakes, 
underpinned by a culture of openness and transparency at all levels and that there should be a 
‘commitment to being open and transparent at board level (CQC 2015c: 8). 
 
Fit and Proper Person Test 
From April 1
st
 2015, all providers of care registered with the CQC were subject to a new 
regulation (5), which put a requirement on the chair of an NHS body to ensure that all 
directors are fit to hold their positions. The CQC’s guidance (CQC 2015d) explains that this 
goes beyond the standard requirements of ‘good character, health, qualifications, skills and 
experience’, but also means preventing individuals from holding office who: ‘have been 
responsible for, been privy to, contributed to or facilitated any serious misconduct or 
mismanagement (whether unlawful or not) in the course of carrying on a regulated activity, 
or providing a service elsewhere which, if provided in England, would be a regulated 
activity’. The guidance goes on to explain that providers must ensure they have processes and 
policies in place to comply with the regulation, and ‘(m)ake every reasonable effort to assure 
itself about an individual by all means available’ (CQC 2015d: 10)    
 
Parallel initiatives to improve quality and safety of care 
The first government response to the Francis Inquiry Report, ‘Patients First and Foremost’ 
(DH 2013), contained a summary of the initiatives either underway or planned, illustrating 
just how numerous the initiatives relating to improving quality of care and the patient 
experience had become. The document referred to six new or concurrent reviews on: patient 
safety; quality and safety in 14 hospital trusts with persistently high mortality rates; health 
care assistants; the handling of complaints; the development of hospital ratings; and the 
burden of NHS bureaucracy, as summarised in table 2. These follow other initiatives that pre-
date the Francis Report, including the creation of Quality Surveillance Groups, and 
Compassion in Practice – a review of caring and compassion for nurses and other care staff 
led by the chief nursing officer. 
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Table 2: Initiatives and reviews relating to the quality of hospital care 2012/13 and the 
second Francis Report 
Title  Date Body Content 
Patients First and 
Foremost: The Initial 
Government Response 
to the Report of Mid 
Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Public Inquiry 
March 2013 Department of 
Health 
Statement of common 
purpose, and call to action 
for every part of the system 
to learn the lessons and act 
on them 
Review into the Quality 
of  Care and Treatment 
provided by 14 
Hospital Trusts in 
England, led by 
Professor Sir Bruce 
Keogh    
(Keogh 2013) 
16
th
 July 
2013 
Department of 
Health/NHS 
England  
8 ‘Ambitions’ with 23 
‘Actions’ aimed at 
government and members of 
trust boards    
The Cavendish 
Review: An 
Independent Review 
into Healthcare 
Assistants and Support 
Workers in the NHS 
and Social Care 
Settings 
(Cavendish 2013) 
July 2013 Commissioned by 
the Department of 
Health  
18 Recommendations aimed 
at national bodies and Trusts 
(e.g. Nursing Directors) 
A Promise to Learn- A 
Commitment to Act: 
Improving the Safety of 
Patients in England  
(NAG 2013) 
6
th
 August 
2013 
Led by Professor 
Don Berwick, 
commissioned by 
the Department of 
Health  
10 Recommendations, 
aimed at government, NHS 
provider organisations and 
all healthcare professionals  
A Review of the NHS 28
th
 October Led by Rt Hon 40 Recommendations, 16 of 
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Hospitals Complaints 
System: Putting 
Patients Back in the 
Picture   
(Clwyd and Hart 2013) 
2013 Ann Clwyd MP 
and Professor 
Tricia Hart, 
commissioned by 
the Department of 
Health    
which were aimed at Trusts 
specifically 
Challenging 
Bureaucracy  
(NHS-Confederation 
2013) 
15
th
 
November 
2013 
NHS 
Confederation, 
commissioned by 
the Department of 
Health  
30 Recommendations aimed 
at national bodies  
More recent reports and inquiries  
Report of The 
Morecambe Bay 
Investigation   
(An independent 
investigation into the 
management, delivery 
and outcomes of care 
provided by the 
maternity and neonatal 
services at the 
University Hospitals of 
Morecambe Bay NHS 
Foundation Trust from 
January 2004 to June 
2013) 
(Kirkup 2015) 
3
rd
 March 
2015 
Independent 
Inquiry set up by 
Secretary of State 
and chaired by 
Bill Kirkup CBE 
18 Recommendations aimed 
at the Trust Board, and a 
further 25 aimed at ‘the 
wider NHS’ 
Freedom to Speak Up: 
An independent review 
into creating an open 
and honest reporting 
culture in the NHS  
11
th
 
February 
2015 
Sir Robert 
Francis QC, 
commissioned by 
the Secretary of 
State for Health   
20 ‘Actions’ aimed at a 
range of bodies, including 
NHS Trusts   
38 
 
(Francis 2015) 
 
The initiatives set out above are only a limited selection. A recent review of the policy 
developments relating to quality across the NHS as a whole identified 179 separate quality-
related initiatives announced by government between June 2011 and December 2015, the 
equivalent of one a week (Molloy et al. 2016). As the table above shows, many of the post-
Francis Report publications contained recommendations, some of which were aimed directly 
at boards.  The Keogh review, for example, (Keogh 2013), contained many actions for board 
members, including putting early warning systems in place to identify patients at risk of 
deterioration, ensuring that they had staff in place to collect and analyse data on quality, and 
actively releasing staff across trusts to work on quality improvement. There were also 
differences in the tone of some of these reports, for example the independent Berwick review 
into patient safety, in contrast to the government’s language of vigilance and inspection, 
emphasised the importance of a blame-free culture: ‘culture will trump rules, standards and 
control strategies every single time, and achieving a vastly safer NHS will depend far more 
on major cultural change than on a new regulatory regime’ (NAG 2013: 11). 
 
 The Healthy NHS Board 
Many of the issues touched on in the reports referred to above, namely how the leaders of 
hospitals should ensure quality and make sure that patients and staff are effectively engaged, 
were also summarized in The Healthy Board guidance, which was updated and republished in 
2013 (NHSLA 2013), aimed at existing and aspiring board members of NHS provider trusts. 
The original guidance was published in 2010, accompanied by a literature review (Ramsay et 
al. 2010) that summarized evidence from both health and non-health theory and practice 
relating to board governance. The 2013 publication does not recommend any particular 
theoretical approach to board governance (see p 41 table 3), but instead identifies three key 
roles and three building blocks for effective boards. The three key roles are: formulating 
strategy, ensuring accountability, and shaping a health culture. In terms of the building 
blocks, effective boards will need to be cognizant of the external context, informed by 
intelligence and give priority to engagement within and beyond the organization. The Healthy 
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NHS Board contains detailed advice for boards in how to go about these functions, including 
what sort of committees might be appropriate, and the timing and content of board papers.   
 
2.5 Changes in the financial context facing acute trusts since 2013 
At the same time as the multiple reports and initiatives were being developed and announced 
in the wake of both Francis Inquiry Reports, there has been a substantial change to the 
financial environment facing the NHS, which has had a particularly profound impact on 
hospital trusts. Following the financial crisis of 2008/9, the UK government has pursued a 
policy of restricting public spending in order to reduce the public sector deficit. Although the 
funding made available for the NHS has been protected relative to other government 
departments since 2010 - rising at an average rate of 1% between 2009/2010 and 2015/2016 - 
demand for health care and the cost of providing it (particularly the cost of drugs and staff) 
has risen much faster than funding growth over the same period. In 2015/16, for example, the 
cost to trusts of providing hospital services rose by 3.2%, whereas their income grew by only 
1.1% (Lafond et al. 2017).  
This financial pressure on trust income has been a deliberate policy. About 60% of NHS 
hospital trusts’ income is paid through the national tariff. Each year, the tariff is adjusted 
upwards for to take account of rising drug, staff and other input costs, but has then had an 
efficiency factor added in, which makes assumptions about the efficiencies that hospitals can 
make to bring their costs down. Between 2011/12 and 2014/15 the efficiency factor was set at 
4%, higher than the uplift to the tariff. Although the efficiency factor was eased to 3.5% in 
2015/16, it has meant that payments to hospitals for this part of their activity has fallen in 
cash terms for four consecutive years (Lafond et al. 2017). Non-tariff and block contracts 
have also been subject to the efficiency factor. 
This gap between costs and income has been evident in the growing deficits of hospital 
providers since 2012/13.  
In 2013/14, trusts and foundation trusts reported a deficit of £91 million after delivering a 
surplus of £592m the year before. In 2014/15, the deficit increased to £859m, and in 2015/16, 
it more than doubled to £2.5 billion. In 2015/16 financial distress had spread across many 
different kinds of organisations, with 88% of acute trusts in deficit, and 50% of specialist 
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trusts also in the red (NAO 2016). Forecasts for this year (2016/17) are of a deficit of 
between £644 million and £873 million (Lafond et al. 2017) (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: NHS trusts in net surplus/deficit
 
 
At the same time as financial performance deteriorated, so has performance against key 
access targets, notably the four hour A&E target, the 18 week target from referral to 
treatment for non-urgent treatment and ambulance response times. According to the National 
Audit Office, in 2012/13, 95.9% of trusts were meeting the four hour A&E standard, but by 
q1 in 2106/17, this had dropped to 90.3% of trusts. Similarly, in 2012/13, 94.1% of trusts 
were treating patients within 18 weeks, but by q1 2016/17, 91% were compliant (NAO 2016).  
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2.6 Changes in the policy landscape since 2013  
When the Francis Report was published in February 2013, the NHS was making its final 
preparations to implement the structural changes contained in the Health and Social Care Act 
(2012). These included the creation of over 200 clinical commissioning groups, which 
formally began their duties in April 2013, overseen by a new arm’s length body, NHS 
England. While the biggest organisational changes took place beyond the walls of NHS 
hospital trusts, the hospital sector was not insulated from change. A new body, the Trust 
Development Authority, was created to oversee the performance of non- Foundation Trusts, 
while Monitor kept oversight of foundation trusts, at the same time as having its own 
mandate expanded. Both bodies had oversight of financial performance of their respective 
trusts, but also saw their role in monitoring quality and performance alongside the CQC and 
the local clinical commissioning groups. They were merged in 2015 to become NHS 
Improvement.  
 
2.7 The Five Year Forward View and STPs 
In October 2014, NHS England, in collaboration with other arms-length bodies including 
NHS Improvement, published the Five Year Forward View (DH 2014b), which set out the 
challenges facing the NHS and plans to address these over the next five years. At the heart of 
the Five Year Forward View were new models of care, which were to receive funding and 
support to trial new ways of delivering care. These included ‘acute care collaboratives’ 
(groups of hospitals working together) and Primary and Acute Care Systems, where acute 
trusts built closer collaborations with community services, including GP services.  
The Five Year Forward View, published on the cusp of the deteriorating financial situation in 
the NHS, also quantified the gap between available resources and future cost pressures, as 
equivalent to £30billion by 2020-21 (DH 2014b). Although the document speculated that 
efficiencies of up to 3% a year were theoretically possible (by holding down staff wages and 
forcing hospital trusts to cut costs using the national tariff), the implication was clear that the 
sort of transformation needed for the NHS would require additional funds. 
In November 2015, the government committed £8 billion in extra funding to the NHS. In 
December 2015, NHS England and NHS Improvement broadened the scope of NHS reform 
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plans beyond new models of care by publishing planning guidance that required all NHS 
providers, commissioners and local authorities to collaborate across 44 local areas in drawing 
up ‘Sustainability and Transformation Plans’ (DH 2015). These plans had to include how 
local areas intended to return to ‘aggregate financial balance’ (DH 2015: 8). For hospital 
providers, this meant accelerating efficiency savings set out in the Carter Review (Carter 
2016), but also being transparent about their costs with their local partners, and, in some 
areas, planning potentially radical changes to service provision.  
Sustainability and Transformation Programme (STP) funding was available to help local 
areas, but further guidance released in September 2016 made this funding contingent on STPs 
and the organisations within them, meeting a financial ‘control total’(NHS-England 2016). 
This guidance made clear that individual organisations, including hospital trusts, would still 
be held to account for meeting their performance and financial targets, including caps on 
spending on agency staff, which NHS Improvement imposed on all acute trusts from April 
1st 2016 (NHS-Improvement 2016).  
The STP planning process has been criticized on several levels, including a lack of public 
transparency, overoptimistic assumptions about the scale of investment needed and the 
degree to which demand for services can be moderated (Walshe 2017). From a trust 
perspective, the STP process contains some contradictory messaging from government. On 
the one hand, there has been a strong emphasis on the importance of collaboration, as the 
NHS England guidance makes clear: ‘(w)hat makes most sense for patients, communities and 
the taxpayer should always trump the narrower interests of individual organisations’ (ref 17 
below p 4). And yet the legal position for trust board members remained unaltered: 
‘accountability for delivery will sit with individual organisations’ (Walshe 2017: 17). 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
The Francis Report identified serious dysfunctional deficiencies in the NHS and, at its heart, 
recommended fundamental culture change: ‘Aspects of a negative culture have emerged at all 
levels of the NHS system. These include: a lack of consideration of risks to patients, 
defensiveness, looking inwards not outwards, secrecy, misplaced assumptions of trust, 
acceptance of poor standards and, above all, a failure to put the patient first in everything 
done’ (Francis 2013a: 1357). Indeed, the Francis Inquiry, like the Kennedy Inquiry into 
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failings at Bristol Royal Infirmary a decade earlier, went to considerable trouble to 
understand the role of culture in a health care context. Some commentators noted that the 
subtlety of some of the supporting evidence to the inquiry was not matched by the same 
degree of nuance in the inquiry’s recommendations, which could be viewed as somewhat 
aspirational and over optimistic about the feasibility of enacting purposeful culture change 
(Davies and Mannion 2013). 
The multi-pronged response by government to the Inquiry Report and recommendations are 
likely to have further complicated this, from the perspective of trust boards.  NHS boards are 
odd creatures of corporate governance – even Foundation Trusts are not autonomous – the 
government role of central control is very powerful and this has also arguably got tighter over 
recent years. Trusts were required to comply with new legislative duties, such as the Duty of 
Candour, at the same time as getting to grips with new, fledgling commissioning bodies, and 
a revamped care quality inspection process. The deteriorating finances of the NHS have also 
played into this turbulence, resulting in the majority of NHS acute hospital trusts boards 
being required to look for challenging efficiencies and savings each year since the Francis 
Report was published, at the same time as public expectations have increased and demand for 
services has grown.  
 
3  Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methods used to carry out this study. Given the intrinsic complexity 
of any relationships between board governance, organisational behaviour and care outcomes, 
we adopted a multi-method approach, integrating qualitative and quantitative elements to 
examine these relationships in both breadth and depth. We begin by outlining the chosen 
theoretical framework underpinning the study and then proceed to describe the research 
design and the content of the four work packages. Finally we refer to patient and public 
involvement in the study and research governance arrangements. 
 
3.1 Theoretical overview 
The theoretical framework for this research is based on a realist interpretation of the 
composition, focus and dynamics of effective healthcare boards. A realist angle builds on the 
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growing acknowledgement of the importance of contextual factors in board governance (see 
for example Bammens et al. (2011)). A realist approach emphasises the contingent nature of 
the evidence, and the notion that change is generated internally by stakeholders in conducive 
circumstances (Pawson and Tilley 1997). It addresses questions about what works in which 
settings, for whom, in what circumstances, how and why (Wong et al. 2014).  
There exist conflicting and competing theories that explain the purpose and function of 
boards. In research which critiques the assumptions behind agency, stewardship and resource 
dependency theories, Nicholson and Kiel (2007) found that while each theory can explain a 
specific case, no single theory explains any general link with organisation performance.  
Within empirical literature, boards have been characterised as having potential to influence 
strategy and performance that is highly contingent on contextual variables and the mobilising 
will and skill of board members (Ferlie et al. 1994, McNulty and Pettigrew 1999, Stiles 
2001). Our proposed research seeks to identify the structure, functions and behaviours of 
boards in relation to effective organisational leadership and shaping organisational culture. 
Choosing appropriate mechanisms for this appears to be important according to the particular 
context faced by a board (Chambers et al. 2013). Accordingly, we propose using an adapted 
version of a realist interpretation framework for boards
 
(ibid) to inform the research design. 
This examines five different combinations within boards of:  
 Contextual assumptions (for example external environment conditions, levels of trust, 
appetite for risk) 
 Mechanisms used by boards (for example instruments for monitoring and control, 
focus on partnership working) 
 Intended outcomes (for example minimisation of risk, increasing rate of innovation, 
long-term added value) 
The framework (table 3) acknowledges that alternative theoretical standpoints offer ways 
forward in particular circumstances, and depending upon what purpose and outcomes boards 
are most desirous of achieving.  
We have focussed on the five main theories of boards relating to agency, stewardship, 
resource dependency, stakeholder and power.  Other theories, for example public 
accountability theory, board legitimacy and dramaturgy of boards, all have merit and 
relevance, particularly in the health care context. The enactment of democratic accountability 
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and the performativity of boards post-Francis play an important part, as we shall see. Our 
view, nevertheless, is that these can be seen as derived, at least in part, from these five classic 
theories in understanding how boards lead change and improvement. 
This is highlighted in the table below in relation to healthcare boards. This also now leads us 
to the proposition that boards do have real choices in relation to composition, processes, 
focus and behaviours.   
 
Table 3: Guiding theoretical framework 
Using a realist perspective for effective healthcare boards with the main board 
theoretical purpose driving the dynamics (from Chambers et al. (2013)) 
Theory Contextual 
Assumptions 
Mechanism Intended Outcome 
Agency Low trust and high 
challengeand low 
appetite for risk 
Control through 
intense internal and 
external regulatory 
performance 
monitoring 
Minimisation of risk 
and good patient safety 
record 
Stewardship High trust and less 
challenge and greater 
appetite for risk 
Broad support in a 
collective leadership 
endeavour 
Service improvement 
and excellence in 
performance 
Resource 
dependency 
Importance of social 
capital of the 
organisation 
Boundary spanning 
and close dialogue 
with healthcare 
partners 
Improved reputation 
and relationships 
Stakeholder Importance of 
representation and 
collective effort; risk is 
shared by many 
Collaboration Sustainable 
organisation, high 
levels of staff 
engagement 
Board power Human desire for 
control 
Use of power 
differentials 
Equilibrium 
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3.2 Research design 
Given the intrinsic complexity of any relationships between board governance, organisational 
behaviour and care outcomes, and the importance of triangulation and completeness (see 
Robson 2011:167) we chose a mixed method approach, integrating qualitative and 
quantitative elements to examine these relationships in both breadth and depth. This is 
described briefly below and the linked work packages are described in more detail in 
following sections. 
To ensure that the study is grounded in the latest empirical work and current policy 
developments, we undertook a scoping study (work package 1). To capture the breadth of 
any associations between board actions taken in response to the Francis Inquiry and care 
quality, we conducted a national survey exploring actions taken by hospitals in response to 
recommendations in reports following Francis and other policy guidance on board 
governance and organisational leadership (work package 2). To contribute depth, we used 
comparative case study methods and qualitative approaches to explore the detailed 
implementation and effects of boards’ actions following the Francis Inquiry Report in six 
hospital trusts (work package 3). This included a survey of ward and department managers 
in the case study trusts. The findings of the three work packages were analysed separately and 
then synthesised into a set of practical and evidence-based learning points for boards, 
focussed on how improved leadership and governance can enable safer and higher quality 
care (work package 4) (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Research design - work packages 1 to 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our approach, and its connection to the research objectives, is set out in table 4: 
Table 4: Research objectives and approaches used 
Research objective Methods to be used 
1. To identify, describe and assess the 
different ways in which the boards of NHS 
hospital trusts and foundation trusts have 
sought to implement the recommendations 
on organisational leadership set out in Hard 
Scoping interviews  
Update of literature review  
Scoping workshop 
National survey of NHS board 
members 
Work package 1:  
Literature review and 
stakeholder interviews 
(Autumn/Winter 2015) 
 
Work package 2:  
National survey of  
NHS board members  
(Spring 2016) 
Work package 3:  
Six case studies  
(Summer 2016 – Spring 2017) 
Work package 4:  
Analysis and synthesis  
(Spring/Summer 2017) 
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Truths and the Healthy NHS Board. 
2. To identify which mechanisms used by 
hospital boards have led to reported 
improvements (or otherwise) in local 
organisational strategies, structures and 
culture, and the factors underpinning such 
progress. 
 
National survey of NHS board 
members 
Case study interviews and 
documentary evidence 
Board observations 
Survey of ward and department 
managers 
3. To explore the  intended and unintended 
effects of the different ways in which NHS 
hospital trusts and foundation trusts have 
sought to improve board and organisational 
leadership in response to Hard Truths and 
the Healthy NHS Board. 
Case study interviews  and 
documentary evidence 
Board observations 
Survey of ward and department 
managers 
4. To examine the financial and non-financial 
costs of developing and implementing new 
policies, processes and actions aimed at 
improving board and organisational 
leadership. 
Case study interviews 
Survey of ward and department 
managers  
5. To explore the enablers of and barriers to 
implementing different approaches to board 
and organisational leadership. 
 
National survey of NHS board 
members 
Case study interviews 
Survey of ward and department 
managers  
6. To analyse and synthesise the findings from 
this research to inform a set of practical and 
evidence-based learning points for boards, 
focussed on how improved leadership and 
governance can enable safer and higher 
quality care. 
 
Within- and across-case data analysis 
Testing of site-specific analysis 
Stakeholder workshop 
Synthesis of work packages 1, 2 and 3 
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3.3 Work package 1: Scoping phase  
Scoping work involved 13 interviews (four by phone and nine face to face) with key 
individuals from national organisations representing patients, medical and nursing 
professions, healthcare regulators, policy think tanks and Department of Health leads on 
implementing the recommendations of the Francis Inquiry. Interviews focussed on research 
objectives 1 and 2, eliciting views on current concerns for boards, actions expected to have 
been taken as a result of the Francis Inquiry, the perceived and actual role of boards in 
overseeing and improving care quality and safety, the desirable characteristics of healthcare 
boards and the barriers to improving board-level leadership in the NHS (see appendix 1 for 
list of prompt questions that were used). The interviews were either recorded or extensive 
notes taken and thematically analysed and presented to the first stakeholder workshop held in 
November 2015. 
We updated reviews of literature on patient safety and board governance, and board 
governance and organisational performance undertaken recently (Chambers et al. 2013, 
Millar et al. 2013). This update, which is outlined in chapter 4, is structured around research 
objectives 1-5, and presented alongside the key themes that emerged in the scoping 
interviews. At the end of this phase, the research team and advisory group ran a workshop 
together with healthcare professionals, lay representatives, policy makers, patient 
organisations, board development experts and governance specialists at which we 
summarised our findings and tested out and refined the research approach, criteria for 
selection of the six case study sites and questions for work packages 2 and 3.  
 
3.4 Work package 2: National survey of NHS board members of general and 
specialist acute trusts in England 
The purpose of the survey was to gather data about the composition of boards and leadership 
changes made since the publication of the Francis Report in February 2013 (see appendix 2 
for Word version of the survey).  The survey aimed to gather mainly quantifiable data about: 
1. Specific actions to improve board and organisational leadership (e.g. new policies, 
processes) 
50 
 
2. Perceived impacts on intermediate outcomes (e.g. organisational strategies, structures, 
culture?) and on organisational performance 
3. Understandings of the connections between actions and impacts, including underlying 
mechanisms, barriers faced, and contextual influences corresponding to categories in 
the research framework 
The survey consisted mainly of multiple choice questions (with some scoring and Likert 
response format items), making it easy to complete and enabling statistical analysis of 
responses. We also included a small number of free text options for respondents to expand on 
key themes. 
We purchased contact details from Binley’s database and in spring 2016 conducted an online 
survey of chairs, CEOs, chief nurses, medical directors, directors of finance, non-executive 
directors and board secretaries (or corporate governance leads) of all the NHS hospital trusts 
and foundation trusts in England.  We had intended originally to survey chairs, CEOs and 
board secretaries only, but widened participation to include other roles following advice from 
our advisory group. 
Details of how we developed, tested and administered the survey questionnaire are provided 
in appendix 3. Multivariate analyses reported in chapter 5 (see also appendix 4) identify and 
compare differences in board activity and associations between actions and outcomes, 
informing the development of questions for the case studies. 
 
3.5 Work package 3: Case studies of hospital trusts and foundation trusts  
We used a comparative case-study design to generalise theoretically from within and between 
cases (Yin 1999). While each case has its own integrity in terms of theory building and 
generating policy implications, we developed common themes across sites using comparative 
case study methods and pattern matching (Eisenhardt 1989, Simons 2009). 
We purposively selected six case studies using criteria for maximising the range that were 
agreed at the stakeholder workshop convened to refine our research approach. These included 
geographical variation, a mix of larger teaching hospital and smaller district hospital trusts, 
single and multi-site,  greater or lesser stability of board membership, higher and lower 
performing organisations (as determined by the Care Quality Commission and Trust 
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Development Authority assessments), foundation and non-foundation trusts and at least one 
specialist acute trust. Obtaining support from trusts to participate was quite difficult: nine 
organisations turned us down; these included some high performing organisations and two 
specialist acute trusts. Reasons for declining the invitation to participate in the research 
included being distracted by an impending CQC inspection, turnover on the board and 
organisation turmoil. One did not respond to our request. By continuing to apply criteria for 
maximum variation, our final selection demonstrates reasonable spread, as follows: 
 Foundation trusts and 1 non-foundation trust 
 General acute hospitals and 1 specialist acute hospital 
 Number of beds: 190 – 1300 
 Single site: 3 Multi site: 3 CQC ratings at the time of selection: Requires 
Improvement (4) Good (1) Outstanding (1) (by the end of the case study period in 
May 2017, 2 of the trusts received a better rating: moving from Requires 
Improvement to Good) 
 2 in the North of England 
 2 in the Midlands 
 2 in the South of England 
Data collection methods for case study work included semi-structured interviews with 
executive and non-executive board members of trusts, commissioners, staff representatives, 
patient groups and the trust board secretary. A minimum of 12 interviews took place in each 
case study site, supplemented by two governors, patient and staff focus group discussions or a 
series of single depth interviews per site. See appendices 5 and 6 for copies of the individual 
interview and focus group topic guides. We also observed one public board meeting and one 
meeting of governors in each site and a number of board committees, using these to inform 
our understanding of local board and organisational dynamics. 
We undertook documentary analysis of board papers, trust annual plans and reports 
(including about staff engagement and development, patient and public involvement), 
materials related to board development activities, data on board and organisational 
development and quality accounts.  
In interviews and focus group discussions, we explored knowledge and views of board 
initiatives taken in response to the Francis Inquiry. These included assessments of the 
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relevance, usefulness, and impact of such actions, costs in terms of staff and others’ time, 
barriers encountered and thoughts about how best to improve further the governance and 
leadership of the board and trust. In addition, we were able to administer an online survey 
questionnaire to middle managers (ward and department managers) at three out of the six 
case study sites. Two of the others declined to participate, and in the remaining trust the 
response rate was too low for completed questionnaires to be considered for analysis. The 
survey was based on items in our national board-level survey. A particular aim was to elicit 
qualitative responses from a wider population to supplement the interviews and focus groups. 
Therefore we included many free-text-response items. A Word version copy of the 
questionnaire used is in appendix 7. It was piloted in the first of the trusts. There was a little 
tailoring to capture some differences between trusts (e.g. for multi-location trusts to capture 
at which location the respondents were based), and at each site our contact checked the 
questionnaire design. The three case-study sites themselves distributed a link to the 
questionnaire (hosted on a fileserver at the University of Manchester) by targeted internal 
email or by a notice in the staff newsletter. Follow-up reminders were also sent. Appropriate 
groups of staff were also alerted to it through the management chain. Responses were 
anonymous and overview summaries fed back to the sites. 
Towards the end point of the research, we returned to the case studies to carry out up to three 
follow up interviews (by phone or face to face) with key informants (for example chair or 
CEO, board secretary, medical director, chief nurse) in each site exploring: accuracy and 
completeness of our emerging findings, perceived progress with actions taken, any initiatives 
that have been dropped or modified, costs incurred and seeking views about next steps.  
Each case study was written up by its academic lead, focusing on the context of each board 
and organisation. In order to safeguard internal validity (Lincoln and Guba 1985), all board 
meetings were observed by two members of the research team except on one occasion. All 
interviews and focus group discussions or notes were fully transcribed and we used 
qualitative coding software (Dedoose) to facilitate data storage and retrieval in analysis. All 
members of the research team were involved in generating coding frames for themes from 
qualitative data, and we carried out an exercise to compare independent coding of a subset of 
data to identify and address coding differences and ensure consistency (see appendix 8).  
As part of our testing of emerging themes and for checking external validity, we offered a 
case study summary for each trust with tailored feedback, thus ensuring that research 
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participants gained a local perspective on our analysis, and to support their board and 
organisational development plans. We also offered to present our findings on the study as a 
whole and on their trust at a board meeting at their convenience. Sites responded to our 
invitation to feed back to us on the insights shared, helping us refine our final report.  
 
3.6 Work package 4: Synthesis of findings and production of recommendations 
This package integrated the findings from earlier work packages. We conducted our synthesis 
by combining our multiple sources of data, and an iterative process of research team peer 
review. We started by summarising the key actions that have been taken by boards to 
implement the recommendations of the Francis Inquiry and the subsequent reports including 
those by Berwick (NAG 2013) , Clwyd (Clwyd and Hart 2013), Kirkup (Kirkup 2015), 
Francis 3 (Francis 2015) and Carter (Carter 2016). We then assessed the impact of those 
actions, the evidence for improvements in board leadership, the narrative around financial 
and non-financial costs of implementing Francis, the reported and observed barriers and 
enablers in implementing Francis and, finally, the implications for healthcare board 
governance theory. We concluded by making recommendations for policy, practice and 
further research. 
 
3.7 Patient and public involvement, the role of the advisory group and the 
contributions made by the stakeholder workshops to the research 
An advisory group, led by a lay member and consisting of three further patient 
representatives and five academic experts in healthcare board governance, met on two 
occasions with the research team in the course of the study. Members of the group were also 
invited to shape and participate in the two project scoping and review workshops, to give 
advice on how the research was carried out and on the selection of the six hospital case study 
sites, and comment on findings, draft reports and other materials. As well as the advisory 
group, the workshops included representatives from healthcare professional bodies, frontline 
clinical staff, and people involved in the administration of the Francis Inquiry. Changes were 
made to the questions in the national survey and its reach, additional lines of inquiry were 
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pursued in the case study sites, and interpretation of some findings was altered as a result of 
deliberations in the workshops. 
Advice was sought from two patient representatives in the initial specification developed in 
response to the invitation to tender. A particular feature of patient and public involvement in 
this study subsequently was the recruitment process to the chair and lay membership of the 
advisory group. Rather than relying on personal contacts, we put out a call to invite 
expressions of interest, and outlined in more detail than usual the expectations that we had of 
the lay member role, for which were able to offer a small honorarium according to 
INVOLVE guidelines. The result was 18 expressions of interest including five applications 
for the chair role. The final lay membership was decided by two members of the research 
team, by matching expressions of interest and experience against expectations of the roles 
and a telephone interview for the chair appointment. An external assessment of the 
arrangements for patient and public involvement in this study was provided by National 
Voices (see appendix 9 for more details). This assessment concluded that the approach taken 
was well-motivated, authentic and broadly fit for purpose. It had some impact on the conduct 
of the research. A small number of ways in which the approach could have been strengthened 
were suggested, and implications for the wider health research community. 
 
3.8 Research governance arrangements 
This research was subject to external academic peer review prior to funding. It then received 
ethics approval from the University of Manchester as the sponsoring body and research 
governance approval from the Health Research Authority via the IRAS process (IRAS No 
196184). Research and Development (R&D) offices at all case study sites confirmed 
approval to proceed. 
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4 Characteristics of effective NHS boards: updated literature review and 
accounts of stakeholders 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it is to outline the findings from an updated 
literature review about the characteristics of effective healthcare boards, to further an 
understanding of what to look out for in our empirical work on the composition, structures, 
focus and behaviours of NHS board leadership post-Francis. Second, this account offers a 
theoretical lens for interpreting our findings in relation to effective healthcare board 
governance. Third, we report on interviews with key stakeholders in which we seek opinions 
about desirable changes in NHS board governance post-Francis, the extent to which, 
according to interviewees’ experience and knowledge, recommendations have been acted 
upon, and their assessment of the enablers of and barriers to implementation. Underpinned by 
a theoretical understanding of effective healthcare board governance, the stakeholder 
interviews start the process of addressing our research objectives 1-5 as summarised below: 
1. To chronicle how boards have sought to implement  recommendations on organisational 
leadership since the publication of the Francis Inquiry Report 
2. To determine which mechanisms used by boards have led to reported 
organisational/service changes, and the factors underpinning such change 
3. To explore the intended and unintended effects 
4. To examine the financial and non-financial costs of developing and implementing actions 
5. To identify the enablers of and barriers to implementation 
Findings from our interviews and the updated literature review were reported and discussed 
in our first stakeholder workshop and informed question setting in the national survey of 
board members (see Chapter 5) and lines of inquiry in our  case study work (see Chapter 6). 
 
4.2 Summaries of two recent reviews 
Our aim here is to summarise two main recent reviews of literature on board governance, 
particularly in relation to (1) patient safety and (2) organisational performance,
 
undertaken by 
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members of this research team (Chambers et al. 2013, Mannion et al. 2016) and then to 
provide an update from a search of relevant articles not captured by these two studies. 
Using a narrative review approach, Mannion’s team set out to identify the evidence and 
debates concerning board oversight of patient safety. 124 publications fell within the scope of 
their review. The findings were informed by an underlying programme theory that failures in 
care are conditioned by latent organisation factors rather than individual human error or 
malefaction. The researchers found that boards that place a high priority on quality and safety 
are more likely to be running higher performing organisations. They identified a wide range 
of operational governance practices linked to higher organisation performance, including the 
amount of time spent on quality issues and setting and reviewing quality goals, as well as 
benchmarking, constancy of feedback and monitoring. Strategic governance practices 
included having a separate quality committee with clinical membership, involving medical 
staff in developing the quality strategy and developing new services that enhance quality and 
safety. This review also identified that adoption of these approaches and activities remained 
highly variable. One significant barrier is the low level of technical competence and 
proficiency of board members in measuring and assuring quality and safety, and limited 
training opportunities. Nursing leadership was often low profile in board deliberations and 
decision-making. 
In addition to the literature review, Mannion and his team conducted national quantitative 
surveys of hospital boards and in-depth case studies. Their empirical study (summarised in 
more detail in appendix 10) found: 
 No statistically significant relationship between board attributes and process and any 
patient safety outcome measures  
 A significant relationship between board attributes and process and staff ‘feeling safe’ 
to raise concerns and ‘feeling confident’ that their organisation would address those 
concerns 
 A high proportion of desirable characteristics and processes that previous research  
studies indicate may be associated with high performance, including having quality 
sub-committees and proactive procedures in place to address patient safety  and 
explicit objectives relating to improving patient safety  
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 Most boards do allocate considerable time to discussing patient safety and quality 
related issues. The survey found that hospital boards were using a wide range of hard 
performance metrics and soft intelligence to monitor their organisation with regard to 
patient safety, including a range of clinical outcome measures 
 Development and implementation of a clear corporate strategy and operational plan is 
a key facilitator in enabling effective board governance 
 Stability of board membership and strong, committed clinical leadership are important 
facilitators of patient safety governance 
 Barriers included a corollary of the above i.e. lack of engagement among senior 
medical staff and problems and disputes over the validity and reliability of summary 
performance indicator data 
 Boards of governors are generally perceived as well-meaning but they were also 
considered largely ineffective in helping to promote and deliver safer care for their 
organisations 
Broadening the scope of board responsibilities, a literature synthesis of characteristics of 
effective healthcare board governance (Chambers et al. 2013) aimed to offer fresh insights 
into healthcare board composition, structures, processes and behaviours, and to further an 
understanding of how boards can affect organisational performance. Drawing from 670 texts 
selected for review, the study found that there was no one simple theory about how boards 
should operate. The review identified alternative courses of action for members of boards, 
using the learning from different theoretical standpoints on the purpose of boards and sources 
of evidence about effectiveness in the for-profit and public sectors, and relating it to the 
healthcare context.  
Most academic papers on corporate governance were focussed on performance in financial 
terms. Hospitals need to maximise their use of limited resources, so the findings do offer 
enlightenment, but only in part, for the healthcare sector. The results from the general 
literature can be summarised as follows: 
 Contradictory evidence: There was evidence of positive and negative associations or 
no effect in terms of overall impact of governance on performance and for specific 
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aspects of governance studied (e.g. board size, duality, gender and ethnic diversity) 
within statistical analyses. 
 
 Contingent nature of relationships between key variables in relation to board 
composition. First, gender diversity has a positive impact on performance in firms that 
have otherwise weak governance, but in firms with strong governance, greater 
diversity may result in over-monitoring. Second, in relation to the length of tenure of 
outside directors, outside director tenure is positively related to performance, with the 
accumulated learning and power effects of long tenure enabling directors to be more 
effective in their various governance roles, but these benefits diminish as tenure 
further increases. In relation to board strategy, board independence (i.e. majority of 
outside directors) has a significantly more positive effect on performance for firms 
pursuing a strategy of cost efficiency than for those pursuing a strategy of innovation. 
 
 Benefits accrued by larger boards, particularly in relation to increased monitoring, are 
outweighed by higher agency costs, informational asymmetry, communication and 
decision making problems.  
 
 Improved monitoring can come at a cost of weaker strategic advising and greater 
managerial myopia. Firms with boards that monitor intensely exhibit worse 
acquisition performance and reduced corporate innovation. 
 
In relation to the healthcare related literature, the review found the following: 
 
 US studies comparing corporate and philanthropic models of governance suggest that 
corporate models are associated with increased operational efficiency. Hospitals with 
a corporate governance configuration, (i.e. smaller, narrow membership, greater 
management participation, strategic focus, scrutiny of CEO, competitive positioning) 
were more likely to respond to major change by diversification or merger and less 
likely to experience closure. 
 
 Boards of high performing hospitals are more fully engaged in key governance 
processes and the prevailing governance culture is more interactive and proactive. 
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 High performing hospitals have: physicians involved on the main board; a quality 
subcommittee; greater expertise and formal training in quality; quality reported as a 
higher priority for board oversight and CEO performance evaluation; boards that are 
significantly more familiar with current performance and significantly more involved 
in reviewing quality data; and more time spent on clinical quality at board meetings 
(greater than the time spent on financial performance).  
 
 Healthcare governance failings in UK and US are associated with boards having a 
comparative lack of focus on clinical performance and outcomes, and a preoccupation 
with financial matters, or, alternatively, not being sighted on the latter. There were 
also organisational culture issues including lack of grip by the board either on 
undesirable management behaviours or management performance. 
 
 The importance of appropriate organisation-environment linkages, and of increasing 
embeddedness of healthcare governance as part of complex superordinate and 
subordinate governance networks within and across institutions 
 There is some weak evidence that investment in board development affects 
organisation performance (for example improved board member confidence, greater 
board engagement and challenge, better financial results) but there is comparatively 
little to report definitively. 
The authors derived some support from these findings for a triadic theoretical proposition of 
high trust - high challenge - high engagement for effective boards but with less empirical 
evidence to support the first of these three. This current study provides the opportunity to 
further test this proposition. Furthermore, given that governance theories suggest that boards 
face choices about their principal purpose, depending on the circumstances and situations that 
their organisation faces, a framework for effective healthcare boards was developed using a 
realist lens using the context, mechanism and outcome configuration to structure the model 
(see table 3 in Chapter 3 Methodology above). Along with the triadic proposition for all 
boards, this current study affords the chance to test this framework. 
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4.3 Themes from updated literature review 
To inform this current study, we have drawn from the two literature reviews outlined above, 
and, in addition, we searched for additional material published since those reviews took 
place. The method for this selective review is described in more detail in chapter 3.  
We found six articles for full review which are relevant to one or more of our research 
questions, and which not only confirm previous research, but also further our understanding 
of effective healthcare boards. These articles are listed in appendix 11.  
We outline below the main themes from this update choosing the headings which relate to 
theories about the purpose of the board, and choices for boards in relation to their 
composition, the focus of their activities and dynamics in the boardroom. 
 
Board purpose  
The emergence of foundation trust NHS hospitals has resulted in governance structures that 
may provide new forms of board level scrutiny and oversight. All foundation trusts have a 
membership, a council of governors and a board of directors. The council of governors is 
made up of public governors, staff governors and patient, carer or service user governors. The 
governors are not directors but it is their duty to hold the non-executive directors, 
individually and collectively, to account for the performance of the board of directors 
(Monitor 2014). The rationale for foundation trusts is therefore rooted in stakeholder theory, 
which advocates the development of mutual and cooperative forms of organisation as a way 
of harnessing stakeholder ownership and influence.  
The apparent higher performance of foundation trusts in terms of overall organisational 
performance, service quality and financial management scores and the behavioural measures 
of effectiveness, has been partially attributed to boards having a wider perspective in 
strategising, greater stakeholder involvement in decision making processes, being more open 
to internal and external feedback, and more willing to improve collegiality (Veronesi and 
Keasey 2012). Structures for stakeholder representation are not sufficient for effective 
accountability however; representatives need to be engaged and informed to have an impact. 
In some trusts where members of the public had a formal representative role, this allowed 
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patient representatives to pose questions that were well-informed, constructive and generated 
discussion amongst Board members (Endacott et al. 2013).  
 
Board composition 
A number of academic studies have sought to link board composition with patient outcomes 
and have found differences between high and low performing hospitals, with particular 
attention given to whether clinicians on the board can have a positive impact on performance. 
The line of thought here is that clinicians have acquired specialist knowledge through their 
training and direct interaction with patients that could lead to greater strategic leadership on 
the board, especially in relation to quality. Previous studies have identified links between the 
presence of physicians on the board and improved process of care and mortality (Jiang et al. 
2009). Since the literature review conducted by Chambers et al. (2013), further studies have 
sought to establish a link between the presence of clinicians on the board and clinical 
outcomes. Veronesi et al ((2012), (2014)) analysed their own unique dataset made up of the 
qualifications of board members and performance scores incorporated in the ratings of 
hospital trusts published by the Healthcare Commission (now CQC) in their annual health 
check, and found significant and positive associations between a higher percentage of doctors 
on boards and quality ratings, i.e. waiting times, referrals to treatments, infection rates and 
their financial rating (ability to manage resources). A later study by Veronesi et al. (2015) 
also found a significant positive effect of the number of clinicians on the boards on overall 
patient experience scores, with five or more clinical board members instead of two having an 
even more significant positive impact on patient experience. Moreover, in a comparative 
study of the UK and US, it was found that 46% of board chairs from high performing 
hospitals reported that their board members had very substantial expertise in quality of care, 
compared to 26% of board chairs at low performing hospitals (Tsai et al. 2015).  
A report into diversity of NHS boards in London (Kline 2014) found that only 8.6% of board 
members were from black or minority ethnic backgrounds. This figure is a reduction from 
9.6% in 2006. Two-fifths of boards had no BME representation at all. Whilst there is no 
evidence to connect increased diversity on boards to improved performance in healthcare, 
West’s work on high performing teams suggests that paying attention to issues of equality, 
diversity and inclusion matters (West et al. 2015). 
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Board focus on setting and tracking the strategic direction 
Most studies confirm that the board has an important role to play in setting the strategic 
direction and in monitoring quality and safety within hospitals, and that the ability of boards 
to set clear measurable goals for improvement has an impact on performance (Mannion et al. 
2016). Dixon-Woods et al. (2013) found that when boards did provide a strong focus in 
identifying system-level problems, they were powerful in supporting cultural change that 
delivered benefits for patients. However, they also identified some poor practice in which 
boards rarely stated clear objectives that were challenging and measurable. The case study 
analysis by Mannion et al. (2016) also found mixed practice within and amongst boards. For 
example, all case studies sought to provide strategic assurance by establishing organisational 
structures and processes for reporting safety information through the organisation and to the 
board. However, the study highlights that case study sites had localised ways of organising 
themselves and the way they used their time was variable. For example, only one of the sites 
sought to provide a strategic focus on quality improvement. It is therefore generally argued 
that boards have the ability to show leadership and to be influential in setting the direction for 
hospitals, especially in relation to quality, but have a variable track record in actualising this. 
 
Board focus on monitoring of clinical quality of care  
There is much discussion in the literature about the impact of devoting time and attention at 
board level to quality issues. The boards of English NHS trusts are found to devote a greater 
proportion of time to quality monitoring than their equivalents in the US and Scotland. In one 
study, 72% of English board chairs compared with 31% of US chairs chose clinical 
effectiveness as a top priority, and quality of care performance was on the agenda at every 
board meeting in 98% of English hospitals, but in just 68% of US hospitals (Jha and Epstein 
2013). Scottish boards meet less frequently than those in England and focus on quality less, 
discuss it for a shorter time period, review data less often and set few local targets, despite 
having a greater number of NEDs and more with a clinical background (Bream et al. 2013). 
The national survey of NHS boards conducted by Mannion et al. (2016) also found that only 
a fifth of boards reported spending 30% or less of their time on quality and safety issues. The 
World Management Survey, which rates a hospital’s overall management score from 1 to 5, 
with a score of 5 being the highest, across 20 questions, showed that management scores in 
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the UK and US were significantly higher in hospitals with boards that paid greater attention 
to quality, illustrating the importance of devoting attention to quality. These hospitals were 
also more likely to adopt effective practices related to the use of clinical quality metrics (Tsai 
et al. 2015).  
There seems to be unanimous agreement about the importance of devoting time and having 
expertise in quality at board level. However, there is also debate about how quality 
information is best processed and understood by board members. Mannion et al. (2016) found 
that hospitals use a range of performance metrics and soft intelligence to monitor their 
organisation and that quantitative data were reportedly used at every board meeting in over 
80% of hospital trusts. But both Mannion et al. (2016) and Dixon-Woods et al. (2013) are 
sceptical about simply using data to inform the board about quality performance. Mannion et 
al. (2016) found in their case study analysis of four NHS foundation trust boards that the use 
of performance data to alert the board to poor performance encourages under reporting and 
does not indicate how to address deficiencies, and the research by Dixon-Woods et al. (2013) 
argues for the importance of high quality intelligence (not just data) and making that 
intelligence actionable. The stakeholders interviewed by Mannion et al. (2016) also 
emphasised the need to ‘triangulate’ hard data with different information sources. 
The importance of an emphasis on quality was illustrated in the previous literature review 
(Chambers et al. 2013). This updated review goes further in providing some international 
comparisons with English hospitals, suggesting that they spend more time on quality than 
their counterparts in other nations, as well as drawing the link between performance and time 
spent on quality. The recent literature also looks further into the use of quality data and 
challenges the extent to which boards effectively process and act on information about 
clinical quality of care.  
 
Board dynamics 
An observation of 24 board meetings at eight NHS Trusts and a content analysis of board 
minutes from 105 NHS trusts found that non-execs were variable in holding the exec team to 
account. Where NEDs were confident and tenacious, there was greater depth and discussion 
of all issues, including on clinical matters. On balance, they did find that NEDs’ behaviour 
was more indicative of an active strategic approach to governance than a passive rubber 
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stamp, as had been argued by previous literature. However, they did find that some NEDs 
said very little in board meetings and their ability to contribute and to hold the executive to 
account was very much down to individual personality and experience (Endacott et al. 2013, 
Sheaff et al. 2015).  
Veronesi and Keasey (2011) found that a limiting factor for NEDs being involved in board 
decision making is the dominance of the individual expertise model, where individual 
expertise is given prominence at the expense of a holistic approach to problem solving. 
Analysis of stakeholder interviews conducted by Mannion et al. (2016) also found that 
limited knowledge of patient safety among board members, especially non-executives, 
restricted their ability to ask challenging questions about safety issues. The interviewees 
reported that this was exemplified by non-executives who do not have a clinical background. 
 These studies suggest that it is the perception of NEDs by the executive team and their own 
perception of themselves that is a significant barrier in their ability to have an influence over 
strategic decision making. Other studies have also suggested that the NEDs’ ability to hold 
the executive to account is impacted by what other roles they occupy in the organisational 
structure, asides from board membership (Endacott et al. 2013, Sheaff et al. 2015). 
 
Summary of new conceptions about the work of healthcare boards 
There are five developing lines of inquiry from this review: 
First, there is new evidence about the stakeholder model of governance that is embedded in 
NHS foundation trusts, which has the potential (not always realised) to provide the board 
with a wider perspective when strategising, decision-making, monitoring performance and 
receiving and acting on feedback. The developing role of the council of governors is worth 
scrutinising in this regard. Second, there is growing evidence about the positive effect that 
clinicians, particularly doctors, play as members of healthcare boards in terms of improving 
patient outcomes, although more evidence on how they enact their role as board-clinicians 
would be helpful. Third, there is a concern that ethnic diversity on NHS boards may actually 
be decreasing, with little understanding of the impact on staff engagement and patient 
experience. Fourth, there is a variation in the competence and diligence of boards in setting 
direction and monitoring quality of care in their organisations. Finally, recent studies also 
show variation in the level of board engagement, for example how firmly non executives hold 
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the executives to account, and, connected to this, the level of board confidence in relation to 
the use of quality metrics. A question that remains is what accounts for this variation in board 
practices, and how have these practices changed since the publication of the Francis Inquiry 
Report in 2013, which is the main focus of this study.  
These lines of inquiry can now be compared with the results of interviews that we conducted 
with opinion leaders in 2015 and 2016, in which we asked for their views on how they 
expected that board leadership would have changed since 2013, and what their experiences 
and observations were about what had in practice happened so far. 
 
4.4 Accounts of opinion leaders 
Thirteen interviews took place between August 2015 – April 2016 with key stakeholders 
from national organisations representing patients, medical and nursing professions, healthcare 
regulators, policy think tanks and Department of Health leads on implementing the 
recommendations of the Francis Inquiry. Chapter 3 provides more detail about the 
methodology used. Interviews elicited views on current concerns for boards, desirable 
characteristics of effective board leadership, actions expected to have been taken as a result 
of the Francis Inquiry, the perceived and actual role of boards in overseeing and improving 
care quality and safety and the barriers to improving board-level leadership in the NHS and  
levers for change.  
 
Main concerns of boards 
The interviewees thought that boards shared three main concerns post-Francis. The first was 
how to maintain quality in a time of financial austerity. The financial pressure amounted to ‘a 
different kind of worry’  from patient safety worries, but one which was commanding much 
attention from the centre and which was also coupled with growing pressure on NHS 
Constitution access and other performance targets, especially with social care in crisis. The 
second concern was about the burden and anxiety around CQC visits and verdicts. The third 
was nurse staffing, agency costs, and wider workforce pressures. These themes are echoed in 
the findings of the national survey of board members conducted in spring 2016 (which we 
report on in chapter 5 and the case study investigations which took place from summer 2016 
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to spring 2017 (see chapter 6)). And the backcloth to these preoccupations was the need, 
according to these stakeholders, for boards to act simultaneously on so many reports and 
recommendations: Francis 2 (Francis 2013a), Berwick (NAG 2013), Keogh (Keogh 2013), 
Clwyd (Clwyd and Hart 2013), Francis 3 (Francis 2015) and Kirkup (Kirkup 2015). 
 
Desired characteristics of healthcare board leadership  
In the face of these challenges, we invited interviewees to comment on what they thought 
were the desirable characteristics of healthcare board leadership. 
In terms of focus, there were four main areas that were considered to be crucial. First was a 
palpable concentration of effort towards ensuring patient-centred care. Second was the need 
to support staff, heed concerns and provide protection from negative pressures. A close 
alignment between what the board says and what staff say about what is going on in the 
organisation is a good sign. Third was the importance of promoting a certain culture which 
enabled a climate for compassionate care, insisting on certain behaviours and ensuring good 
governance. And running through all these was the perceived board priority that should be 
accorded to quality, safety and learning for improvement and, as one interviewee quoted,  
‘problem sensing than comfort seeking’ (Dixon-Woods et al. 2013), ensuring that the quest 
for assurance is balanced with a drive for improvement. Underpinning this effort, the board 
should be receiving detailed and timely data on patient and staff concerns, ensuring that 
quality improvement is hardwired through organisation, using good quality data and 
information as the basis for improvement. One respondent suggested that the national survey 
of board members should address the question about how much they know about what was of 
concern to patients, staff and regulators, and we acted on this suggestion (see appendix 2 for a 
copy of the survey questionnaire and chapter 5 for the results). 
In terms of desirable behaviours, the need for boards to act as ‘the guiding mind’ of the 
organisation and to live the organisation’s espoused values was mentioned as important. 
Team spirit and good working relationships especially between the CEO, medical director 
and director of nursing, and between the chair and the CEO, with a balance of support and 
challenge from the non-executives and dissenting views shared and contained within the 
boardroom, was all called for. It was important to see collective leadership in evidence as 
well as a strong medical leadership voice. Finally, interviewees expected the appropriate full 
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deployment of subject matter expertise and executives who provided a broader view beyond 
their specific function. 
 
Actions that boards were expected to take after Francis 
Respondents felt that responsibility weighed heavily on boards after Francis. They would 
expect to see a programme of work to improve quality, staffing, safety, patient experience, 
complaints handling and raising concerns. Specifically, boards would need to understand and 
implement the Duty of Candour. They also expected boards to be attuned to concerns and to 
‘soft’ data with regard to quality and safety, and that board papers would include impacts on 
patients, public and staff of proposals, as well as comments from these groups. They hoped 
that there would be closer relationships between the board, the executive and clinical 
directorates. Finally, they expected boards to be self-critical about board culture and 
behaviours. 
 
Current realities for boards 
The respondents were concerned that the current reality of board leadership was some way 
off from the desired focus, desirable characteristics and expected actions described above. 
They were aware of some high performing boards but elsewhere they considered that quality 
was not seen as a whole board issue and there was often a focus on financial pressures at the 
expense of quality and strategy. Compliance was driving out improvement: ‘grip becomes 
throttle’ was how one respondent described the situation in some hospitals. This was 
compounded by variable access to and use of data. 
In terms of behaviours, there was a worry about the cult of the CEO, cosiness of some board 
committees and that in some organisations boards were not listening to the concerns of 
middle managers or frontline staff and not inviting and acting on suggestions for 
improvement from the workforce. Other specific concerns included boards having little time 
and resource for board development, lack of diversity on boards, especially BAME, and also 
executive recruitment that fished from a very small pool, resulting in a self-perpetuating 
oligarchy (‘the village’). This can result in it being easy for board leaders at random either to 
be either dropped or supported and a reluctance to look outside the system. This may be 
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connected to the low profile of the Fit and Proper Person’s Requirement. Externally, poor 
relationships with others in the health economy were also often observed. Also externally, 
there was a warning about boards being focussed on reputation and image rather than 
substance and outwardly projecting an image of success whilst not having grip on operational 
performance. 
 
Common board behaviours 
Stakeholders were asked which behaviours were most commonly exhibited by boards, and in 
particular those behaviours connected with the various theoretical purposes of boards, that is 
agency, stewardship, stakeholder and resource dependency. 
The three types of board behaviours that interviewees were most concerned about and had 
some experience of were the ‘top-down’, ‘powerless’ or ‘cosy’ boards. Beyond that, they 
reported a whole range, including observing board members expressing vulnerability and 
being sensitised to risks. Holding to account was the most common stance taken – which 
relates to board challenge connected with agency theory. There was a view that the 
stewardship and stakeholder theoretical models had most potential for staff engagement. The 
‘expert’ board with a concentration of power was also common, and in this circumstance 
certain groups (for example patient representatives or certain professional groups) can feel 
marginalised. 
In conclusion, the stakeholders judged that effective boards knew which mode of behaviour 
to use in which circumstances; despite confusing policy and governance guidance (and 
incongruent behaviours exhibited by national bodies). 
 
Levers for change 
Building on what respondents considered to be the barriers, current realities, post-Francis 
agenda and their knowledge of effective healthcare board leadership, they provided insights 
into levers for change. They indicated the importance of a broad leadership repertoire, 
balancing the range of board behaviours as appropriate, drawing from the alternative theories 
of board working. At the same time there was also a view that boards needed to think and 
work as a team (i.e. a dominance of stewardship theory). As indicated above in the section on 
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desirable characteristics of boards, there was considerable support for an approach to quality 
improvement that was agreed and backed by all the board and making use of soft as well as 
hard intelligence. Underpinning this was rigorous follow through of agreed actions from 
committees to the main board and across committees. 
There was a strong emphasis on supporting and developing board leaders: the need for 
coaching of individuals and teams, replacement of poor performers where needed, providing 
tailored and sustained support for new CEOs and development in place before people take up 
executive roles. It was important for boards to look downwards and outwards to ensure 
cultural change. This included acknowledging the importance of middle managers (not 
always focusing on top tier and frontline) and commissioning bespoke internal leadership 
development programmes. 
Externally, hospital chains and networks were seen as a way of drawing organisations 
together to learn, peer review and challenge. The incentives for board leaders to take on 
poorer performing organisations had to be right.  
 
Concluding remarks 
There are some recurring themes and questions arising from this literature review and 
accounts of stakeholders. The messages, which we shared at our first stakeholder workshop, 
helped to guide some of the questions in the national survey of board members and the lines 
of inquiry for data collection at our case study sites. These included: an exploration of the 
assuring versus improving dichotomy; unintended consequences, including the ‘long shadow’ 
of Francis; initiatives started and stopped; reliance on action plans; and a seeming lack of 
focus on messages from the Berwick Report. One specific question, with broader 
organisation cultural significance, was whether the implementation of Duty of Candour was 
generally closer to the Alton Towers or the Thomas Cook model– which related to different 
organisation responses following tragic accidents.
 1
 
                                                 
1
 Alton Towers and Thomas Cook approaches to handling service failings resulting in harm 
to customers in their care: 
Alton Towers 
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There is still considerable uncertainty about the most effective behaviours for boards to 
deploy. On the one hand there are many messages about the need for strong governance and 
boards which hold to account using a range of sources of credible data, drawing from agency 
theory, and on the other there are also views about supportive, collective leadership drawing 
from notions of stewardship theory and the unitary board. The accounts of stakeholders 
mentioned issues concerning sources of power in the organisation only a little, perhaps 
because the interviewees were themselves in positions of authority. Although references were 
made to the importance of staff engagement, structural frameworks for encouraging this (for 
example referring to stakeholder theory) were less to the fore. The ability to collaborate 
externally and manage the external environment (resource dependency theory) was also more 
in the background. The literature review and the stakeholder accounts do however lend 
further support, in particular around the quality and improvement agenda for the triadic 
proposition of effective healthcare boards that are high challenge – high support – high 
engagement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
On 2 June 2015, two of the trains on the Smile ride at the Alton Towers theme park collided 
leaving five riders seriously injured, including two young people who had partial leg 
amputations. The whole theme park was closed for five days as the company made an 
assessment of safety procedures covering all its attractions. An investigation by the Health 
and Safety Executive was initiated, and the ride was closed for the remainder of the season. 
The owner of Alton Towers admitted liability for the Smiler crash and was found guilty of 
neglecting to ensure safety standards and fined £5 million. In the days immediately after the 
accident the company took to the media to publicise messages directed at affected resort 
guests to make a claim for compensation which they said would be dealt with quickly and 
comprehensively. 
 
Thomas Cook 
Two children aged 6 and 7 from Yorkshire died of carbon monoxide poisoning while on 
holiday with family in Corfu in October 2006 arranged through the Thomas Cook travel 
company. The cause of death was found to be carbon monoxide poisoning from a faulty gas 
boiler. Three people, including the manager of the hotel where they were staying, were found 
guilty of manslaughter by negligence following a criminal trial in Greece in 2010 and were 
each sentenced to seven years in prison. At the inquest into the children’s deaths, which was 
held at Wakefield Coroner’s Court in 2015, the CEO at Thomas Cook said that he felt 
incredibly sorry for the family but there was no need to apologise because there was no 
wrongdoing by Thomas Cook. He said his company had a policy of avoiding gas-fired hot 
water appliances but that it had been lied to by the hotel, which had said that it had no gas 
supply. The jury at the inquest returned a verdict of unlawful killing and concluded that the 
travel company Thomas Cook had breached its duty of care. 
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5 National survey of board members and secretaries 
This chapter details the findings of our national survey of members and secretaries of boards 
of NHS acute hospital trusts in England. First, we briefly outline the survey purpose and 
questions and assess the representativeness of the survey respondents. Then we present our 
findings regarding the following aspects of boards: 
 The role of the board 
 Challenges facing boards 
 Board member knowledge of what is important to patients, staff and regulators 
 Implementation and impact of the Francis Report recommendations 
 Implementation and impact of the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement 
 Implementation and impact of the Freedom to Speak Up Guardian 
 Impact of the Duty of Candour 
 Enablers and barriers to improving board leadership 
 Board development 
 CQC Well-Led Ratings and NSS scores 
 
5.1 Purpose and scope 
The purpose of the survey was to gather mainly quantifiable data about boards and how 
members see the board impacting on the organisation, including changes since the 
publication of the Francis Report in February 2013. We surveyed CEOs, chairs, chief nurses, 
directors of finance, medical directors, non-executive directors, and board secretaries 
between December 2015 and May 2016. For further details of the survey process, see chapter 
3, section 3.4. 
We asked questions about: 
1. Specific actions to improve board and organisational leadership (e.g. new policies, 
processes) 
2. Perceived impacts on intermediate outcomes (e.g. organisational strategies, structures, 
culture?) and on organisational performance 
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3. Perceptions of the connections between actions and impacts, including underlying 
mechanisms, barriers faced and contextual influences corresponding to categories in 
the research framework 
4. Financial and non-financial costs incurred 
All of the survey questions are detailed in appendix 2. Most of the questions were posed to all 
respondents, but to avoid duplication questions seeking factual information about the board 
as a whole (e.g. number of board members, number of board development days) were only 
put to board secretaries, who we considered would have the easiest access to the information 
sought. 
 
5.2 Respondents 
In this section we highlight key characteristics of the respondents to our survey, focusing on 
those most pertinent to the survey findings. Further details of respondent characteristics are 
given in appendix 12. 
381 respondents completed the whole survey (response rate 20%), with an additional 57 
respondents (3%) answering some of the survey questions. At least one full response was 
received from 139 (90%) of the 154 NHS hospital trusts and foundation trusts in England at 
that time. Our findings are based on statistical analyses of all 381 responses. 
There were no statistically significant differences in response rates between different types of 
trust (acute, specialist, foundation, non-foundation), between trusts with different CQC Well-
Led Ratings, or between female and male board members (Chi-square test, p>0.05). 
Response rates did vary by role, with finance directors in particular being under-represented 
(11% response rate) (see box 3 below and further details in Table 17 in Appendix 12). 
Response rates also differed between regions of the country, ranging from 14% in London up 
to 26% in East of England. 
 
 
 
 
Box 3: Completed survey responses by role 
Board secretary 48 
Chair 43 
CEO 39 
Finance director 19 
Medical director 42 
Nursing director 28 
Non-executive director 162 
 
TOTAL = 381 
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184 out of 331 (56%) of all board member survey respondents joined their current board after 
February 2013. CEO respondents were more likely to be longer serving than board members 
in other roles. 74% of CEO respondents had joined the board before March 2013, whereas 
only 40% of board members in other roles had joined their board before March 2013. 
In terms of diversity, 37% respondents were female compared to 77% of the workforce, and 
94% were white in comparison with 78% of the NHS workforce. 
 
5.3 Findings 
The role of the board: emphases placed on different purposes 
When asked about how much their board emphasises purposes corresponding to those of the 
different theoretical models of boards, responses suggest that boards give most emphasis to 
holding the executive directors to account (figure 3). This was scored more highly than the 
other purposes. The scores for supporting the executive directors and for enhancing the 
reputation of the organisation were also higher than those for representing the interests of all 
stakeholders and reconciling competing interests. 
Figure 3: How much boards emphasise different board purposes and associated theories 
of boards (average scores) 
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(1 = Hardly at all; 3 = A little; 5 = Moderately; 7 = Quite a lot; 9 = Massively) 
(p<0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank test) 
 
The differences are, however, relatively small; board members typically perceive that their 
board is giving ‘quite a lot’ of emphasis to all of the purposes. Exploratory factor analysis 
(promax with Kaiser normalisation) suggests that these variables may represent a single 
underlying latent factor, accounting for 59% of the variance, which we might perhaps call 
board diligence.
2
 
The comments that respondents made in the survey about how the board of their trust viewed 
its purpose were varied, partly reflecting the range of possible purposes indicated by theories 
                                                 
2
 Exploratory factor analysis is a statistical technique that indicates whether quantitative data 
provided in answer to different questions might be similar, and whether potentially the 
different questions might be measuring aspects of a single underlying concept, or ‘latent 
factor’. For example, concepts such as personality type may impact on various visible 
behaviours, and personality types are usually assessed by asking a number of questions about 
such behaviours. Interpreting the results is an art as much as a science. The meaning 
attributed to the latent factor is provisional, and should be assessed through further research. 
Various techniques, such as promax rotation and Kaiser normalisation, may be used within 
factor analysis in order to aid such interpretation. 
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of boards, but also broader or higher purposes. Many respondents reported that the purpose of 
the board was to ensure that their trust provided safe and effective care to patients, whilst also 
keeping the organisation financially sustainable. There were also many references to the 
desirability of the board providing leadership for the organisation through having a clear 
purpose and vision to give strategic direction: 
 ‘1- Safety and quality 2- Money 3- Strategic direction.’ [Medical Director] 
Comments also suggested an emphasis on governance and accountability. This was 
frequently expressed in terms of the board seeking assurance, holding executives and 
managers to account, and having oversight of delivery. 
Supporting the executives was also mentioned occasionally, usually as a complement to 
challenge. There were a number of references to the unitary board and NEDs and executives 
working together. 
‘In practice that means challenging and supporting the executive to develop the 
capability of the middle management of the Trust, whilst managing and synthesising 
the external forces brought to bear on the Trust.’ [CEO] 
‘To challenge and support in equal measure the decisions the exec board make. To 
represent the values and patient interests. To encourage new ways of thinking and to 
ensure that there is a vision and strategy that all decisions can be measured against.’ 
[NED] 
‘I think the board of my trust has always been quite clear in its expectations of execs 
... I certainly feel like I'm held to account, whilst at the same time being supported.’ 
[Medical Director] 
In text comments in response to the question about purposes of the board, governance had 27 
mentions in terms of the role of the board being accountable to external stakeholders such as 
governors, regulators, patients and the wider public. With regard to patients this was 
expressed as being patient centred, listening to patients and focussing on patient experience. 
There was also an emphasis on working in partnership with other local health and care 
organisations in order to produce coordinated, integrated systems of care. There were also 
reports of having the right core values embedded into the culture of the organisation with an 
engaged workforce that would deliver the organisations objectives. 
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‘Our Board's focus is on the delivery of high quality care to patients and families, to 
provide this in a sustainable way within the financial envelope and to work in 
collaboration with the system to achieve that.’ [Chief Nurse] 
 ‘The staff are very important and their wellbeing is a constant focus of discussion.’ 
[NED] 
There was recognition of the multiple roles of boards and of the necessity of balancing 
competing demands or issues, and working within constraints. This could be difficult to 
achieve. Focussing on targets and key performance indicators (KPIs) was seen as part of the 
task, and special measures could provide a useful focus for Trusts in trouble, but there was a 
danger of focusing too much on performance detail and not enough on strategy or culture 
change and staff engagement. 
‘The Board considers its role to be more about day to day running of the Trust and 
holding to account than strategy. It has struggled to set a course between competing 
demands.’ [CEO] 
‘The current board agenda is dominated by navigating the Trust through 
exceptionally difficult strategic, commissioning, regulatory and financial terrain 
whilst not losing sight of the core values of high quality patient care.’ [NED] 
‘My Trust has been in special measures. Its purpose has been a simple one - Meet 
minimum regulatory requirements and in doing so provide safe services and exit 
special measures. In the longer terms the Board wants do this in a way which is 
financially sustainable.’ [Board Secretary] 
‘Its sovereignty as a Board is significantly constrained by the NHS organisational 
structure and culture and, of course, its financial freedom to operate. Against that 
context, the board sees its role as ensuring operational grip (clinical quality, patient 
experience, and financial outcomes) is maintained; trying to engender a more 
strategic approach to the Trust's activities; nurturing organisational and cultural 
change; and being accountable for delivery / performance.’ [Chair] 
There were a few mentions of different board members having different perspectives. While 
it was thought by some respondents that this could be helpful in terms of getting a rounded 
view and division of responsibilities, it could also potentially be problematic. 
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‘The Board is complex and I think that different individuals view it in different ways. 
All would agree that we need to set the overall strategy and then monitor 
implementation. I also think there would be consensus on the need to gain assurance 
on how major strategic risks are being managed. I think we struggle at times to 
reconcile this with the necessity to undertake deep dives and get into some of the 
detail around quality and safety. … Finally, our Board does struggle at times with the 
wide range of strategic priorities.’ [Finance Director] 
  
Challenges reported by boards 
We asked respondents to pick the top five challenges their board faced, drawn from a list of 
15 common challenges identified by the research team. These challenges were selected to be 
(logically) related to the various board purposes, with a view to investigating whether such 
relationships would hold empirically. The most important challenge perceived by respondents 
was patient safety, which scored higher than finances, which in turn scored higher than 
patient experience (see table 5). 
 
Table 5: Perceived challenges for boards in order of importance, showing statistically 
significant differences in importance between adjacent challenges 
Challenge 
Average 
score 
Our 
assessment 
of 
importance 
Patient safety 3.1 
Extremely 
high 
>   
Finances 2.2 Very high 
>   
Patient experience 1.6 High 
A&E performance 1.4  
Workforce shortage 1.3  
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Service reorganisation across the 
local health and social care economy 1.3 
 
Clinical effectiveness of care 1.2  
>   
Staff engagement 0.8 Medium 
>   
Organisation viability 0.6 Low 
Responding to regulators 0.5  
Referral to treatment (RTT) times 0.4  
Workforce capability 0.3  
Relationship with commissioners 0.2  
Infection control 0.2  
Organisation reputation 0.1  
(Rank 1 scores 5, Rank 2 scores 4, Rank 3 scores 3, Rank 4 scores 2, Rank 5 scores 1, 
otherwise scores 0) 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p< 0.01) 
 
A factor analysis (promax, Kaiser normalisation) indicated one latent factor, which we have 
characterised as a quality outcomes orientation, as opposed to a focus on organisational 
processes and inputs or national targets. This orientation places importance on clinical 
effectiveness, patient experience, patient safety and to some extent staff engagement, rather 
than on finances, A&E performance, workforce shortage and to some extent responding to 
regulators. This factor only accounted for 15% of the variance however, so does not on its 
own explain a large part of the data. 
Respondent comments on the challenges faced by the organisation, as perceived by the board, 
echoed and amplified comments made earlier in the survey about the purposes of the board 
(see above), reaffirming the centrality of quality and safety but highlighting the perceived 
difficulty of balancing these against financial pressures. 
‘If the safety of patients and the quality of services are a priority together with 
effective  staff engagement then many of the other challenges will follow e.g. 
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financial viability,  organisational reputation. It's getting those basics right that is 
imperative.’[NED] 
 ‘The board takes patient safety and experience as the key priorities but recognises 
that  these are the outputs of resources and especially staff. Therefore these latter 
issues are  seen as primary in terms of operational focus. We are undertaking a 
lot of work around  patient defined value in the knowledge from other industries 
that if this drives change,  most other matters will come right as an output of this 
central focus.’ [Finance Director] 
‘We have a number of competing challenges but the board will not compromise 
patient safety for targets or finance. Future sustainability across the whole health 
economy is a key issue, along with recruitment issues and increasing demand.’ [Board 
Secretary] 
For some boards, achieving safe staffing levels was regarded as being more important than 
financial sustainability, at least in the short term, whereas for others finances were regarded 
as a hard constraint. Some boards highlighted staff shortages in A&E and other service areas, 
particularly with regard to skilled clinical professionals, which threatened patient safety, or 
exacerbated financial problems because of the high cost of agency staff. In the medium term 
insufficient capital investment might also become an issue. 
‘We know we cannot function without great people. We have some very loyal staff, 
with over 40% with us for 10 years+. But we also have niche vacancies and high 
turnover in some areas, compounded by our own investments to expand, for instance, 
night time qualified nursing. This dwarfs all other issues, but demands good 
management, which we looking to develop greater capability in, as the gulf between 
our best teams and the weakest is a large gap.’ [CEO] 
Difficulties in achieving A&E targets were mentioned several times. While A&E 
performance was an important issue in its own right, and could produce unhelpful stakeholder 
attention – ‘naming and shaming’ – it was more often perceived as emblematic of a key 
underlying issue of lack of smooth/sufficient patient flow through the hospital, which 
produced inefficiencies and other undesirable effects. While some boards were focussed on 
internal actions to improve flow, 22 respondents indicated in their comments that they 
believed that this problem was primarily a wider system issue that lay beyond the control of 
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the trust, emanating from increased demand from a frailer, more elderly population. Many 
boards perceived that this required a system level perspective and radical change, so were 
seeking to work in collaboration with other stakeholders such as commissioners and local 
authorities. STPs were mentioned several times as the vehicle through which such 
collaboration was being sought. Some reconfiguration of services to improve patient 
pathways was being pursued. 
‘A&E performance as it is reputationally challenging and creates financial issues due 
to fines for non-performance. Ironic as the main reasons for failure are the delayed 
transfer of fit patients to external care which is an issue largely outside the immediate 
influence of the trust.’ [NED] 
A number of respondents saw value in a positive, proactive approach from boards, seeking to 
reshape the health system. There was an acknowledgement however that trying to lead 
system change, while also seeking to be collaborative with other organisations in the local 
health community, was difficult. Many respondents expressed frustration that other local 
stakeholders did not appear to share the same priorities, or lacked strategic leadership 
capacity, skills and experience. There was also concern about the many and various demands 
of the Department of Health, NHS England and regulators. There was perceived to be a lack 
of joined up thinking, with such demands sometimes being a distraction, or getting in the way 
of local system partnership working, rather than being supportive. Furthermore, the difficult 
financial situation made change even harder to achieve because of the additional costs of 
change. 
‘It's interesting how much the regulator influences the board's focus. So in breach of 
licence for finances and failing A&E target consumes the time.’ [Board Secretary] 
‘The financial difficulties prevalent across the sector are hugely distracting and 
frustrating and make it difficult to move forward the type of organisational and 
facilities changes which we know are required to prepare us for the demographic 
changes which will increase the pressures on our service areas.’ [NED] 
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Board member knowledge of what is important to patients, staff and 
regulators 
We asked board members to say how much they knew about what is important to the 
following groups: 
 Patients cared for by the organisation and their families 
 Staff employed by the organisation 
 Regulators 
The average scores indicated that board members felt they knew quite a lot about what was 
important to these stakeholder groups (figure 4). This was particularly the case for regulators, 
about whom knowledge scores were higher than the other two (p<0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank 
test). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Board member self-assessed knowledge of what is important to different 
stakeholder groups (average score based on ranks) 
 
(1 = Hardly anything; 3 = A little; 5 = A moderate amount; 7 = Quite a lot; 9= A massive 
amount) 
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Implementation and impact of the Francis Report recommendations 
Impact on the role of the board: emphases on different purposes 
We asked the 147 board member respondents who had been associated with their current 
board since before March 2013 how much they thought their board emphasised the various 
board purposes prior to the publication of the Francis Report in February 2013. The scores 
given to the different purposes followed a similar pattern to the scores given to current 
purposes, but were somewhat lower (see figure 5). All of the differences were statistically 
significant. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Emphasis on different board purposes and associated theories of boards: 
comparison of current and pre-Francis average scores (long-standing members only) 
(1 = Hardly at all; 3 = A little; 5 = Moderately; 7 = Quite a lot; 9 = Massively) 
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(p<0.01, Wilcoxon signed rank test) 
 
We asked longstanding board members to comment on what influence they thought the 
Francis Report had on how their board views its purpose and priorities, either directly or 
indirectly. 
Many respondents said that the report had prompted self-examination by the board to check 
that it was actually and consistently focussed on patient safety and quality as aims, and a re-
examination of governance processes and structures to ensure that they were contributing 
effectively to this. 
 
Developing new policies and implementing new actions 
Board secretaries responding to our survey question about how various policies had been 
developed since the publication of the Francis Report in February 2013, typically indicated 
that policies were already in place, but had been formally reviewed and reissued (table 7). For 
most policies, 15-20% had been newly established by trusts since the publication of the 
Francis Report. 
 
Table 6: How organisation-wide policies have developed since the publication of the 
Francis Report 
 
Newly 
established since 
Francis 
Pre-Francis 
policy has been 
formally 
reviewed and 
reissued 
Pre-Francis 
policy is still in 
place; not 
formally 
reviewed since 
No organisation-
wide policy 
Count 
Row N 
% Count 
Row N 
% Count 
Row N 
% Count 
Row N 
% 
Statement of common purpose, guiding 
principles, values and behaviours for the 
board and the organisation 
12 23.1% 33 63.5% 5 9.6% 2 3.8% 
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Policy on learning and improvement 9 20.5% 30 68.2% 4 9.1% 1 2.3% 
Policy on listening and responding to 
patients 
10 21.3% 34 72.3% 1 2.1% 2 4.3% 
Policy on how to raise concerns 11 20.8% 41 77.4% 1 1.9% 0 0.0% 
Policy on complaints handling 5 10.0% 44 88.0% 1 2.0% 0 0.0% 
Policy on openness about patient safety 
incidents 
10 20.4% 39 79.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Policy on improving staff wellbeing 8 17.4% 34 73.9% 3 6.5% 1 2.2% 
 
Over half of responding trusts had not newly established any of these policies since Francis, 
while 10% had established 5 or more new policies. This suggests some polarisation, with a 
lot of new policies formulated in some trusts, but few in the majority. Establishing at least 
one new policy was associated with having a lower CQC ell-Led Rating at the time of the 
survey (table 8). 
 
Table 7: Relationship between establishing at least one new policy since the publication 
of the Francis Report and the trust’s most recent CQC Well-Led Rating prior to the 
survey 
 
Count   
 
Previous CQC Well-Led Rating 
Total Inadequate 
Requires 
Improvement Good Outstanding 
At least one new policy established since the 
publication of the Francis Report 
No 0 13 12 1 26 
Yes 5 12 4 2 23 
Total 5 25 16 3 49 
(Chi Square = 9.2, df=3, p=0.03) 
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Board secretary respondents indicated many actions post-Francis (table 9). Over 70% of 
respondents said that regular reports to the board on ward-by-ward staffing levels had been 
newly established since Francis. A substantial minority of boards had also newly initiated 
patient stories in board meetings and various staff engagement activities. About a third of 
boards had also instigated external review s of the organisational climate, to include board 
leadership and values. Board and executive development was reported to have been reviewed 
by a majority of trusts. Board walkabouts, or quality walks, were most often mentioned under 
‘other activities’. 
 
  
86 
 
Table 8: Actions taken since the publication of the Francis Report 
 
Newly 
established since 
Francis 
Done pre-
Francis; formally 
reviewed since 
Done pre-
Francis; not 
formally 
reviewed since Not done 
Count 
Row N 
% Count 
Row N 
% Count 
Row N 
% Count 
Row N 
% 
Hearing and discussing patient stories at 
board meetings 
22 43.1% 7 13.7% 20 39.2% 2 3.9% 
Listening Into Action surgeries or events 
for staff led by board members 
18 36.0% 17 34.0% 12 24.0% 3 6.0% 
Other engagement activities with frontline 
staff, led by board members 
20 44.4% 5 11.1% 17 37.8% 3 6.7% 
Regular reports to the board on ward-by-
ward staffing levels 
37 72.5% 3 5.9% 10 19.6% 1 2.0% 
Collective board development days or half 
days 
6 11.8% 7 13.7% 32 62.7% 6 11.8% 
Individual executive leadership 
development 
7 16.7% 3 7.1% 24 57.1% 8 19.0% 
External review of the climate in the 
organisation, including board-level 
leadership and values 
15 31.9% 11 23.4% 15 31.9% 6 12.8% 
Other actions 5 33.3% 7 46.7% 3 20.0% 0 0.0% 
 
The distribution of total numbers of actions again suggested some polarisation, like the 
promulgation of new policies described above. Implementing at least three new actions was 
associated with having a lower CQC Well-Led Rating at the time of the survey (table 10). 
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Table 9: Relationship between implementing at least three new actions since the 
publication of the Francis Report and the trust’s most recent CQC Well-Led Rating 
prior to the survey 
Count   
 
Previous_CQC_Well_Led_Rating 
Total Inadequate 
Requires 
Improvement Good Outstanding 
At least three new actions implemented since the 
publication of the Francis Report 
No 1 12 14 3 30 
Yes 4 12 1 0 17 
Total 5 24 15 3 47 
(Chi Square = 13.5, df=3, p<0.01) 
 
Board member respondent views were rather mixed with regard to the actions arising from 
the Francis Report. Some respondents felt that there had been a change of mindset and a 
valuable refocusing on patients rather than on finance. They pointed to concrete examples of 
changes that they believed were positive. Greater emphasis was now given to board level 
engagement with staff, and generally collecting patient and staff feedback and other 
qualitative data and on getting to the bottom of issues rather than just looking at statistics and 
indicators. There were some mentions of candour and increased openness. 
‘It became ‘ok’ to talk about the patients and their care much more, the old adage of 
strategy as being the ‘in’ thing was actually eaten by the understanding that the right 
culture is what is really important. Looking after your patients but equally looking 
after your staff, communication, engagement, empowerment were all important 
previously, however post Francis this was ‘accepted’ as what we must do and it was 
not optional.’ [Chief Nurse] 
‘The Francis Report has made the Trust Board focus more on the safety of care, the 
quality of care and the outcomes of care provided by the Trust. An example of this is 
the creation of a Trust Board sub-committee entitled Quality & Patient Experience 
Committee.’ [NED]   
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‘It was a Stop moment for us.’ [NED] 
‘The Francis Report was a shock. It was clear from the report that any Board could 
be wrapped up in statistics and reports and fail to understand what was happening to 
patients on the ward. Much more emphasis is now given to Director visits and 
visibility and the Board holds regular conversations with its three divisions to assess 
the state of play in respect of patient care and safety.’ [NED] 
Many respondents believed that Francis had led to a much greater focus on staffing levels in 
order to ensure safe, high quality care. For some, this was thought to be at the expense of 
financial sustainability, creating new tensions with government bodies; for others it was 
about recognising and taking account of the links between funding, staffing and outcomes. 
‘More focus on safer nursing. However this has contributed to financial stresses. 
There is a huge supply and demand dilemma here. Not enough nurses nationally 
especially in certain specialities and agency caps should lead to bed closures to 
maintain safety ratios but demand for services and the number of very sick patients 
makes this a difficult call.’ [NED] 
Some board members said that while Francis had not changed the board’s direction, it had 
strengthened their resolve, provided them with an additional lever to help persuade other 
board members or staff and bring about change, and made them think through what needed to 
be done. 
‘The Francis Report did not cause us to change our values or objectives, or change 
the accountability we already felt for the conduct of the organisation in providing best 
care quality, but it did cause us to think hard about whether we really knew 
everything that we had to know, whether our staffing levels were what they should be, 
whether we cared properly for our patients.’ [NED] 
‘The Francis Report reminded the Board about the importance of good leadership 
and the priorities of the organisation. The Trust has moved on from the Francis 
Report, but a lot of its actions are the basis of some of how the Trust now looks at 
issues.’ [Board Secretary] 
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Others felt however that the Francis Report had achieved little, had been a waste of time, and 
had increased costs. There was some cynicism about whether it had really produced a change 
of approach. 
 ‘(The board) requested a thorough review of the report's recommendations but did 
not consider changes to its role or responsibilities were required.’ [Medical Director] 
‘It raised costs both by making far too many recommendations which turned into a 
massive additional paper chase across the NHS and by encouraging a general 
increase in nursing numbers which in turn led to a rapid rise in agency costs.’ [NED] 
‘Setting of  'safe staffing' levels without an agreed phasing meant Trusts were all 
fishing in the same limited pool at the same time. Almost overnight this made working 
as an agency nurse a very attractive career move. Following this we have had to 
spend huge amounts on Agency and on international recruitment. This expense is 
repeated across the entire NHS and could have been largely mitigated with a sensible 
phasing plan.’ [NED] 
‘The post Francis focus is not genuinely about whether patient experience is better or 
outcomes are enhanced it is just about having added quality metrics to the dashboard 
and wanting them to be green.’[CEO] 
There were some concerns that Francis had led to an increased bureaucratic burden of 
regulation and reporting which was time consuming and costly; although others saw positives 
in how regulation had changed. 
‘None - we still prioritise quality & safety. However, the difference is we spend more 
time having to prove it and watch each other’s backs.’ [CEO] 
‘The regulatory regime post Francis has impacted on putting quality first. There is 
more challenge and deep dives into quality.’ [Board Secretary] 
Some notes of caution for the future were sounded. In particular that there was a renewed 
emphasis on financial and performance targets: 
 ‘We focused to a far greater extent on listening and engaging staff and over the last 
three years that has really made an impact on our focus as an organisation. The real 
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test will be now we have been told the two priorities are money and A&E targets.’ 
[Finance Director] 
‘If anything, Francis is losing traction now. Messages from regulators appear to 
underline that finance and performance are more important than quality.’ [CEO] 
In summary: 
‘It has reinforced our focus on quality and safety. It has made us more aware of the 
risks of boards not understanding what is going on. Both of these were achieved by 
the initial report. It has also made life harder by producing an unnecessarily long list 
of recommendations which we have had to monitor, by prompting a competition for 
extra nurses which has exacerbated shortages, and by making the inspection regime 
more aggressive and costly.’ [NED] 
 
Impact on board views about which challenges are important 
We also asked the 147 longstanding board members to rank the top five challenges that their 
boards faced pre-Francis, choosing from a list of challenges that we supplied. Comparing 
these rankings with current rankings, the most important challenges are perceived to be the 
same ones (table 11). Workforce shortage and service reorganisation across the local health 
and social care economy have however become markedly more important issues for board 
members. On the other hand, board members regard infection control, relationships with 
commissioners, responding to regulators, referral to treatment times and organisation 
reputation as being less important challenges now. None of these were regarded as 
particularly important previously, but they are still less important now. 
Table 10: Perceived challenges for boards, showing statistically significant differences in 
importance between pre-Francis and the time of the survey  
Challenge 
Average 
score 
currently 
 Average 
score pre-
Francis 
Patient safety 3.1  3.1 
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Finances 2.2  2.0 
    
Patient experience 1.6  1.7 
A&E performance 1.4  1.5 
Workforce shortage 1.3 > 0.6 
Service reorganisation across the 
local health and social care economy 
1.3 > 0.6 
Clinical effectiveness of care 1.2  1.3 
    
Staff engagement 0.8  0.6 
    
Organisation viability 0.6  0.5 
Responding to regulators 0.5 < 0.8 
Referral to treatment (RTT) times 0.4 < 0.7 
Workforce capability 0.3  0.2 
Relationship with commissioners 0.2 < 0.6 
Infection control 0.2 < 0.7 
Organisation reputation 0.1 < 0.3 
(Rank 1 scores 5, Rank 2 scores 4, rank 3 scores 3, rank 4 scores 2, rank 5 scores 1, otherwise 
scores 0) 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p< 0.01) 
 
Most respondents did not provide comments about the role of the Francis Report in 
influencing the importance of challenges. The overall impression is of important challenges 
being associate with more proximal and direct causes than the Francis Report. Of the two 
challenges that had increased significantly in importance, board member comments have 
connected workforce shortages with Francis, but service reorganisation would appear to be 
largely due to other factors, such as the advent of STPs, and only indirectly to Francis, which 
had contributed to financial issues becoming prominent and hence the need for service 
reconfiguration to reduce costs. 
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There were a number of comments about the difficulty of balancing different priorities. 
Finances were typically mentioned in regard to this, despite the importance of financial 
challenge apparently not having risen significantly. Francis was also sometimes referred to as 
contributing to this difficulty, because it had ruled out reducing staffing to save money, 
although some other comments suggested that this was no longer the case. 
‘The differences in the two responses above (current and pre-Francis challenges) are 
about timing, not about Francis. Our whole landscape has changed in 3 years: we 
had good finances and full compliance on all targets in 2013- now we don't so there 
are now our big challenges. Patient safety was and is the highest priority, but it's not 
the biggest challenge.’ [NED] 
 ‘It is extremely challenging trying to keep the three points of the triangle in balance - 
Safe services, target delivery and financial balance. When the numbers don't add up 
any more and there a limited places to look (after many years of Cost Improvements 
and the option to reduce ward based staff is no-longer there (post Francis) then there 
is a high risk that target delivery will be compromised.’ [NED] 
 ‘We’ve been ‘riding’ the quality and safety horse since Francis but others are making 
the finance and performance horse their bet.’ [Chief Nurse] 
 
Impact on board member knowledge about what is important to patients, 
staff and regulators 
We also asked the 147 longstanding board members about their knowledge of what was 
important to patients, staff, and regulators, respectively, pre-Francis. All of the groups rated 
their knowledge levels as being higher now than they were pre-Francis (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6: How much board members know about what is important to patients, staff 
and regulators: Comparison of current and pre-Francis average scores (long-standing 
members only) 
(1 = Hardly anything; 3 = A little; 5 = A moderate amount; 7 = Quite a lot; 9 = A massive 
amount) 
(p<0.01, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test) 
 
We asked respondents what influence they thought the Francis Report had had on their board 
knowing about what is important to patients, staff and regulators. 47 out of 144 who provided 
additional comments in answer to this question said that the impact had been minimal, and 
some of these indicated that they already had mechanisms in place to provide good 
knowledge in these areas. In some instances where there had been changes, these were 
thought to be more due to the initiative of new board members rather than to the Francis 
Report. 
‘Little, we did that before Francis II.’ [Medical Director] 
‘I don't know - staff survey and friends and family test certainly inform the Board. 
Patients’ stories, Board walkabouts, staff forums, Quality report were all in place 
from 2010.’ [Medical Director] 
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Some respondents highlighted greater engagement with staff or patients. A few respondents 
said that new mechanisms for obtaining feedback had been established, such as staff with 
responsibility for patient experience, or patients’ councils. 
‘We were always strong on listening to patients, but since Francis we have also paid 
much more attention in listening to our staff.’ [Chair] 
‘Execs have established an 'in your shoes' programme and spend time doing other 
people's jobs on the shop floor.’ [CEO] 
‘Prompted us to ask more questions of patients and staff. Much more co-design with 
both groups.’ [Chair] 
‘It prompted a much stronger focus on the patient experience, their views and the 
views of their relatives or carers. We now have a patient experience coordinator, who 
marshals patient stories for Trust Board.’ [NED] 
However, a small number of respondents said that engagement strategies were developed 
through consultation with and involvement of local stakeholders, with local views being a 
greater influence on the strategy than the recommendations from Francis. 
‘The (patient experience) strategy was lead locally by staff, patients and service users 
but clearly took into account national initiatives and recommendations.’ [Chief 
Nurse] 
There was a sense that knowledge of what was important to regulators hadn’t needed to be 
increased, because regulators had good communication channels to trust leadership anyway. 
‘Not a lot. We knew what patients wanted and were told in no uncertain terms what 
regulators wanted.’ [Chair] 
 
Impact on the leadership style and behaviours of the board 
We asked longstanding board members how they thought the leadership style and behaviours 
of their board had changed since February 2013, and what the influence of the Francis Report 
had been, either directly or indirectly. Some said there had been little change. Others referred 
to new board members having produced positive change. It was thought that some new 
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executive directors lacked depth and breadth of experience however, and a degree of stability 
of board membership might be helpful. 
‘We have had fundamental changes but this is down to a change in all of our NEDs 
(including the chair), a new CEO and a new COO. All of which has made a huge 
difference for the better.’ [Board Secretary] 
‘We have experienced significant change to the board structure and membership at 
Executive Director level which combined with the maturity and experience of 3 of the 
NEDs has led to a very open and honest environment which is very healthy and 
productive. I am not sure that the time limit on the service of NEDs is in the best 
interests of the NHS. With churn at board level of Execs the stability of the NED 
contribution is extremely important.’ [NED] 
Boards could also develop without changes in personnel. 
‘Our board is a very stable board, with a very stable executive team. We haven't 
changed - but we have grown and developed and have brought to life a very engaging 
style with our workforce.’ [CEO] 
A number of respondents thought that their board had become more open, transparent and 
visible, engaging more with staff, patients and the public, governors and external 
stakeholders, with a view to learning and collaboration and an emphasis on values. This was 
sometimes linked with non-executive directors being more challenging. There were also 
references to boards being more unitary with members working well as a team and supporting 
each other. Challenge and support could complement each other, but in some instances 
greater NED challenge was seen to have impeded board cohesion. 
‘Greater openness and transparency. More focus on acting on feedback and 
improving patient experience, and on creating a learning organisation. More 
emphasis on the board holding the executives to account but with some detriment to 
the board functioning in (a) unitary way.’ [Board Secretary] 
‘In spite of our personality style I think we are made to feel we should be much more 
vocal in Boards. I resent this to a degree since I spend a lot of time in the hospital 
working with senior management and sitting on committees which feed into Clinical 
Governance. What is the point of making a set piece statement about an issue that you 
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know is declining in target achievement but you know the plan, you know what is 
being done and you are trying to be part of the solution!’ [NED] 
There were few mentions of boards having changed for the worse. Some may have become 
more directive. 
‘The Leadership style has become more direct and not necessarily supportive or 
facilitative.’ [CEO] 
Views were mixed about the extent to which these changes had been influenced by the 
Francis Report. Some perceived little or no influence on their board, whereas others 
perceived massive influence (typically positive) on their board’s approach. Where there had 
been impactful changes in board membership however, these were typically regarded as not 
being a consequence of the Francis Report, and of being more important than any changes 
due to Francis. Some respondents connected Francis with increased regulation, reporting 
requirements and central direction, which they regarded as unhelpful distractions. 
 ‘Just another set of action plans to add to all the others e.g. Mid-Staffs, Keogh. We 
and many other trusts suffer from ‘response to reports fatigue’ … whilst we struggle 
to afford basic maintenance never mind new initiatives.’ [NED] 
 ‘The Francis Reports had a significant impact on changing the focus on the Board 
and resulted in it feeling more accountable, and indeed more vulnerable, to external 
regulation.’ [CEO] 
‘Heightened accountability and ownership of the patient safety agenda and a greater 
challenge on issues beyond the national must dos.’ [Chair] 
‘It did raise the profile of patient safety, make us think much harder about the Duty of 
Candour and result in an increase in ward staff .... but I don't think it materially 
altered the Boards leadership style.’ [NED] 
‘Reconfirmed the need for openness and accountability … Francis has also provided 
a real impact to the need for whole systems leadership.’ [NED] 
For some, Francis was receding into the background, but for others it was still emblematic. 
‘The Francis Report has acted as a reminder of what sort of an organisation we don't 
want to be like, and continues to be a reminder.’ [NED] 
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Board Impact 
We asked the 147 longstanding board members about their assessments of board impact since 
February 2013 with regard to the following: 
 Organisational performance 
 Patient safety 
 Patient experience 
 Patient voice 
 Board visibility within the organisation 
 Staff engagement 
 External relationships with other stakeholders in the local health and social care 
economy 
Overall, respondents believed that their boards had made all of these outputs or outcomes 
quite a lot better (figure 7). The greatest perceived impact was on patient safety. Patient voice 
and organisational performance were not perceived to have improved by as much as the 
others. All of the impacts were highly correlated with each other. Very few responses 
indicated negative impacts, but there were a small number for external stakeholder relations, 
organisational performance and board visibility. 
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Figure 7: Perceptions of board impact since February 2013 
 
(-5/-4 = Made it massively worse; -3/-2 = Made it quite a lot worse; -2/-1 = Made it a little 
worse; 0 = Made no difference; 1/2 = Made it a little better; 2/3 = Made it quite a lot better; 
4/5 = Made it massively better)  
 
5.4 Implementation and impact of the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement 
We asked board secretaries to indicate the various potential actions their organisation had 
taken to implement the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement. The majority of respondents said 
that their organisation had carried out background checks on existing board directors and on 
new appointments (see table 12). A small proportion had responded to CQC concerns about 
directors. The other actions reported were largely concerned with requirements for directors 
to make an annual declaration, sometimes as part of an annual review which involved checks 
with relevant external agencies such as Companies House. 
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Table 11: Actions taken to implement the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement 
 
Yes No 
Count 
Row N 
% Count 
Row N 
% 
Carried out background checks on existing board directors 38 (80.9%) 9 (19.1%) 
Carried out background checks on new appointments (since the requirement came 
into force in November 2014) 
44 (93.6%) 3 (6.4%) 
Responded to CQC concerns about directors 4 (8.5%) 43 (91.5%) 
Other actions to implement Fit and Proper Persons Requirement 13 (27.7%) 34 (72.3%) 
No actions to implement Fit and Proper Persons Requirement 0 (0.0%) 47 (100.0%) 
 
All respondents were asked to comment on the impacts of implementing the Fit and Proper 
Persons Requirement. Many said that there had been little impact, as no issues had been 
identified with regard to current or past directors, and the self-declaration element could be 
regarded as a tick box exercise. A small number of respondents suggested that the 
requirement had reputational benefits for the organisation and provided some reassurance to 
the public. It was thought that the requirement could contribute towards a culture of 
transparency and cause individual directors to reflect on moral and ethical values, and was 
not suggested to be a deterrent to recruitment. 
‘It went well and an Internal Audit of this subject highlighted quite a few areas where 
we needed to improve our record keeping for those concerned with this aspect of 
regulation. We are now fully up to speed on this one.’ [NED] 
‘Internally, the annual performance review process has been beefed up and 
standardised to ensure expectations of individuals are met.’ [NED] 
Many board members reported that their trust already had similar processes in place, but 
typically the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement had codified and extended these. In a few 
trusts the requirement had prompted perceived improvements in recruitment policies, 
procedures and practices to provide due diligence. Views differed about the resources taken 
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up by administering the requirement, but the overall  balance was that it was not overly 
onerous and was consistent with good governance, albeit that the impact might be marginal. 
Individual respondents suggested that increasing the diversity of board members and 
reducing central regulation and ‘bashing’ of managers were of greater importance with regard 
to recruitment to the board. 
‘The checks required prior to implementing the FPP requirement were already fairly 
rigorous and the additional checks (insolvency, disqualified directors) were minimal 
in terms of the burden they represented.’ [Board Secretary] 
‘The rationale behind Fit and Proper Persons recruitment is sound and the impacts 
are positive. The approach is highly relevant to ensuring rigour in the recruitment of 
appropriate persons to roles within the NHS.’ [Chair] 
‘The centrally defined requirement is not that fit for purpose. It has not shown up any 
'bad apples' or 'undesirables' in our Trust. Looks to be another box ticking type 
activity.’ [NED] 
Where the requirement had revealed potential issues, then it was reported that the impact 
could be large. For example, the subsequent investigation could be disruptive, time 
consuming and expensive. A small number of concerns were expressed about the rules 
emphasising problematic issues. 
‘One of the concerns is the retrospective nature of the requirement: actions from 
years ago may be picked up and gone over, as happened to a CEO in a nearby trust. 
She was vindicated, but it opens up all sorts of possible needs to carry out expensive 
reviews (the internal review in that case was held not to be independent enough) 
which could cause uncertainty and instability within a trust until the repost has been 
provided. I don't think the definitions are clear enough and nor are the actions that a 
trust should take if it is alleged that due to some past action a board member's fitness 
and properness is called into question.’ [NED] 
 
5.5 Implementation and impact of the Freedom to Speak Up Guardian 
We asked respondents how their board had implemented the Freedom to Speak Up Guardian 
role. Trusts are at various stages of the implementation process, from reviewing pre-existing 
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arrangements, such as raising concerns and whistleblowing policies and procedures, to 
developing a new model and roles, to implementing the new model through staff recruitment, 
etc. A significant proportion of respondents were however either not aware of the guardian 
role, or not aware of how it was being implemented. 
A number of trusts had pre-existing arrangements including a lead NED for whistleblowing, 
and facilitating opportunities to access governors and senior managers. Some trusts 
determined that these arrangements already met the requirements, and appeared to have 
simply rebadged and re-publicised these. Some trusts were awaiting the outcome of 
consultation on a national whistleblowing policy, so that their arrangements could dovetail 
with this. 
‘Nominated a NED - that's about it.’ [Finance Director] 
‘Existing policies have been reviewed and a nominated non-executive director now 
has responsibility as part of their portfolio. This is being widely publicised and will 
supplement existing processes and practices that exist and are robust within the 
Trust.’ [Board Secretary] 
‘One has been appointed - me - but it has not been embraced by the Trust and I do not 
yet feel that I am in role and can make a difference.’ [NED] 
Arrangements appeared typically to consist of employing a guardian, sometimes part-time, 
together with a network of staff acting as champions in different parts of the organisation, 
plus confidential email addresses and phone numbers and various forms of publicity (e.g., 
incorporation into induction). The guardian would have access to a nominated lead NED and 
lead ED for support, typically the CEO.  
Some concerns were expressed that the Guardian needed to be external if there was to be 
confidence in the role. One trust was planning to work with another trust to provide external 
support, while others saw governors as an appropriate channel. 
Where the role had been implemented, comments suggested that this was having a positive 
impact, while also acknowledging that much would need to be done to embed a culture of 
speaking up across and around professional hierarchies. 
‘We have implemented multiple channels to encourage freedom to speak up - through 
the unions, through staff governors, through specialist designated staff. Feedback has 
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improved substantially. Role play sessions at our clinical governance half days have 
proved very effective at getting all staff to understand how their behaviours might 
stifle important warnings or contributions from staff team members.’ [Finance 
Director] 
One respondent however suggested that the model was already outdated in a social media 
age. 
‘This is now already irrelevant and old fashioned. Transparency is through social 
media for which there is no filter or censorship and from which there is no hiding 
place. The public are and will become more their own 'speak up' guardians and we 
already see this.’ [Chair] 
 
5.6 Impact of the Duty of Candour 
We asked respondents for their assessments of the impact of implementing the Duty of 
Candour on various aspects of the organisation and its functioning. The overall picture is of 
marked increases in the openness of the culture and in learning and improvement (see figure 
8), albeit this is based on subjective judgements of a complex situation. There would also 
appear to have been some net reputational benefits and increases in patient confidence and in 
whistleblowing, but little change in numbers of complaints and litigation claims. 
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Figure 8: Impact of implementing the Duty of Candour 
 
Comments indicated that the policy had required substantial resources to implement, 
particularly with regard to staff training. The amount of documentation required was seen by 
some as potentially burdensome to frontline clinicians, with a danger of tick box compliance 
and routine issuing of letters rather than keeping to the spirit of the policy and 
communicating sensitively with patients and families following an error. 
‘We have spent a great deal of time and money on comprehensive training across the 
trust. It is probably too soon to judge if that is now engrained in the culture.’ [Chair] 
‘It is quite onerous as the process is very prescriptive e.g. need to follow up 
conversation with a formal letter and to keep an audit trail. There is a danger of it 
becoming a tick box exercise. It has involved a lot of training which is a positive thing 
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and our trust has tried to focus on the quality of the conversation and learning.’ 
[Board Secretary] 
In common with other aspects of Francis, some respondents felt that their trust had already 
been practising the values and behaviours of the Duty of Candour. These respondents 
typically perceived little value, although some saw benefits in the greater formalisation and 
an opportunity to reinforce the existing approach. 
 ‘I believe we were already very open but this has reinforced the message. Duty of 
Candour is mentioned very regularly in board meetings.’ [NED] 
‘It is a natural extension of what we did, with more formality and more conscious 
expectation.’ [NED] 
Other respondents identified better handling of complaints and incidents by clinicians, which 
was appreciated by patients and relatives. 
‘Patients appreciate our openness and honesty and staff feel much more comfortable 
in identifying, acknowledging and identifying the learning from when things go wrong 
or not as planned.’ [NED] 
‘Whilst ethically all professionals would feel a Duty of Candour (since this is the 
basis of honesty and integrity and respect to our patients and their families), the 
formalisation of this has helped many staff reflect upon its importance and thus 
embed such integrity into their practice.’ [Medical Director] 
A number of respondents stressed that it takes time and perseverance to change the 
organisational culture and make openness and candour a norm for all staff. A couple of 
respondents pointed out that the word ‘candour’ was not readily understood by all staff, and 
suggested a change in terminology. 
‘It is the correct way forward but trust in staff needs to be nurtured to remove the 
'blame culture'.  Staff and patients need to be encouraged to talk to one another and 
resolve issues in a professional and transparent way. Time is needed to achieve this 
change in culture.’ [NED] 
‘When you ask (staff) about Duty of Candour they look vacant. If you ask the about 
openness etc they know what you mean. The term needs to change!’ [NED] 
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‘We, as a Trust Board have to think very carefully each time something appropriate 
arises where Duty of Candour might have an impact. We are now moving quite 
clearly to a position where we routinely consider this in our various actions on a day 
to day basis.’ [NED] 
 
5.7 Barriers to improving board leadership 
We asked respondents to indicate significant barriers to improving its leadership that their 
board had experienced, by choosing from a list of common barriers drawn up by the research 
team. Financial pressures and meeting the demands of regulators were selected by a majority 
of respondents (figure 9). Substantial minorities of respondents also experienced barriers 
arising from poor relationships with others in the local health and social care economy, acting 
on the many reports for boards issued after Francis, and recruitment and retention of 
executive directors. 
 
Figure 9: Respondents reporting barriers to improving board leadership 
 
The recruitment and retention variables were correlated – in 70% of the instances in which 
recruitment and retention of the CEO was perceived to have been a barrier, recruitment and 
retention of other executive directors had also been a barrier. Financial pressures and meeting 
regulator demands were also related – in 83% of the instances where meeting demands of 
regulators was perceived to have been a barrier, financial pressures had also been a barrier. 
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Both of these variables were also related to action on reports issued after Francis, although 
the correlation was lower. The results of a factor analysis were suggestive of three factors: 
recruitment and retention issues; external/national agency demands and pressures; and local 
health and social care economy issues. 
A number of comments highlighted the quality of current leadership as a barrier. The board 
itself could be problematic, either due to poor leadership from individuals in key roles (Chair, 
CEO), or the culture or experience of the board as a whole. Some respondents indicated that 
recruitment and retention of NEDs could also be a barrier, together with associated issues of  
not having appropriate skills and experience, or lack of diversity or being sufficiently 
representative of the local community. A small number of respondents said that insufficient 
remuneration of board members was a problem, particularly in non-foundation trusts. 
Respondents also highlighted that good leadership at board level needed to be backed up by 
good leadership throughout the organisation. There were two themes within this: the need to 
recruit high quality managers below board level, and the need to improve the quality of 
clinical leadership, all within the context that these roles might not always be sufficiently 
attractive. 
Many comments indicated that a lack of system leadership nationally and locally were 
problematic. A lack of coherent long term strategy and consistency among politicians, 
government agencies and commissioners made it difficult for boards to plan. Respondents 
also said that strategic thinking could be squeezed out because of demands caused by system 
shortcomings: a lack of coordination, with too many initiatives and reporting requirements 
from government agencies and regulators; and having to address pressing operational issues 
arising from insufficient capacity in other parts of the local health and care system. 
‘Lack of a clear vision for the local health economy with local CCG overspent and its 
own Board in a state of flux.   Local health & social care organisations being forced 
to reduce costs unilaterally putting pressure on others rather than a whole system 
approach.’ [NED] 
‘Although the relationships with others in the local economy could not be said to be 
‘poor’, they are not necessarily helpful. What is lacking is system leadership to try to 
overcome individual agendas and encourage collective thinking and action for the 
benefit of patients. There appears to be too much sitting on the sidelines by 
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commissioners, regulators and key players and an aversion to any level of risk 
taking.’ [Board Secretary] 
‘Our Executives spend too much time reacting to external audits and reports and not 
sufficient on developing the strategic direction of the individual clinical specialties 
with the clinicians. It is hard to develop a culture of empowerment with accountability 
in this hospital when the NHS itself suffers from a culture of command and control 
and management by committee with little individual accountability. Both are 
completely outdated in the year 2016!’ [NED] 
‘Reactive focus on regulators’ demands and insufficient time set aside for forward 
thinking. Lack of investment in understanding in detail the needs of our health 
economy and the views of our stakeholder. We limp from crisis to crisis.’ [NED] 
 
5.8 Board development 
We asked board members to estimate how many days of individual leadership development 
they had participated in during the last 12 months. We also asked board secretaries to 
estimate how many collective board development full and half days there had been. Seminars 
and briefing sessions were excluded. 
20% of respondents said they had not participated in any individual leadership development 
during the last 12 months. The median was participating in three days of leadership 
development. 
Executive directors generally participated in more days of leadership development (median 4 
days) than did NEDs and chairs (median 2 days) (p<0.01, independent samples median test). 
This is in line with expectations, as most executive directors work full time, while NEDs are 
part time. To allow for this, in subsequent analyses we have applied a simple global 
correction factor of two to the development days indicated by NEDs and Chairs. 
 
5.9 Associations with indicators of leadership effectiveness 
We investigated the relationships between variables, including with indicators of leadership 
effectiveness, in the form of Care Quality Commission (CQC) Well-Led Ratings (CQC 
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2015b) at trust level and selected NHS staff survey (NSS) scores (NSS 2016). The dataset is 
complex to analyse fully on two counts. First, it includes data at two different levels: 
board/organisation (e.g. NSS scores) and individual board member (e.g. days of leadership 
development). Rigorous analysis of such data typically requires the use of multi-level 
modelling techniques that take account of the likelihood that members of the same 
board/organisation will provide more similar responses than will members of different 
boards. Second, response rates varied greatly between different boards/organisations, with the 
number of respondents from each board varying between zero and seven. Such ‘unbalanced’ 
data makes multi-level modelling more challenging and reduces its power. 
Contrary to expectations, initial analyses indicated that while there were was some variation 
in the data which could be attributed to factors at the organisational/board level, levels of 
agreement between respondents from the same board were not particularly high, despite 
being asked questions directly about their board. We calculated Intra-class Correlation 
Coefficients (ICC’s) for each variable as per Lüdtke et al. (2009). ICC1 was typically of the 
order of 0.1 and ICC2 of the order of 0.25, much lower than the suggested 0.8 cut off if 
aggregating individual board member responses is to provide a reliable average figure for 
each board. 
In view of these complications and the complexity of the dataset, we have conducted 
exploratory bivariate and multivariate regression analyses which do not involve multi-level 
modelling in order to get a sense of the relationships between variables. In order to reduce the 
risk of spurious results, we have focused only on highly statistically significant relationships 
which are robust to exclusion of outliers and high leverage points. The following findings 
should however be regarded as indicative. 
In this section we consider the following indicators of impact: 
1. Board member assessments of board impact since February 2013 on patient 
experience, patient voice etc. 
2. CQC Well-Led Ratings for the trust at the inspection closest in time to the survey 
3. NSS scores on four indicators of leadership up until 2016 
CQC ratings and NSS scores are correlated with each other, but not with board member 
assessments of board impact since February 2013. These assessments could only be provided 
by relatively longstanding board members however, restricting the size of the dataset. 
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Board member assessments of board impact since February 2013 were correlated with the 
amount of leadership development they had participated in during the past 12 months. The 
highest correlations were with impact on patient experience, staff engagement and patient 
voice (p<0.01). Correlations were low for impact on organisational performance and external 
relationships with other stakeholders locally. 
Board impact self-assessments were also correlated with emphases on the different board 
purposes. Some correlations concorded with expectations from theories of board 
performance. For example: greater emphasis on representing all stakeholders is particularly 
strongly correlated with impact on patient voice relative to correlations with other impacts, 
and greater emphasis on holding the executive to account is more strongly correlated with 
impact on organisational performance than with other impacts. There are various significant 
correlations however, and more sophisticated analysis would be required to more confidently 
determine the key relationships.  
Board impact self-assessments are most highly correlated with assessments of impacts of 
implementing the Duty of Candour, particularly the impact on patient confidence in the 
organisation. CQC ratings and NSS scores are correlated with emphases on the different 
board purposes, being a foundation trust, and being a specialist trust. They are negatively 
correlated with various barriers to leadership improvement: particularly recruitment and 
retention of CEO and executive directors, but also financial pressures, meeting demands of 
regulators and poor relationships with other stakeholders locally. They are negatively 
correlated with the total number of beds and with the impact of the Duty of Candour on the 
openness of the organisation’s culture, and respondents joining the board more recently tend 
to be from trusts with lower CQC ratings (see above). 
To develop this analysis further we conducted a multivariate statistical analysis in the form of 
binary logistic regressions and ordinal regressions. The dependent variable for each 
regression was a variant of the CQC Well-Led Rating for the trust that was closest in time to 
the survey data collection period, based on CQC inspection dates. The independent variables 
were drawn from the list in the previous paragraph, and various stepwise procedures were 
used to identify a set of variables which contributed significantly to the model fit. The binary 
logistic regressions focused on distinguishing CQC ratings of Good and above from lower 
ratings; one set of ordinal regressions focused on unadjusted CQC ratings, the remainder 
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combined Inadequate and Requires Improvement ratings into a single category because 
previous modelling suggested that independent variables did not distinguish these categories. 
The various regressions produced similar results. The independent variables that were 
consistently statistically significant in the models (p<0.01) are listed in table 13. The 
confidence intervals for the coefficients in the model were quite wide, so we cannot be 
confident in the relative strengths of the associations with different variables. 
 
Table 12: Variables associated with CQC Well-Led Ratings 
Higher CQC rating Lower CQC rating 
Emphasis perceived across the five board 
purposes 
Is a foundation trust 
Recruitment and retention of EDs perceived 
as a barrier 
Meeting demands of regulators perceived as 
a barrier 
Is an acute trust 
 
A higher CQC rating was positively associated with a stronger self-reported emphasis on all 
board purposes, with the biggest difference on holding executives to account (see figure 10 
below). 
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Figure 10: Association between CQC Well-Led Ratings and board emphasis on 
different purposes 
 
  
Correlations with other variables may provide some pointers to what underlies the lower 
ratings of acute trusts and the higher ratings of foundation trusts.  Being a respondent from an 
acute trust is also associated with clinical effectiveness of care not being perceived as an 
important challenge, RTT times not being perceived as an important challenge, A&E 
performance being perceived as an important challenge, number of beds, recruitment and 
retention of EDs being a barrier, poor relationships with others locally being a barrier and 
financial pressures being a barrier. 
Being a respondent from a foundation trust is associated with an emphasis on holding 
directors to account, an emphasis on enhancing the reputation of the organisation, an 
emphasis on representing the interests of all stakeholders, having joined the board more 
recently, a higher proportion of female board members, fewer beds, knowing more about 
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what is important to staff, recruitment and retention of EDs and CEO not being a barrier and 
poor relationships with others locally not being a barrier. 
We conducted further multivariate analyses with CQC rating as the independent variable, but 
including the variables listed in the previous two paragraphs rather than those indicating 
whether trusts are acute or foundation trusts. The results were less clear cut than for the 
previous regressions. In addition to the ones in the previous model, the strongest consistent 
relationships were positive associations with the proportion of women on the board. There 
were less consistent and generally weaker associations with being a relatively longstanding 
board member (positive), poor relationships with others locally being a barrier (negative) and 
with the number of beds (negative). 
 
5.10 Summary of main findings from the national survey 
As reported above, the main self-reported challenges for trusts are patient safety, finances, 
dealing with regulator demands, workforce shortages and, for some, poor relationships in the 
local health economy. Patient safety is generally reported as a very high priority for boards. 
Long-term financial sustainability is also regarded as important, and numerous respondents 
said that the current access and finance targets environment can make it difficult to hold the 
line on maintaining quality and safety. Managing the demands of multiple system regulators 
is sometimes experienced as distracting from the strategic and monitoring tasks of boards. 
We now summarise the main findings against the three research objectives as set out in table 
4 in our methodology chapter that this survey addresses: 
1. To identify, describe and assess the different ways in which the boards of NHS 
hospital trusts and foundation trusts have sought to implement the 
recommendations on organisational leadership set out in Hard Truths and the 
Healthy NHS Board. 
The survey results show that board members see it as their role to provide a high level of 
challenge to the executive team. This suggests a concern for performance, addressed by 
ensuring that the executive directors are held to account and scrutinised effectively at board 
meetings. However, the relatively small difference between board purpose scores and, 
particularly, the high score given to supporting the executive directors, suggests that board 
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members recognise the importance of high levels of support, combined with high challenge 
within a board environment. The emphasis placed on holding the executive to account can be 
seen to reflect one of the three key roles for boards within The Healthy Board guidance, that 
of ensuring accountability. The relatively high scores for representing the interests of all 
stakeholders and for reconciling competing interests, albeit the bottom two board purpose 
scores, might suggest that boards are also beginning to commit to one of the key building 
blocks also contained within the report, that of giving priority to engagement within and 
beyond the organization. Boards that embody the range of NHS Healthy Board principles and 
practices may be correlated with higher performance, with statistical evidence showing a 
positive association between higher CQC ratings and a stronger self-reported emphasis on 
board purposes that stress both challenge and support at board level, as well as stakeholder 
engagement.  
The majority of boards had not newly established their organization-wide policies, choosing 
instead to formally review and reissue existing policies. This might suggest that the changes 
required post-Francis involved alteration or reinforcement of existing policies, as opposed to 
wholesale revision. Those boards with lower CQC ratings within the Well-Led domain were 
correlated with establishing at least one new policy, post-Francis. This indicates that the 
greatest level of learning has taken place within those trusts with the most need of 
improvement. The number of board level actions, however, has increased substantially post-
Francis, with the introduction of reports on ward-by-ward staffing levels, patient stories at 
board meetings and board walkabouts, reflecting the implementation of recommendations 
within the Hard Truths Report.  
Greater emphasis is now widely given to board level engagement with staff, gaining 
feedback, and considering a broad range of information, which also reflects a further building 
block contained with the Healthy NHS Board Report, which is to arrive at sound judgments 
about organization performance informed by multiple sources of data. The extent to which 
board members feel they are having an impact on patient experience, staff engagement and 
patient voice is correlated with a higher number of board development days, suggesting that 
increased training enhances the self-assessed ability of the board to act on requested varied 
intelligence and stakeholder engagement. The fact that board members reported that they 
knew slightly more what was important to regulators than to staff or patients is telling with 
regard to the ways in which  boards call for, discuss and process information about 
performance and their de facto  sense of accountabilities. 
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Overall, many boards have taken actions to improve the conduct and content of board 
meetings by introducing reports on staffing levels, patient stories and board walkabouts. A 
much greater emphasis on making decisions based on qualitative feedback from a range of 
sources, as well as analyzing quantitative data, has been implemented. Boards are also 
reporting that they see their purpose as encapsulating a range of different roles, from holding 
the executive to account to representing the interests of all stakeholders.   
2. To identify which mechanisms used by hospital boards have led to reported 
improvements (or otherwise) in local organisational strategies, structures and 
culture, and the factors underpinning such progress. 
Mechanisms for obtaining the views of patients, staff and regulators included designating 
staff with specific responsibility for patient experience, or implementing patient councils. 
However, many respondents said that listening mechanisms were already in place before 
Francis, or that newly developed feedback processes were developed through engagement 
with local stakeholders, as distinct from being generated by the Francis Report. Trusts were at 
various stages of implementing the Freedom to Speak Up Guardian role, with positive 
impacts, such as improved feedback, found when the function had been more fully 
developed. However, it was also highlighted that much more needed to be done to achieve 
culture change, with some suggesting that the traditional guardian role may be outdated, 
given the rise in the influence of social media. 
The Healthy NHS Board Report placed emphasis on the importance of having highly 
qualified directors who are capable of setting strategy, monitoring and managing 
performance, and emphasising quality improvement. The report also stresses that there 
should be a balance between continuity and renewal in appointments.  Respondents found the 
arrival of new non-executive directors to have led to major improvements in the working of 
the board, including increased openness and transparency, and greater level of engagement 
with staff, patients and external stakeholders. These impacts were specifically linked with the 
introduction of non-executive directors who were challenging, mature and experienced.  
The Hard Truths Report introduced the Fit and Proper Persons Test to ensure that board 
members are compliant with a prescribed standard of conduct in public life, and signalled the 
implementation of a statutory Duty of Candour, which requires providers to inform people if 
they believe treatment or care has caused harm. The majority of boards said that their 
organisation had carried out background checks on existing board directors and on new 
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appointments. However, many reported that the checks had little impact and the self-
declaration element could be regarded as a tick box exercise. Nevertheless, some did say that 
they that the requirement contributed towards a culture of transparency and that it was 
consistent with good governance. Duty of candour was found to have had a considerable 
positive impact, with increases in the openness of organisational culture and in learning and 
improvement, as well as better handling of complaints by clinicians. However, some also felt 
that implementation was resource intensive, and overly prescriptive. As with most of 
recommendations generated from Francis, many also believed that they were already doing 
what was being suggested.  
Overall, many trusts have implemented mechanisms that have led to greater engagement with 
staff and patients, improved culture and greater organisational openness. However, it is not 
always easy to determine the exact contribution of Francis, as some mechanisms predate the 
publication of the report, or have developed through different means.  
3. To explore the enablers of and barriers to implementing different approaches to 
board and organisational leadership 
The majority of respondents found that the greatest challenge their board faced was patient 
safety, with many reporting that Francis, specifically, had prompted them to ensure that this 
remained their main focus. Francis was seen, in some instances, to be an enabler to boards 
making improvements, by focussing board aims, and acting as a reminder to place quality of 
care and patient safety at the top of the agenda. However, financial pressures were still seen 
as a barrier to making these ambitions a reality. Some respondents highlighted staff shortages 
in A&E and other service areas as exacerbating financial difficulties and creating a threat to 
patient safety. Financial pressures were reported as the top barrier to improving board 
leadership, suggesting that boards see financial difficulties as permeating all aspects of their 
work.  A prominent issue was ensuring safe staffing levels, and rising agency costs. Many 
respondents reported that the setting of safe staffing levels without phasing meant that all 
trusts were fishing in the same pool of agency staff.  Some felt this was part of a wider 
problem with Francis in that it had created far too many recommendations that led to 
additional bureaucracy and higher costs.  
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The second and third barriers to improving board leadership felt by respondents were meeting 
demands of regulators, and poor relationships with others in the local health economy. Many 
boards felt that trying to lead system change should be a central aim of the board, but this was 
difficult due to local stakeholders not sharing the same priorities, or lacking strategic 
leadership.  Contradictory demands from Department of Health, NHS England and regulators 
were also seen as obstructing system working.  
Overall, Francis has enabled boards to refocus their attention on patient safety and care. 
However, external factors, such as limited finances, variable system relationships, and 
regulators that are sometimes perceived to be overbearing, are still acting as barriers to 
boards achieving their strategic and organisational aims.  
The next chapter provides an opportunity to look at these themes in more depth and to begin 
to understand the circumstances and mechanisms that are associated with improvements in 
board leadership. 
  
117 
 
6 Case study findings 
This chapter outlines the findings from our six case studies. Mirroring our research 
objectives, we look at local contextual factors, what actions were taken by boards of these 
trusts to respond to Francis recommendations, progress made on quality and safety and 
changes to the composition, role and behaviours of boards. We describe board efforts to put 
patients first, engage staff and support quality improvement. Finally, we assess changes that 
have taken place in these sites with regard to organisation culture. In order to assure 
anonymity of the case study sites and because of the sensitivity of some of the information 
shared with us, we have chosen to analyse the findings thematically, rather than to summarise 
them case by case. We provide a brief summary of the main themes at the start of each of the 
sections.    
 
6.1 Characteristics of the six case study sites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Foundation Trusts and 1 non Foundation Trust 
5 General acute hospital and 1 specialist acute hospital 
Number of beds:  190 - 1300 
Single site: 3; Multi site: 3 
CQC ratings [May 2016]: Requires Improvement [4] Good [1] Outstanding [1] 
CQC ratings [May 2017]: Requires Improvement [1] Good [3] Outstanding [1] 
NHS Staff Survey 2016 overall engagement score:   
  
1   = < 3.80 
3   = 3.81 – 3.84 
2   = > 4.02 
 
2 in the North    2 in the Midlands    2 in the South 
 
Fieldwork and data collection took place from April 2016 – May 2017 
 
Box 4: Features of the six case study sites 
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Stage one - 1:1 Interviews  n = 69 
Chair 6 
CEO 6 
Non-executive directors  7 
Executive directors 18 
Other staff  22 
Patient and public representatives including governors 7 
Commissioner 3 
 
Focus groups  n = 8 
4 x Patient experience  - number of participants = 31 
4 x Staff experience or staff side or staff meeting – number of participants = 53 
 
Meeting Observations  n = 16 
Public board meeting  - 6  
Private board  or committee meeting – 6 
Council of governors  meeting  - 4 
 
Stage 2 follow up 1:1  interviews and/or email contact   n = 12 
Chair = 5 
CEO = 3 
Executive directors = 4 
Box 5: Aggregated information about interviews, focus group participants and 
meeting observations across the six case studies 
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6.2 Main local contextual issues 
All six case study sites had more in common than divided them. All were facing growing 
financial difficulties and increasing demand, and all the boards named similar priorities 
around quality and safety. Differences included the challenges brought by the local external 
environment and in particular tensions, or opportunities,  that the STPs presented, problems 
with staffing and most of all the scale of the  operational leadership challenges facing the four 
trusts on an improvement trajectory.  More detail on local issues is provided below. 
  
At the time the Francis Report was published, four out of the six case study sites had been 
experiencing difficulties in the quality and safety of their services, as well as financial 
management. This resulted in two of them being placed in special measures, and a third being 
made a ‘Keogh’ trust, which meant implementing an action plan to improve quality.  
It is noteworthy that within the time period from 2013 to 2016/7, when the fieldwork was 
conducted, even the two remaining case study sites, which had been judged by regulators to 
be high performing organisations and financially secure for some years, had begun to 
experience pressure from the combination of rising demand and restricted budgets referred to 
in chapter 2. This has clearly been a shock for some: ‘Posting a deficit, this organization, 
posting a deficit, never happened. I never thought I’d see the day.’ [ED, Trust 3]    
The pressure to meet the demands of performance targets and financial balance was a strong 
theme common to nearly all of the interviews. Two of the six trusts are currently managing to 
meet A&E performance targets well and the others are struggling to meet the four hour 
target: ‘Our acute services, particularly our ED is inundated - I’m just thinking whether 
that’s the right word, but it probably is- is inundated with patients who shouldn’t be 
anywhere near a hospital.’  [NED, Trust 6]   
The other main contextual factor is the influence of the potential changes in the local health 
economy that are resulting (or might result from) new models of care launched in the Five 
Year Forward View (see chapter 2) and the sustainability and transformation plans that are 
being implemented across the country. In some areas, the plans are interacting with long 
standing problems with the financial and clinical sustainability of standalone trusts. The 
spectre of mergers hung over two of our case study sites, and all case study trusts are actively 
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involved in discussions in their local STP about closer collaboration with other providers and 
with commissioners. 
 In terms of the stated priorities of the trust boards, the public-facing documents emphasised 
very similar objectives, for example: the improvement of clinical quality, governance and 
organisation viability, overarching priorities for safe, timely, patient-focussed and clinically 
effective service delivery, education and training, and research and development.  Releasing 
the talent of staff, working in partnership and accelerating improvement also featured 
prominently in some of the trusts’ objectives. 
But the interviews revealed different emphases, reflecting the different circumstances faced 
by individual case study trusts.   
Some were starting from an organisation baseline that quite recently was poor on staff 
capability and patient safety:’(w)e’ve had an organisation that over a period of ten years was 
bereft of what I would call competent staff and the capacity to deliver what was expected of 
it... I was quite shocked….that I could walk into a ward and find that the drug cupboard 
would not be locked.’ [Chair, Trust 6] 
Other trusts had priorities that were particular to them, for example getting out of special 
measures, or the perceived threat of new models of care e.g. Multi-Specialty Community 
Provider Vanguards, and organisation sustainability: 
Obviously the sustainability of the organisation, given the turbulence that is being 
experienced at the moment, and obviously I mean it goes without saying that to enable 
that sustainability you need to deliver on your key performance areas as well as your 
financials to support the service anyway.  So, yeah, that said, you can’t stop thinking 
about improvement and innovation because that of itself is something that enables 
sustainability too.’ [Chair, Trust 1] 
This combination of pressures driven by the national financial environment, and the 
opportunities and threats resulting from sustainability and transformation plans, affected the 
ability of several trusts to protect headroom for adequate strategic thinking. The chief 
executive of one of the trusts, which had worked its way out of special measures, described 
the effort needed to work on developing a future strategy simultaneously as ‘trying to fix 
what’s in front of you today’ [CEO Trust 5]. 
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In one trust, the CEO reported that his priorities were more clinically focussed, e.g. receiving 
and acting on results from clinical benchmarking rather than digesting national policy 
documents: ‘….I don’t read any of the stuff that comes out from NHS England…..it’s a 
source of immense frustration…. I haven’t got the time and most of the time I’m uninterested.  
So I am lucky that….. I’m an NHS lifer, so a lot of my social contacts are NHS, so I’m 
completely immersed in it anyway…so I walk round the thicket…’  [CEO, Trust 2] 
 
6.3 How the trusts responded to recommendations from the Francis Inquiry in 2013, 
and other reports  
There was evidence in all case study sites of a flurry of activity immediately following the 
Francis Report in 2013, especially focussing on staff.  Longer term, we discerned the spirit of 
Francis continuing in ongoing work programmes to improve patient experience and staff 
engagement, as well as the continuation of specific actions such as the implementation of the 
Duty of Candour. The efficacy of immediate and longer term responses by the six trusts 
varied. More detail is provided below.  
Immediate actions 
As required, trusts responded formally to the Francis Report and published action plans.  As 
we have already indicated, for four of the trusts, the publication of the Francis Report 
coincided with a very difficult time when there had been some high profile patient failures or 
external regulatory interventions that required urgent review of systems and culture anyway. 
These four trusts reported that Francis was a useful backdrop in guiding and supporting them 
in the urgent implementation of measures and organisational cultural changes required by the 
findings of the CQC and other external reviews. 
One of our case study sites was local to Staffordshire and the issues were keenly felt by the 
organisation. The trust chief executive there took the recommendations of Francis 1 (the 
initial independent report) in 2010 and developed an action plan for the trust.  This plan 
included changing the way in which complaints were handled and having Listening Into 
Action events with complainants.   
When Francis 2 came out in 2013, the trust built on this work, although the major impact for 
them of the public inquiry report was subsequent regulatory intervention. In response to 
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questions about Francis, this intervention was nearly always mentioned.  In another of the 
case studies, the fact that the organisation went into special measures in 2013 dominated, 
rather than implementing the recommendations of the Francis Inquiry. 
At one case study site (where there were no concurrent regulatory interventions), board 
interviewees described an immediate response involving briefings for all managers on 
recommendations and content of the report. Focus groups were used to explore the issues in 
Francis, reaching 12% of the workforce over a period of ten days. A report was fed back to 
the board. Board members described the Francis Report as a catalyst for greater self-
reflection, re-stating of values, a reminder of the importance of communicating between 
leadership and front line and it legitimized what they were doing.  It also came out at the time 
that the trust had launched a big initiative, led by the chief nurse, to train the whole workforce 
in better patient centred care for vulnerable people. This trust has the highest staff 
engagement score of our six sites, as reported in the NHS Staff Survey carried out in 2016.  
A wide range of initiatives following Francis were reported to us across the six sites. These 
included actions which were compulsory (either legally required or subject to central 
performance management) for example the implementation of the Duty of Candour policy, 
overhaul of the complaints policy with an emphasis - where possible - on swift resolution, 
establishment of champions for speaking up/whistleblowing, improvement in the reporting 
of serious incidents and investment in nurse and medical staffing. But common to all the 
trusts were other initiatives which were central to Francis, but not mandated in any concrete 
form, for example, efforts to improve staff engagement, opportunities for staff and patients to 
communicate with the CEO directly, safety huddles, 15 steps, improved governance of 
quality and safety, patient stories at board meetings and new ways of involving and working 
with governors. 
The quality and safety strategy from one case study frames the trust’s priorities in the context 
of the Francis Report and also explicitly refers to the recommendations of Hard Truths, 
Keogh, Berwick and Cavendish. The overarching thrust here is striving for excellence, and 
the strategy is also framed round the five domains identified by the CQC.  
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Impacts of actions post-Francis 
Some of the reported impacts included that mistakes are now more likely to be seen as an 
opportunity to improve, and trusts are more likely to commission an external review in more 
serious cases. There was a sense that at least in some places, the spirit of Francis has lived on 
even though the details of the report are no longer current in the minds of staff. The survey of 
managers indicated that, although not all staff are closely familiar with the precise 
recommendations of the Francis Inquiry, working practices have been significantly 
influenced by Francis and the board has exercised clear leadership in this regard: ‘Within our 
team, the results of the Francis Report are central to work streams and decision-making. 
Francis has been the foundation of work streams including Schwartz Rounds….’ [Senior 
Manager, Trust 4] 
For one of the trusts (and this was echoed in responses to the national survey) the Francis 
Inquiry confirmed and energised a direction of travel that they had already taken: 
‘I would say that the publication of the Francis Report and the follow up action 
around speaking up, raising concerns, about transparency and candour, were very 
positive reinforcements for a culture which I think people hoped they had here, and 
has led to, I think, further developments in clinical governance, which continue to go 
on.’  [Chair, Trust 3] 
One chief executive assessed that his organisation still had a way to go, saying that 
the board has now arrived at a position ‘….which is to have them [Francis 
recommendations] as part of core business….. I think one of the big issues that we’ve 
got by having this sort of stuff as core business is you’ve got to be totally confident 
about what you do as core business and how you assess that.  I think there’s a real 
challenge about how we assess our core business internally and at board level and 
down to ward level.’  [CEO, Trust 2] 
Duty of Candour has been embraced enthusiastically, as reported to us by board members 
and managers, and from documents obtained from case study sites, although we weren’t able 
to corroborate this, within the scope of this study, with much evidence from the patient 
perspective. We were told that the legislative underpinning of this policy does sometimes 
make staff wary and for clinicians it can be difficult and frightening. There was a perception 
amongst some board members that the Duty of Candour was more useful than the speaking 
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up initiatives, which have tended to turn up more HR issues that genuine safety/quality 
issues, although at the same time the speaking up campaign has facilitated the spread of good 
practice across the whole organisation.  
In relation to the Berwick Report, which emphasised the importance of learning for 
improvement, the application of quality improvement science is a work-in-progress and was 
not systematic across all areas in any of the six case study sites. Intention to apply a 
systematic focus was detected and programmes of work, and training and development of 
managers and staff was taking place during the time of our fieldwork. 
We found that the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement for  vetting board members has been 
implemented, but rarely discussed and not particularly embedded in the culture, for example 
in the medical workforce. There is a sense in which it is rather literally implemented which, 
it was observed by one respondent, might be due to the fact that the policy is not well 
constructed (nationally) or understood. 
At one of the observed board meetings, and in relation to the patient story, the medical 
director mentioned Francis when commenting that compassion had got better in emergency 
care and less so in elective care. Patients actively involved in the trust, and governors, 
reported to us that the patient story at the start of board meetings was an important symbolic 
gesture. Some of these patients also wanted to report, in general, greater confidence in more 
recent years about the quality of care: ‘I do think in that period of time I have seen a dramatic 
improvement….. I do believe that at point of delivery they provide quite an exceptional 
service, and that’s certainly been evidenced in my last two visits to the hospital. I used to 
dread it enormously, visiting the hospital.  And I used to think that’s the worst possible place 
that somebody could go to when they were poorly…’ [Patient and governor focus group 
participant, Trust 2] 
But there was a concern about lack of consistency in the level of patient centredness of care. 
One carer’s story in one of the case study trusts echoed some of the very same problems that 
the Francis Inquiry uncovered: 
‘Some of the wards are much different from others and it does rely very much on 
particular individuals and particular shifts, how things are.  I mean we have had two 
elderly neighbours….. and one of them had dementia and she had a nephew who lived 
in London and only us.  And because we were not next of kin, nobody would talk to us 
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about her…..I looked at her notes quite often and they would tick that she’d taken her 
medicine.  On her bedside table were these little cups with the tablets still in them….. 
It wasn’t enough to pop them in a pot and put them on her table; nothing would 
happen.  You know, if she was thirsty, she was hungry, she wouldn’t ring her bell 
because she was so confused……So my husband and I used to come in just about 
every night just to make sure that the basics were being dealt with because she would 
talk to us because she knew who we were.  But we, as far as the hospital were 
concerned, we were nothing….. Some of the staff would say to us, ‘We’ll lose our jobs 
if we talk to you.’  It seems counterproductive…’  [Patient and governor focus group 
participant, Trust 2] 
 
6.4 Progress on quality and safety 
Despite examples of variability as shown above in patient experience of care, there was a 
strong emphasis reported in all our sites and in most of the interviews on initiatives to 
measure and improve patient safety. We found evidence to demonstrate there had been a step 
change since 2013 in the seriousness with which trust boards took matters of quality and 
safety. More detail is provided below.  
One trust moved from being one of the worst for hospital mortality to being now in the top 
10%.   In another of the case studies, the clinical effectiveness and services group has a clear 
remit to prioritise clinical audit activities and improve clinical outcomes. Around 2015, its 
remit was broadened to encompass service evaluations and improvement. 
Handling and reporting of serious incidents has had a marked focus. In one trust it was 
reported that the medical director and chief nurse now get a daily report with incidents from 
all divisions and a complaints summary.  ‘It comes into my inbox between four and six, and I 
can see every single incident that’s occurred in the organization the day before’ [Medical 
Director, Trust 6]. Staff are able to flag potential solutions alongside reporting the problem. 
The trust also holds a patient safety summit every week. It lasts for an hour, looks at a recent 
incident (not always serious), presented by the clinical team in question, and attended by 
representatives from all the divisions,  and other doctors, nurses and students. Between 30 
and 70 people attend. ‘The narrative starts off by saying this is not about who. This is about 
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what happened, where it happened, how it happened, to extract learning to help with root 
cause analysis’ [Medical Director, Trust 6].       
Board members across all sites reported varying progress with improving the quality of data 
to measure quality and safety, for example clearer presentation of trends over time, 
benchmarking against national standards and processes for validation. 
Although there was perceived good intention in relation to patient safety in all cases, the 
trusts varied in the attention paid to structures and formal processes to see initiatives through.  
 
6.5 Composition, role and behaviours of the board (including individual 
members of the board) 
There was much evidence of board renewal since 2013 in all trust sites in terms of 
membership, committees and ways of working. There are significant issues with regard to 
ethnic diversity and the strategic sightedness of boards. All were focussed on staff and patient 
experience but with varying impact. More detail is given below. 
 
Composition and structures 
Four out of six of our case study sites had had significant turnover on the board since 2013, 
including new chairs and CEOs. The most stable board also had the highest proportion of 
non-executive directors (four) with clinical or social care backgrounds; others had one, two or 
three. Two trusts had an all-white board; others did better but not much in terms of Black and 
Asian Minority Ethnic (BAME) representation. NEDs with BAME backgrounds were, in 
general, scarce. Gender balance was good. 
New appointments were generally welcomed by a number of respondents from across the 
organisations. The contribution of new CEOs with their refreshing leadership styles was 
particularly singled out generally for positive comment. During our fieldwork phase in 2016, 
the CEO in one of the case studies departed for another CEO position in a larger trust and 
their loss was commented on as keenly felt by some of the interviewees.  For many of the 
directors, especially in the smaller trusts, it is their first executive role.  
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Board committees, especially quality committees, have received greater attention in recent 
years, and been enhanced in size and seniority of membership and length of meetings. One 
trust had combined quality and performance, to ensure that there were joined up assurance 
processes around access targets and clinical quality. For one trust who had been the subject of 
regulatory intervention, there was a strong emphasis on the safety/governance axis to ensure 
follow-through of intentions. 
Non-executive directors in the most challenged trust, which had just come out of special 
measures, were concerned about their workload. This included their contribution to the many 
new appointments that had to be made and the hard graft in getting stronger governance and 
assurance processes embedded. Two of the trusts (both rated as Requiring Improvement at 
the start of the case study field work) reported they had difficulty in recruiting non-executive 
directors. 
 
Role of board 
It was observed that part of the job of the board is ‘to filter all the nonsense that comes from 
outside’ [Director of Organisation Development, Trust 3]. This interviewee, and others in the 
same trust, felt that the board was effective in conveying  to staff of the trust the importance 
of carrying on with caring for patients, and putting to one side some of the policy ambiguity 
that might be reigning in the wider NHS. This ‘shock absorber’ role of the board is developed 
further in our concluding chapter. At the same time, there was evidence in a couple of the 
trusts with more stable membership, that as well as a steady internal focus on quality, 
attention was paid to developing productive relationships with commissioners and other local 
health care providers, and having one or more of their executive directors take a lead on 
aspects of the local Sustainability and Transformation Plans (STPs). 
For one of the trusts that had recently come out of a regime of special measures imposed by 
the regulators, the board role was described as getting the basics right, a good line of sight 
from board to ward and then beginning to focus on organization strategy. Sometimes getting 
the basics right involved board meetings getting into quite a lot of operational detail, 
including rehearsing some of the conversations that had taken place in the quality committee.  
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Space for strategic conversations at the public board meetings appeared to be limited and 
sometimes comments on strategic agenda items had an operational bent. Private board 
meetings were more likely to get into the detail on risk. 
We observed that in four of the case studies, in order to gain assurance and promulgate core 
values around patient centred care and the importance of staff engagement, the boards carried 
out a lot of direct communication with the organisation: core briefs, meet the CEO sessions, 
contact the CEO, freedom to tweet, walking the wards, mock CQC inspections, and what the 
chair in Trust 6 called ‘dawn raids’ to find out what’s not been fixed.  These efforts were 
generally appreciated:  ‘Some but not all of the Board are very adept at reflecting and 
modelling the values of the Trust in their leadership style and behaviours’ [First Line 
Manager, Trust 4]. ‘Highly committed, very supportive and focussed in quality improvement, 
responding to risks and development of services…’  [Consultant, Trust 4]. 
 
Board behaviours 
 It was reported and observed that the longer serving and more stable boards exhibited greater 
unity and collective effort in terms of their behaviours. This was described by board members 
as being on the same side, not trying to catch executives out, and building close relationships 
with the senior clinical leadership of the trust, as well as being challenging, in an 
interrogative rather than in a confrontational way.  This was the subject of probing at a CQC 
visit, which was not well received:  ‘Maybe I’m over sensitive- there was a slightly veiled 
positioning about you’re daft to trust people, we shouldn't use trust as a currency, whereas I 
always thought exactly the opposite’   [Medical Director, Trust 3]. 
Challenge by non-executive directors was expected, especially from the more recent 
appointments, and generally welcomed by executive directors. A view was expressed that 
they could be even more testing. Chairs were keen to coach NEDs to be appropriately 
challenging and, in one example, played devil’s advocate to provoke the expression of 
alternative perspectives.  
One of the public board meetings observed was very stage managed, with no questions from 
the public and little cross-questioning, but it was directly followed by a governors’ meeting in 
which executives fielded a wide range of questions. A board meeting at another trust was 
quite low energy and formal with little challenge from NEDS, and the meeting at a third also 
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demonstrated fairly low challenge from NEDs. The discussions at the board meetings of the 
other three organisations were more spontaneous and spirited but challenge was nearly 
always congenial and supportive. 
Box 6: Summary of observations of board meeting at Trust 2 in July 2016 
 
At the board meeting we observed a predominant focus on monitoring of performance 
data, calling for more information and holding the executives to account.  Much time was 
spent on reporting on and gaining assurance about workforce, mortality rates in particular 
specialties and patient safety issues (e.g. management of deteriorating patients).  Finance 
and performance came later in the agenda. There was not much attention paid to strategy 
and no monitoring against strategic objectives. There was a debate about the tactical (to 
meet RTT) vs strategic approach to outsourcing work to the private sector. There was little 
reference to the local health and care landscape except in relation to the STP. There wasn’t 
a pervading sense of representing the public or stakeholders and the trust values weren’t 
invoked in the course of discussions. However in relation to the patient story (about lack 
of compassion in relation to a minor planned operation), the medical director mentioned 
Francis when commenting that compassion had got better in emergency care and less so in 
elective care. The response from the chief nurse was notably un-defensive and robust in 
calling for the surgical team to ‘step up’. 
 
There was a clear division between executive directors and NEDS with regard to board 
roles and contributions (‘you’ rather than ‘us’) and not a strong sense of collaboration 
amongst the NEDs.  The DOF stepped out of her functional role to comment on the role of 
porters in compassion in relation to the patient story.  The NEDs questioning style varied 
from strongly interrogative (‘I want assurance’ as one NED put it) to much quieter 
approaches. We witnessed examples of EDs supporting each other to manage NED 
challenges and close working relationship between CN and MD. The chair was not 
particularly interventionist or involved in the substance of agenda items but closely 
sighted on inviting contributions from all. When they did put a question it was framed in a 
supportive (c.f. stewardship) way but was responded to within an agency framing by the 
ED. 
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We observed strong nurse leadership in four out of six cases, both internally and, to some 
degree, externally focussed. It was suggested that the re-ordering of priorities (and board 
agenda items) since Francis, with a greater emphasis now on quality of care, had provided the 
opportunity for the chief nurse to take up a more visible and prominent role as a trust leader. 
As the chief nurse in Trust 3 put it, her role is ‘pricking the conscience of the board 
continuously’. 
We also observed variable contribution of executive directors beyond their functional role 
(for example finance directors commenting on issues arising from the patient story). These 
contributions had a marked impact and other board members listened carefully. Otherwise, 
contribution at board meetings by executive directors was generally dependent on the board 
agenda item. Actively supportive relationships between medical directors and chief nurses 
was noted – when examples of this occurred, it enhanced messages to the board about quality 
and safety. 
The chair and CEO in all case study sites set a tone that was calm, inclusive and thoughtful.  
In most cases the chair was also careful to draw in contributions from all board members and 
encourage executive director challenge as well as asking questions of their own. In one case 
the chair tended to summarise the agenda topic rather than to invite contributions. 
Relationships between the board of directors and the council of governors at all five 
foundation trusts appeared to be, on the whole, close, mutually respectful and supportive and, 
in one, vibrant and highly engaged. We witnessed differing degrees of challenge by 
governors towards the board of directors. There had been different histories of relationships 
in the trusts, including a legacy of distrust in more than one that executive teams appeared to 
have worked hard to overcome. 
 
Board development 
Three of the boards described extensive board development activities. 
Trust 2 commissioned a nine month board development programme in 2016 in order to build 
a closer bond between board members (especially between executives and NEDs) and to 
ensure rigorous scrutiny from a platform of strong and respectful relationships.  The main 
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reported impact of this so far has been that members have gotten to know each other better 
and behaviours have become more cohesive across the non-executive director and executive 
director constituencies - still appropriately challenging but  ‘less of us and them’ [Executive 
Director, Trust 2]. There has not yet been an agreement on actions about what the board 
might do differently in future. 
Trust 4 has undergone a board development programme over two years using an internal OD 
team for facilitation and sometimes an external person.  The board benefitted from choosing, 
‘rather than having it done to us’ [Non-executive Director], to have one of the early Well-
Led reviews;  the exercise proved to be a timely reminder that self-assessment can often be 
more generous than external assessment. 
Trust 6 had also commissioned board development from an external provider, focussed 
closely on the CQC Well-Led domains. A different external provider was providing 
leadership coaching for the executive team.  
 
6.6 Board efforts in relation to putting patients first (including Duty of 
Candour) 
Structures for hearing about and responding to patient experience were in place in all sites. 
Initiatives were further advanced and more embedded in some organisations than others; 
sometimes this reflected the different starting points for each of the organisations in 2013. 
More detail is provided below. 
Leads for patient experience were identified in all our case study sites.  Processes for 
listening and responding to patient experiences were more advanced in some sites than in 
others, where the top priority had been to ensure patient safety because of a recent history of 
failures in care. Box 7 gives an example of the remit of a patient experience group at one of 
the trusts. 
We heard many examples of where the trust tried hard to put patients first, really listening to 
their concerns. Non-executive directors and governors were enthused by this agenda. These 
efforts had, with some exceptions noted elsewhere, a tangible impact on patient experience: 
‘from a patient’s perspective, I mean I’ve been a regular visitor to the hospital over the past 
ten years….. and I must say I’ve seen an enormous improvement in the service provision, 
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and I mean across the board.  I don’t mean just from one particular ward or one particular 
nurse and so forth.  I mean porterage, I mean in the cleaning, I mean in everything.  And I 
think it’s incredible the way that we mustn’t forget that this hospital is improving at quite a 
rapid rate.  And, you know, the last CQC is evidence of that’ [Patient and Governor Focus 
Group Participant, Trust 2]. And this was also attributed to good leadership: ‘…. I believe 
that leadership is working here because I’ve seen leadership happen at ground level.  And to 
me what that is is when I’m a patient in a bed in a ward, it’s that person who comes round to 
me and says to me, ‘We haven’t got this today, we can’t do this right now, but what I’m 
going to do about it is— and that’s a great illustration.  I’ve seen that happen so many times 
in the last year.  I’ve seen people take responsibility for what is there within their reach and 
people be open about these things’ [Patient and Governor Participant, Trust 2]. 
 
The approach taken by medical consultants was important – culture change in terms of 
putting patients first was seen as difficult when some consultants did not see patient views as 
having clinical benefit. This was addressed in a couple of trusts by having a medical lead for 
patient experience. Conversely, when consultants went the extra mile in their care for 
patients, this had a big positive impact on other staff. 
It was reported that the Duty of Candour has been embraced enthusiastically across all sites, 
either formalising a process that was already in practice or adopted by those trusts who had 
been the subject of failures of care to win back patient confidence and embed new values. 
Box 8 describes the approach taken by one of the trusts. We were told that the policy can 
 
 
 Chaired by the chief executive since 2012 
 Feeds into quality committee 
 Examines patient survey data and patient experience feedback 
 Contributes to service reviews  
 Considers actions on issues identified 
 Examples of programmes of work include: outpatient care organisation; patient 
food; day case care organisation and planning; and arrangements for patient 
discharge from hospital  
Box 7: Summary of remit and impact of the patient experience group (Trust 1) 
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make staff feel nervous and for clinicians; being honest with patients in this newly systematic 
way when things have gone wrong can be a difficult experience for them. The unit and 
department manager survey findings indicated staff saw the board as strongly committed to 
the Duty of Candour and that the policy was seen as having a positive impact on learning and 
development, openness, organisation reputation and patient confidence in the organisation. 
There remains a residual anxiety about patients and their families, on very rare occasions, 
having an appetite to refer doctors to the General Medical Council, and armed with more 
information than they would previously have had. There was also a minor worry expressed 
that some minor clinical issues could grow out of proportion as a result of the bureaucracy 
surrounding this policy. 
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6.7 Board efforts in relation to staff engagement 
Structures for engaging staff were in place in all case study sites. The sophistication and the 
impact of these varied, and were more related to stability than to size of the organisation. 
More detail is provided below. 
 
Engaging staff is seen as central to patient safety and quality improvement by all the trusts. 
Two trusts started from a low baseline in 2013: ‘Nobody told them they were good at 
anything’ [Medical Director, Trust 6]. Efforts were being repaid through better NHS staff 
survey scores and other positive feedback: ‘Nothing [is a barrier to the Trust Board 
improving leadership]. They seem to listen and make changes. No matter who suggests the 
 
 
‘The Duty of Candour has been supported by the Board. For this Trust there was a need to 
demonstrate a more open and transparent approach to patient care and responding to 
concerns. The duty has been helpful in achieving this.’ [Board Secretary] 
 
‘[The] main impact is that it has made openness and honesty part of the way we do things 
around here.’ [Chief Nurse] 
 
The Duty of Candour itself means that there has to be formal monitoring, but the trust has 
sought to go much further than simply writing apology letters to change the organisation’s 
culture so that there is reflection and learning from what has gone wrong. The trust’s view 
is that acknowledging wrongs to patients and families enables them to work with you to 
improve things and this can be very powerful – invite them in to work with you and have a 
stake – see what is wrong and help you to improve it.  Generally, patients and the public 
do want to help and do recognise the pressure staff are under.  The latest CQC inspection 
reviewed root cause analysis reports from serious incident investigations and found that 
the Duty of Candour was addressed, with specific details of when the patient and/or family 
were communicated with and an apology was given.  Well thought through actions had 
been implemented to reduce the risk of recurrence. 
Box 8: Implementation of Duty of Candour policy (Trust 5) 
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change. If it is believed it will take the Trust forward, it is acted upon’ [Ward and 
Department Manager Survey Respondent, Trust 5]. 
Initiatives have included staff listening weeks led by board members, briefings,  Listening 
Into Action,  Speaking Up campaign, Schwartz Rounds,  staff stories at board meetings, staff 
awards,  a behavioural standards framework and, in three out of six sites, ambitious staff 
health and wellbeing strategies. The approach taken at one trust in terms of staff engagement 
strategy is outlined in box 9.  
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Staff wellbeing, including both physical and mental health, is a high priority. Health and 
wellbeing services include chiropody, counselling, physiotherapy, complementary therapy, 
weight loss class, Pilates and trust sports team sponsorships. The organisational commitment to 
staff health and wellbeing was also acknowledged in the high scores in the NHS Staff Survey.  
There are open invitations for staff to take part in Schwartz rounds and sessions that focus on 
the Berwick principles of quality and safety. The latter are attended by a range of clinical and 
support staff and focus on excellent practice and also practice which ‘keeps you awake at 
night’. There are also quarterly staff listening weeks. Relationships with staff side trade union 
representatives are respectful, trusting, open and robust. 
 
There are staff stories presented at board meetings. There are also a range of staff and team 
awards which are deeply appreciated by staff: ‘…one of my team won it quite recently and he 
doesn’t shut up about it…’  [Staff Focus Group Participant]. The employees in the private sector 
company providing support services are also eligible for staff awards, involved in multi-
disciplinary service quality groups and represented in the hospital trade union staff partnership 
structure.  
 
The survey of managers indicated that generally the board was highly visible to them. This 
philosophy has found its way through the organisation: ‘from my perspective, you know, if we 
ever had a problem we could go to our manager, discuss the concerns and they would do their 
best to support you in that’ [Staff Focus Group Participant]. Despite being very busy, the 
approachability and helpfulness of ward managers was also praised by other staff.  
 
Communications between senior managers and staff was also highly scored in the NHS Staff 
Survey (2016) as was, amongst other things, effective team working, opportunities for flexible 
working, support from immediate managers, and staff satisfaction with the quality of the work 
and care they were able to deliver. Flexibility of working patterns was also very much 
appreciated by staff and it was noted that this also meant staff offered flexibility back about 
finish times if there was a particular problem. Overall, there was a strong sense that staff were 
‘lucky’ to be working at this particular trust in comparison with others that some had 
experience of. There was some minor concern about turnover of managers at divisional level 
which inhibited the building of relationships. 
Box 9: Characteristics of staff engagement (Trust 4) 
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CQC reports and our research interviews have indicated variable visibility of executive 
directors in the case studies to front line staff with some indication that this might be 
improving: ‘I think over the last few years actually that senior board level of management is 
much more visible than what we were used to previously’  [Staff Focus Group Participant, 
Trust 2]. More ‘back-to-the-floor’ exercises were recommended not just for board members 
but other senior and middle managers, too.  One trust had had a big push on greater board and 
management visibility following weaker scores on this in the NHS Staff Survey.  
Other evidence indicates that, in three of the trusts, the CEO personally had a high visibility. 
Invitations to make direct personal contact with the CEO are taken up and dealt with 
diligently but there was a perception that controversial issues are unlikely to be raised. 
It was reported  by some staff in some of the trusts that the quality of leadership varied across 
the organisation from ‘pockets of real excellence’ [Staff Focus Group Participant, Trust 2] to 
poor, in particular in some support service departments, described  in one case as ‘over 
managed and under manned’ [Staff Focus Group Participant, Trust 2. Front line staff were 
not always given the opportunity to engage with progressing the good ideas that had been 
generated at the top of the organisation and the quality of communication could be patchy: 
‘with the Trust, you hear things are going to happen and then you don’t hear anything else, 
the communication seems to stay up the top, at the ceiling if you like…… this is why it starts a 
lot of the rumours off, because the staff don’t know what’s happening, so you hear all these 
Chinese whispers, and if they communicated a lot more, I know they’re better now, but if it 
was even better still, there wouldn’t be such apathy’   [Staff Focus Group Participant, Trust 
1]. 
In addition to communication weaknesses, other obstacles to greater staff engagement were 
reported as lack of execution on diversity and inclusion policies, workforce shortages, 
pressure on staff, redundancies of non-clinical staff (which impacted on the work of others) 
and the fact that champions in safeguarding type roles were seen as part of the organisation 
rather than independent from it. 
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6.8 Patient and staff involvement in quality and service improvement 
All six trusts aspired to have quality improvement embedded across their entire organisations; 
in practice each had some exemplar areas, while other departments and wards lagged behind. 
Quality improvement efforts were hampered by unclear lines of accountability and facilitated 
where there was clear board leadership in this area. More detail is provided below. 
  
See box 10 below for an example in one trust, which was mirrored in one other, of staff 
engagement in quality improvement. Patients were most likely to be involved in the design of 
new facilities. At least one trust viewed patient and staff involvement in quality and service 
improvement as a key driver for organisation success. This trust has combined Listening Into 
Action with improvement tools and techniques using the IHI model for improvement (PDSA 
cycles), supported by staff training, with and through Gold, Silver and Bronze Improvement 
Champions. Cross-organisational/STP-wide improvement events are planned. They also have 
plans for six listening events per annum to ask patients and the public for their ideas for 
improving services.  Users have been involved in interview panels, reviewing quality of 
services and in the design of new facilities. In another trust, there were huddle boards on the 
wards for staff and patient panels which were involved in specific service areas, and in a third 
trust there was mention of patients being called upon to test proposed service changes and to 
contribute to specification of new service contracts. At this trust there was staff training 
available at all levels on quality improvement. 
 
Box 10: Staff engagement in quality improvement (Trust 5) 
The trust engages staff in continual review and supportive challenge through corporate 
quality reviews, which provide a balance of positive feedback and ideas for improvement.  
These reviews began initially as CQC mock visits in preparation for CQC inspections, but 
have been continued because they were found helpful.  The reviews are conducted by teams 
that involve a range of internal and external stakeholders including staff from neighbouring 
wards or departments.  This provides opportunities for staff to learn both by reviewing and 
being reviewed.  Staff are also encouraged to learn from elsewhere by visiting other 
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organisations, and recruiting staff externally bringing with them new ideas into the 
organisation. 
 
Staff are now more empowered so that change and innovation can happen organically 
without needing to be directed.  Staff are also supported by having policies in place and slick 
administrative systems, automated where possible, to enable rapid response (e.g. complaints).  
Project management and business cases have been strengthened through training and access 
to specialist staff support, so that things are done in a more business like way and are 
delivered. There are also structures and processes for learning and sharing learning. 
 
Improvements were described in one public and patient focus group discussion at another 
trust as rather ‘piecemeal’ [Staff Focus Group Participant, Trust 2].  There were views 
expressed by staff that where service improvement initiatives do take place that some 
consider the drivers are as much financial as they were about quality or as a result of a 
national policy priority, and led either by managers that all too quickly move on, or by 
external management consultants.  
It was reported that some trusts and representatives of some healthcare professions still have 
a habit of talking to patients rather than involving them in improvement work. 
It was reported that managers were not always good at listening to frontline staff views about 
how to improve services or reduce waste.  Support for staff and teamwork in some 
departments is excellent and reported in others to be non-existent. This also varied between 
trusts, with some seeing staff engagement in improvement activities as core to the trust’s 
strategy. 
Initiatives can be hampered by a lack of a clear line of responsibility and accountability: 
‘there was no-one really identified as being accountable and responsible for carrying it [a 
particular project] forwards, and that can be really frustrating.  There might be people with 
good ideas, but it’s harnessing it and getting someone to lead and go with it….So I still don’t 
know who – how that’s going to go forward and how that’s going to happen.  There’s some 
good ideas and a lot of the things are out there and can be done, good intentions’ [Staff 
Focus Group Participant, Trust 2]. 
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6.9 Costs of implementing leadership changes since Francis  
Increasing leadership costs (as distinct from staffing costs) since 2013 did not feature 
prominently in views expressed in our interviews. We had some difficulty in obtaining the 
specific financial costs of implementing leadership and governance changes following 
Francis from the case study sites as these hadn’t been recorded in this way and were often 
seen as necessary improvements. We were however able to gather some information, as 
described below. 
 
In five out of the six trusts, there was a deliberate policy by the board, led by the CEO, to put 
quality first: –’in that first three months (in 2013) we set down a trajectory to basically break 
the bank. …. in the last three and a half years we’ve gone from 106 consultants to 155 in a 
time when everybody in the Health Service is saying there’s no money….we’ve increased 
nurses by 20%.  I mean yes, it’s showed on the quality metrics side massively and yes, it’s 
showed on the financial side massively’  [CEO, Trust 2]. Three trusts reported that staffing 
costs went out of control. 
Five of the trusts have commissioned a series of leadership development programmes – for 
boards, clinical leads, newly appointed consultants, deputy heads of service and for the board.  
Incident reporting has increased and this is a burden in terms of investigating and supporting 
staff during the investigations but is also considered to be a symbol of an open and learning 
organisation culture. Similarly complaints handling is a large amount of work. 
In addition to the decision to invest in additional frontline staff, the following were noted as 
additional management costs (not necessarily perceived in a negative way) in the interviews 
and in the managers’ survey: 
 Increased training and development of staff 
 Health and wellbeing services  
 Increased governance arrangements, including the costs of implementing Duty of 
Candour 
 Extra committees:  ‘ever increasing burden of meetings…’  (Senior Manager) 
 Increased scrutiny (the positive impact being improved quality structures across the 
divisions and an Outstanding CQC rating) 
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 New job descriptions to reflect importance of Duty of Candour and patient experience 
 Volunteer support 
Most respondents highlighted that these additional management costs were desirable 
investments, rather than being unnecessary or particularly financially burdensome. 
One of the stakeholder interviewees alerted us to the possibility that damages paid out for 
failures of care was likely to increase following the implementation of the policy of Duty of 
Candour. We therefore looked at payments made by the NHS Litigation Authority over 
recent years.  Payments have increased (see table 14 below) but it is difficult to ascribe any 
particular reason, as processing of claims has recently been speeded up. There was no pattern 
or trend in our six case study sites that could be linked to actions taken by senior leadership at 
the trust in the years following 2013. 
 
Table 13: Total CNST payments in £million made by NHS Litigation Authority = 
Damages + defence & claimant costs in £millions 
(Source: (NHSLA 2016)) 
NB 45% is for maternity / birth harms 
 Trust                                                                                                                 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 
Trust 1 5.9 8.0 5.6 
Trust 2 2.5 3.4 6.7 
Trust 3 7.1 11.1 9.5 
Trust 4 0.53 1.3 3.4 
Trust 5 4.5 9.6 11.0 
Trust 6 13.3 15.7 13.2 
S/H interviewee* 
trust 
4.8 5.3 6.3 
TOTAL across all 
NHS trusts in 
England 
1.051 billion 1.169 billion 1.488 billion 
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NB TOTAL for 2010/11 = 1.095  
                  For 2011/12 = 1.117 
*The stakeholder interviewee (trust medical director) who alerted us to the possibility that 
payments would be going up as a result of implementation of Duty of Candour and had in 
his trust 
 
6.10 Organisation culture (including degree of openness)  
Board members in all the trusts emphasised the importance of an open culture. This was 
acknowledged as being hard work to achieve and more likely where communications, 
systems and processes were reliable and with consistent role modelling by board members. 
More detail is provided below.   
   
There was much evidence in all our case study sites that a vision for the organisation, 
including the values and strategy, were developed through consultation with staff and 
patients. PRIDE (Passion, Responsibility, Innovation, Drive and Empowerment) as a set of 
values was important in two of the organisations. In other trusts, there was evidence that the 
promulgation of organisation values had somewhat lost momentum recently, particularly in 
the light of current service pressures.  
In all the trusts, we identified overall a culture of greater openness, exemplified by a change 
in attitude over time towards CQC inspections in the case of one trust which had been in 
special measures: 
‘The best way to describe the culture might be the example of CQC inspections … The 
first one, everyone was worried.  The second one, people were less worried and were 
thinking, I wouldn't mind if they came in and I could tell them about what we're doing.  
In October they were like, so where are those inspectors?  I'm going to find them and 
tell them about the great stuff that we're doing.  So it was quite ballsy actually, the 
culture, ballsy and on its uppers, really positive about what it was trying to do 
differently and showcase the really, really good things. …. Over time, it's about 
saying, we've learnt from that, we're respectful of what happened, but we're not 
ashamed of it because we've learnt from it.  And now, actually, we are prepared to tell 
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you everything that's good about the organisation.’ [OD and Workforce Director, 
Trust 5] 
Although as we referred to above, significant importance is attached to staff morale and staff 
engagement, interviews in some of the trusts suggested there was a fine line between 
supporting staff and driving much needed transformation in performance and quality. In 
trusts on an improving patient safety trajectory, it was reported that at times an autocratic 
style was needed to correct unacceptable levels of performance, together with an 
acknowledgement that it had to be used sparingly.  The legacy of having been in special 
measures, with staff reportedly too frightened to report incidents, was that there was a level 
of anxiety in this organisation. 
There was a strong sense at another trust, which also had patient safety problems, that the 
staff were bound together as comrades in adversity, especially when being criticised by 
external parties. This trust and one other also had a strong family feel; a drawback was that 
this meant that the culture came across to some as quite old fashioned in modern hospital 
facilities. 
Board members in nearly all the trusts report a strong emphasis, energy and enthusiasm on 
being a learning organisation. Patient representatives in one trust made a plea for this to be 
more visible as they weren’t aware how lessons were learnt after mistakes were 
acknowledged. There was also a plea for greater visibility of and delegation to middle 
management: ‘I do think that there’s also scope within the leadership team for more 
emphasis to be placed upon heads of departments and more involvement – for those people 
to be more visible because they are quite hidden at this moment in time’ [Patient and 
Governor Focus Group Participant, Trust 2]. 
Some patients in our focus groups reported that staff were being more open, whilst others 
reported a perception that clinical staff weren’t always being upfront with them about 
problems or details about their current clinical conditions on the basis that they wouldn’t 
understand. 
Patients reported a greater openness over recent years on the part of nursing and medical staff 
to explain and share clinical problems that patients and those caring for them were facing. 
Equally it was clear that one of the boards in particular aimed to conduct as much business in 
public as possible, to be open and to avoid a paternalistic culture. Respondents indicated that 
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some board members can be nervous especially in relation to papers reporting on serious 
incidents and independent investigations. There are perceived limits to the board’s 
commitment to transparency and openness.  
As reported above in the section on staff engagement, communications, systems and 
processes were reported to be unreliable or slow at times and the quality of documents 
underpinning trust governance was observed as variable. One trust had put a deliberate 
emphasis on having strong processes to ensure follow-through. 
As reported above, the CEOs at five of the six trusts were instrumental in setting the tone. At 
one of these, they ‘…set the heartbeat for the organisation’ [Finance Director, Trust 1] and 
there was a concern about how that might endure after this person had left. 
 
Box 11: The role of the board in shaping organization culture (Trust 3) 
The response to Francis was presented under a set of values, which already existed, in order 
not to confuse staff: ‘because the NHS is full of initiatives, and then, and actually in the end 
you go from one to another, and your poor nurse, student doctor, porter, housekeeper haven't 
got a clue what’s going on and doesn’t understand the language’ [Chief Nurse]. 
 
The trust values had been around since 2006, but ‘sat on posters and cups and haven’t meant 
anything to anybody really’, but a patient centred care campaign brought them alive.  
 
The notion of culture was spoken about frequently in interviews, and, from a leadership 
perspective, the importance of role modelling of senior leaders. The chair described the 
central role for the board in relation to culture: ‘there’s an ambassadorial function for the 
board in relation to the cultural values of the organization…. so living out the values of the 
organisation.’ 
 
 
6.11 Reflections on the legacy of the Francis Report 
There was a strong message from two of the trusts that Francis was a wake-up call, and it 
could have indeed been them in the news. Two others described Francis as fitting well with 
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the direction of travel they were already going in. The final two were subject to external 
regulatory interventions in 2013, which were both a shock and a spur. Berwick was seen as a 
positive driver to stimulate thinking and take action on engaging staff in service 
improvement. More detail is provided below about case study respondents’ views on the 
prospects for and threats to the legacy of Francis. 
For one trust, the relative proximity to Stafford was considered to be an enabler for 
implementing Francis recommendations, as the issues felt close by and very real.  For three 
of the trusts, external regulatory intervention, although a shock and difficult, was also 
reported to have been a key enabler, supported by the work of CQC. Interviewees at one of 
these trusts described how the external scrutiny had galvanized them: ‘actually we’re not as 
bad as the papers make us out… And there’s been a push to start proving that’ [CEO, Trust 
1]. 
Local enablers included having good working partnerships and commissioners who listen. 
There was also a view that involvement in STPs was having a beneficial impact on external 
relationships in the local health economies. 
Across five of the trusts, the leadership of the CEO was also seen as strongly helpful in 
setting the tone for the implementation of the Francis recommendations. 
The interviews and survey of managers (more about which is in section 6.12 below) reported 
the following internal enablers to improving leadership: 
 Training and development at every level 
 Having an effective and cohesive team 
 Collective leadership programme and PRIDE (both mentioned many times) 
 Personal rather than email communication 
 Highly organised and structured way of doing things 
 Action plans that are followed through 
On the other hand, all the trusts described an external environment that had the potential to 
undermine the progress made in the wake of the Francis Report.  This included the sheer 
volume of multiple policy initiatives, seen as impeding progress on improving patient centred 
care: ‘I think certainly in this trust there seems to be far too much effort put into pilots and 
projects that are never really seen through rather than actually focusing that time and energy 
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onto genuine improvements in customer care’ [Staff Focus Group Participant, Trust 2]. It was 
also reported to us that leaders and staff were under strain to address criticism (e.g. from the 
media) and the bureaucracy of regulatory oversight was also constraining because of the need 
to provide ‘endless external assurance’ [Staff Focus Group Participant, Trust 5] as people 
came and went in regulatory organisations, commissioners and NHS England. The pressure 
from external agencies was described as sometimes overwhelming, with a confusion between 
support for improvement and punitive grip:  ‘It’s a weird mix of more bureaucracy, more 
governance, more grip, more you must do versus complete chaos actually, and ambiguity and 
guidelines coming out left right and centre’ [Dir OD, Trust 3]. 
Other issues mentioned include the lack of consistency between NHSE and NHSI, which is 
‘unhelpful and damaging’  [CEO, Trust 6], with NHSE encouraging collaboration via the 
STP, and NHSI insisting on hitting the financial control total, regardless of the money 
available in the CCGs. 
Although elsewhere the intervention of the CQC had been seen as an enabler for 
improvement, the regulator came in for criticism from one trust, especially the continual 
focus on a narrow number of indicators and micro-detail. The impact of the CQC inspection 
in this organization was not positive, despite the Good rating overall: ‘we had staff in tears 
about how they were spoken to, because they were basically accused of lying because they 
were saying positive things’ [OD Director, Trust 3]. The observation was made that this sort 
of inspection was not in the spirit of the Francis Report recommendations. At another trust, 
CQC and other external regulatory interventions were seen as producing a ‘fear factor’. 
Whilst delayed transfers of care and the shortage of social care funding came up often, the 
weakness of local primary care and other community health services was cited as a barrier at 
only two of the trusts. But more generally, staff pressures and financial challenges for boards 
felt, to some, that the NHS is at a watershed: ‘I do worry that we’re about to lose every bit of 
the legacy that Robert Francis could leave’ [Chief Nurse, Trust 3]. 
Both staff and board members indicated that stable board leadership was critical, and there 
had been, at the time of Francis, a lack of leadership capability in two of the trusts. This was 
not cited as an issue currently on the executive side, but two of the trusts commented that it 
was hard to recruit non-executive directors of high calibre. The quality and visibility of the 
middle management tier varied and this had a significant impact on the delivery of the 
Francis agenda. 
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6.12 Trust middle-management surveys 
Three of the six case-study sites (Trusts 1, 4 and 5) agreed to distribute a link to a 
questionnaire aiming to gather opinions from middle managers (for example the leaders of 
departments and wards). In Trust 6, the survey link was distributed to a small number of 
middle managers late in the project. The questionnaire included some items from our 
national, board-level survey, and also many free-text items to capture some richer responses 
to supplement data gathered in the interviews and focus groups.  
 
Respondents 
A total of 91 middle managers largely completed the survey. The modes of distribution make 
determining response rates difficult; see table 14 below for details of numbers of respondents. 
The sampling frame was very small in Trust 6; the handful of text responses were fed into the 
information for the case, but no further analysis was done. For the other three case studies, 
we estimate the response rate to be very roughly 50%, with nearly 50% of these providing 
mostly-complete responses (the others supplying only demographics, or little beyond that). 
Therefore we estimate the completed response rate to be around 20-30%.  
 
Table 14: Middle-manager survey: respondent numbers and percentages 
Trust Sent to  Demographics Mostly complete 
  approx 
number 
number approx 
% of 
total 
number approx 
% of 
total 
approx % 
of 
responses 
1 200 85 43% 39 20% 46% 
4 60 37 62% 18 30% 49% 
5 - 70 - 30 - 43% 
6 - 20 - 4 - 20% 
 
We asked respondents to give their job role (free text) and self-identify as a first-line or 
senior manager or other. Typical titles for ‘first-line managers’ included titles like lead 
148 
 
nurse, head/manager of department/service, team leader and clinical consultant. ‘Senior 
managers’ included matron, deputy director/deputy chief, director, head of function (nursing, 
estates, service improvement, communications etc) and directorate manager. ‘Others’ 
included clinical consultants, educators and district nurses. There was, of course, overlap, in 
particular there were clinical consultants who self-identified in each category. Roughly a 
third were senior nurses or nurse managers.  
 
Findings 
The primary aim was this supplementary information-gathering rather than statistical testing 
or model building.  
Amongst the quantified items, of particular relevance to the discussion in this report are the 
middle managers’ perceptions of:  
 Training opportunities  
 Their board’s commitment to the Duty of Candour, openness and transparency 
 Encouragement to innovate 
There were very few responses from Trust 6 on these items (four or fewer), so only the data 
for Trusts 1, 4 and 5 have been included. 
On training opportunities, Question 3.14: was 
‘How do you rate the opportunities for management training and development for staff (of 
four types) in this Trust? (0 = Not good at all, to 100 = Extremely good)’ 
In Trusts 1 and 5 it is remarkable how dispersed the responses are, from poor to excellent, 
(see   
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Figure 11 below). 
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Figure 11: Middle managers’ perceptions of the opportunities for management training 
and development in their trust  
 
Clin Mgrs = clinical managers Snr Mgrs = senior managers FL Mgrs = front line managers 
FL CSS = front-line clinical, scientific and support staff 
On Board commitment, Question 3.18: was 
‘In your experience how strongly is the Board and senior management committed to the 
following: 
 Openness (allowing concerns to be raised and aired) 
 Transparency (sharing of information) 
 Candour (ensuring that patients who have been harmed are informed of the fact) 
(0 = Not at all committed, to 100 = Extremely committed)’ 
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The responses are shown in Figure 12.The vertical lines indicate the means. For Trusts 1 and 
4, board commitment to candour is perceived as materially higher than transparency and 
openness. For Trust 1 this is robustly statistically significant (using the Kruskal-Wallis test 
with Conover-Iman post-hoc comparison with Bonferroni adjustment). For the other two 
trusts, though candour is higher, the difference fails to reach the threshold for statistical 
significance with samples of these sizes (though note the small sample size for Trust 4). 
 
Figure 12: Middle managers’ perceptions of their board’s commitment to Duty of 
Candour, openness and transparency 
 
 
On encouragement to innovate, Question 3.12 was: 
‘To what extent are frontline staff and managers encouraged to innovate to do things 
differently, by allowing them to make decisions and take reasonable risks? (0 = no 
encouragement at all, to 100 = very strong encouragement)’ 
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The survey indicated there is great variety in the middle managers’ perception of this (see 
Figure 13), and there is little difference between the views of the (self-identified) ‘first-line’ 
and ‘senior’ managers. 
 
Figure 13: Middle managers’ perception of the extent of encouragement to innovate in 
their trust  
 
 
With regard to additional text comments volunteered by the survey respondents, there is very 
little specifically about board improvement initiatives. On the other hand there were many 
comments more broadly on organisational leadership. These are summarised below under the 
153 
 
themes of leadership strategies, structures, styles and culture, financial and non-financial 
costs of improving board and organisational leadership, and strengths and weaknesses in 
board and organisational leadership. 
 
Leadership strategies, structures, styles and culture 
Middle managers at Trust 1 reported a generally good and open relationship with board level 
leaders, with increased transparency through reports and feedback to staff, and respect for the 
clinical staff. It was felt that a lot of effort had been put into direct communication from the 
CEO (talks, newsletters, Listening Into Action, away days for consultants). The leadership 
style of the recently-departed CEO was felt to have left a lasting legacy. There were mixed 
reports on visibility. There was praise for how visible, open and approachable the CEO had 
been and some reports of visibility and a visit by the chair (much appreciated) and staff 
awareness of names and faces, however many reports of there not having been any visits to 
departments and community sites. Whilst many members of the board acted as good role 
models, there were some suggestions that this was deteriorating and when under pressure 
some of the board exhibit negative behaviours (for example, belittling, disempowering). 
Several staff talked about a cohesive and ‘can do’ culture with engaged and empowered staff 
and an upbeat patient focus, with staff embedded in ‘old style’ culture leaving. However, 
others talked of deterioration recently, with strong leadership and board visibility in nursing 
deteriorating, and some suggested the trust’s focus appeared to be increasingly about money 
and capacity. 
At Trust 4 the board were felt to be visible; seen around the hospital, they chatted with staff, 
and could be found when needed. (It was noted that it is a small trust). Changes at board level 
since Francis included: restructuring of board, clearer terms of reference, annual audit of 
compliance for all board and sub board committees; changes to job descriptions to include 
clearer Fit and Proper Person and Duty of Candour elements; introduction of new roles such 
as Freedom to Speak Up Guardian and restructured committees to ensure that all information 
is passed up to the board. Members got involved in staff and patient survey data collection. 
The majority of the board were felt to reflect and model the values of the trust in their 
leadership style and behaviours. Recent changes had overcome deficiencies of some board 
members who had ‘development needs’; things have improved, including moving away from 
a ‘slightly catastrophizing’ style of medical management. Leadership was now very 
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professional, receptive to innovation or concerns. The trust board always listened to the 
clinical staff, and now there is further increasing staff engagement with regular clinical 
senates.  At Trust 4, staff credited the following as having helped to improve leadership from 
the board: changes to the executive team, board development sessions, collective leadership 
approach to quality and leadership and an open culture (open to ideas and opinions from staff 
at all levels) as foundations for the quality and patient safety strategy. 
At Trust 5 (as at others), middle managers reported that governance was felt to have 
improved greatly and to have increased performance of the trust. 
At Trust 6, respondents reported that the current chief executive had engaged first line 
managers and tried to engage clinical and other staff. There was a greatly improved culture of 
transparency and openness, honesty and freedom of speech, empowerment, drive, staff 
recognition and innovation. However, there were views that engagement may be focused on 
certain groups and not sustained, and that leadership visibility was more in the form of social 
media, with the previous monthly executive rounds are now less frequent. 
Respondents had suggestions for improvements to board level leadership. At Trust 1 there 
were ideas for better communications between the board and the frontline: for example, a 
quarterly forum with members of board for staff to access and discuss any issues, and 
confidential focus groups for shop floor staff with board members to discover what is really 
going on. Similarly, at Trust 4 it was proposed that there was more interaction with service 
frontline staff. Trust 6 respondents indicated that engagement needed to be wider, deeper and 
more sustained. 
 
Financial and non-financial costs of improving board and organisational 
leadership 
At Trust 1, it was reported that there was generally no additional budget specifically allocated 
for improving leadership. There was, on the other hand, indication of investment in training, 
time outs, wellbeing services, Schwartz rounds, staff awards, management time on 
governance and patient safety summits. 
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Trust 4 respondents similarly reported that improving leadership was contained mainly within 
current resources, including requirements to attend study sessions, investment in an E-
portfolio, more committees and scrutiny. 
At Trust 5, as at others, it was noted that there was more staff to ensure safer staffing levels 
and more trained night staff. There was one suggestion that this was cost neutral as it brought 
down absence rates due to stress and bullying. Respondents at this trust reported pressure for 
short-term cuts (including to safe staffing) starting to reappear. 
 Respondents also noted a large growth in their corporate governance departments, costs for 
internal and external engagement events and significant spend to improve services and 
equipment to respond to regulators. 
 
     Strengths and weaknesses in board and organisational leadership 
At Trust 1, middle managers commented positively on the creation of a trust slogan and 
vision and values, new senior team briefings and support from the board for leadership 
courses. There was a widespread perception that governance structures had greatly improved. 
At Trusts 1 and 4, staff noted that allied health professionals (AHPs) were not represented or 
visible at board level. 
At Trust 5, many reported no barriers to the process of improving leadership. A few, on the 
other hand, mentioned the risk of the dilution of messages from the board due to middle-
management filtering, and often still being target driven rather than quality driven. Executing 
a change of trust culture from 'heavy touch' management required to bring the trust out of 
special measures to the light touch management style required to encourage innovation and 
development was considered to be a work in progress..  There was a sense of being pulled in 
different directions by middle managers and by board level leaders. 
The few respondents in Trust 6 considered it a strength that the organisation culture allowed 
for discussions in a non-critical way, so as to explore innovative ways of working towards 
improvement and the provision of safety summits to discuss incidents. Weaknesses included 
lack of stability, particularly too many management staff not remaining in post for longer 
than two years, too much top down leadership and too many decisions made without 
engaging those who work on the floor and who have the clinical expertise. 
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In conclusion, there are some clear messages emanating from the 91 middle managers in our 
survey about their perceptions of desirable leadership. These included prioritising training 
and development at every level, building effective and cohesive teams, preferencing personal 
over email communications, insisting on organised and structured ways of doing things and 
having action plans that are followed through. These are also amongst the themes that have 
emerged from the fieldwork as a whole that we conducted across our six case study sites 
which we recap below.  
 
6.13  Summary of findings from the case study sites 
We now summarise the main findings against the five research objectives as set out in table 4 
in our methodology chapter. 
1. To identify, describe and assess how boards have sought to implement  
recommendations on organisational leadership since the publication of the 
Francis Inquiry Report 
There was evidence in all case study sites of a broad range of actions instigated by boards 
immediately following the Francis Report in 2013, especially focussing on patient experience 
and staff, which we have been able to chronicle in some detail. Longer term, we discerned the 
spirit of Francis living on in ongoing work programmes to improve patient experience and 
staff engagement, as well as the continuation of specific actions such as the implementation 
of the Duty of Candour.  
2. To determine which mechanisms used by boards have led to reported 
organisational/service changes, and the factors underpinning such change 
We found evidence to demonstrate there had been a step change since 2013 in the seriousness 
with which trust boards took matters of quality and safety. The efficacy of immediate and 
longer term responses by the six trusts varied.  The robustness of governance, 
communications and administrative systems and processes, the credibility and drive of the 
CEO, medical director and chief nurse and the quality of middle management had a bearing 
on the ability of senior leadership to execute desired improvements. Stability of board 
leadership was also associated with these organisational attributes. Respondents to our survey 
of middle managers felt particularly strongly about the importance of consistency of 
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messaging by board level leaders and about the impact of poor middle management, a cadre 
which they are, simultaneously, both part of and immediately affected by.  
3. To explore the intended and unintended effects 
There was a strong message from two of the trusts that Francis was a wake-up call. Two 
others described Francis as fitting well with the direction of travel they were already going in. 
The final two were subject to external regulatory interventions in 2013, which were both a 
shock and a spur. Generally speaking the actions taken by boards in the wake of Francis were 
viewed as resulting in a more open organisation culture. Implementation of the Duty of 
Candour has been part of that journey. Middle managers of  the three trusts where we were 
able to administer a ward and department managers survey reported that the commitment of 
their boards with regard to candour (ensuring that patients who were harmed were informed 
of the fact) was generally higher than their commitment to openness (allowing concerns to be 
raised and aired) and  transparency (sharing of information). 
Berwick was seen as a positive driver to stimulate thinking and take action on engaging staff 
in service improvement, although none of the case study trusts had, by the time of the close 
of the fieldwork, been able to implement a culture of quality improvement comprehensively.  
4. To examine the financial and non-financial costs of developing and 
implementing actions 
Increasing leadership costs (as distinct from staffing costs) since 2013 did not feature 
prominently in our interviews. There was some concern about the time costs in preparing for 
CQC visits but others welcomed the challenge that inspections brought to the organisation to 
raise their game. There were also mentions of increased bureaucracy around implementing 
the Duty of Candour. Other costs, for example on board leadership development, staff 
training, and improved governance arrangements were considered to be justified.   
5. To identify the enablers of and barriers to implementation 
The main enablers were seen to be organisations with a stable board, visible senior leadership 
who consistently modelled behaviours that were congruent with trust values, good 
governance, communications and administrative processes, and an empowered, capable cadre 
of middle managers.  Barriers were the absence of these things and, additionally, unhelpful 
and sometimes conflicting interventions by the different national bodies. On the horizon, too, 
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and more to the fore towards the end of our fieldwork, were issues connected with workforce 
shortages, social care funding and primary care capacity to deal with increasing demand. In 
conclusion, all the trusts had a number of strategic priorities including patient safety, 
finances, dealing with regulator demands, workforce shortages, long-term organisation 
sustainability and working productively with their STP. All boards had developed or revised 
a raft of policies since Francis, including in the handling of complaints and serious incidents, 
listening to patients and staff engagement. Policies and practices of listening to and acting on 
patient feedback were further advanced than partnering with patients to improve care. Duty of 
Candour was reported to be well embedded and to have led to greater openness and patient 
confidence. Board members in all trusts were exercising leadership that was more visible to 
staff and patients. There were notable differences between the case study sites. Only one 
board demonstrated excellence in equality and diversity. It was noteworthy that this trust 
served a predominantly poor white population, although it had a diverse workforce.   
More stable boards, with lower turnover of members, were able to act in a more unitary way.  
The space created on boards for strategic thinking varied. A culture of quality and service 
improvement was emergent and variable. Managing the demands of national bodies was 
challenging. Some trusts had experienced the intervention of CQC as supportive and others 
had less positive experiences. Perceived variable quality of middle management and of ward 
and department level teamworking acted as a barrier to implementation of policies associated 
with Francis. The emphasis on quality following Francis may have provided an opportunity 
for the leadership role, sphere of influence and profile of the chief nurse to become more 
prominent on some boards. There was considerable variation within trusts too. For example 
the middle managers in the ward and department managers’ survey that we were able to 
conduct at three of the sites reported significant variation in training and development 
opportunities and in encouragement they were given for innovation. 
What contextual influences accounted for some of these differences? Variations in the 
perceived quality of middle management, quality of teamworking, the embeddedness of 
quality improvement, the stability of board membership and the self-assessed strategic 
competence of the board were associated, in three of the four cases, with those organisations 
which were on an improving trajectory. And in two of these four cases there were also 
reported concerns about the robustness of governance systems and processes. This indicates 
the sustained hard work, over an extended period of time, that is involved in the leadership 
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effort to take organisations out of trouble. It also suggests a context that national bodies need 
to be aware of as they performance manage and support these fragile organisations.  
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7 Analysis, synthesis and discussion of findings 
 
7.1 Summary 
This chapter draws together the findings from work packages 1, 2 and 3 of this research 
study.  We start by summarising the key actions that have been taken by boards to implement 
the recommendations of the Francis Inquiry and the subsequent reports including those by 
Berwick (NAG 2013) , Clwyd (Clwyd and Hart 2013), Kirkup (Kirkup 2015), Francis 3 
(Francis 2015) and Carter (Carter 2016). We then assess the impact of those actions, the 
evidence for improvements in board leadership, the narrative around financial and non-
financial costs of implementing Francis, the reported and observed barriers and enablers in 
implementing Francis and, finally, the implications for healthcare board governance theory.  
The following four sections in this chapter correspond to four of our five research objectives 
outlined in chapter one. The final chapter addresses the fifth research objective which is to 
assess the implications of this study for policy and practice and further research. 
 
7.2 Actions taken by boards  
(Research objective 1: To identify the different ways in which the boards of NHS 
hospital trusts and foundation trusts have sought to implement the recommendations on 
organisational leadership set out in reports following the publication of the Francis 
public inquiry) 
In our scoping phase, national opinion leaders and formers told us that responsibility weighed 
heavily on boards after Francis. These interviewees said they would expect to see a full 
programme of work to improve quality, staffing, safety, patient experience, complaints 
handling and staff able to raise concerns.  From the national survey and case studies, boards 
asserted to us that they had risen to that challenge, providing energetic and comprehensive 
responses. Over half of board secretaries responding to our national survey said that their 
trusts had not newly established any of these policies since Francis, while a much smaller 
number had established five or more new policies and the numbers of actions also varied.  
This suggests some polarisation, with a raft of new policies formulated in some trusts, and 
few in the majority.  Establishing at least one new policy was associated with having a lower 
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CQC Well-Led Rating at the time of the survey. This suggests that post 2013 the boards of 
organisations with a legacy of lower performance may have been making conscientious 
attempts to narrow the gap by adopting policies and practices that others already had in place 
and implementing recommendations of the above named reports. And it suggests the benefits 
of regulatory intervention for struggling trusts. We also observed this levelling up in three of 
the six case studies that had had regulatory intervention or failures of care that had come to 
light between 2012-2014. The following sections will consider the extent to which these 
efforts have been sustained and what impact they have had. 
 
7.3 Impact of Francis and of actions taken  
(Research objective 2: To find out which mechanisms used by boards of NHS trusts and 
foundation trusts have led to reported improvements (or otherwise) in local 
organisational strategies, structures and culture, and the factors underpinning such 
progress) 
This study has identified a number of impacts of the actions taken by boards following 
Francis and the suite of reports that ensued. We have grouped these into five areas: patient 
experience, staff engagement, openness (including Duty of Candour), improving the quality 
of care and improving governance. We would like to add a cautionary note – some of our 
findings relate to self-reported impacts and we are aware from upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick 2007) that executives' experiences, values, and personalities colour their 
interpretations of the situations they face, their influence and their contributions. We also 
know that board members in the healthcare sector can also overestimate the quality of care in 
hospitals that they oversee (Jha and Epstein 2013). We have sought corroborative evidence 
from other sources to mitigate this problem and highlighted this where this has been possible. 
 
Patient experience 
The structures for improving patient experience were widely evident in the case study sites, 
including patient experience leads or coordinators, job descriptions emphasising Duty of 
Candour and patient experience, the establishment of patient councils or patient experience 
committees (in one case chaired by the CEO), welcoming HealthWatch representatives at 
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board meetings and encouraging governors to take an active role in this area. Patient 
experience came third as a board challenge after patient safety and finances in the national 
survey, indicating insight that this was still very much work in progress.  In recognition of 
this, two of our case studies had medical patient experience leads to support change in 
mindsets in the medical workforce.  
Leads for patient experience were identified in all our case study sites. Processes for listening 
and responding to patient experiences were more advanced in some sites than in others, 
where the top priority had been to ensure patient safety because of a recent history of failures 
in care. 
We heard many examples of where the trust tried hard to put patients first, really listening to 
their concerns. Non-executive directors and governors were energised by this agenda, 
although it might seem odd to outside observers that boards felt liberated to be able to do this: 
‘It became ‘ok’ to talk about the patients and their care much more, the old adage of 
strategy as being the ‘in’ thing was actually eaten by the understanding that the right 
culture is what is really important. Looking after your patients but equally looking 
after your staff, communication, engagement, empowerment were all important 
previously, however post Francis this was ‘accepted’ as what we must do and it was 
not optional.’ [National Survey Respondent] 
From what we could glean, and in the absence of large scale patient surveys which were 
beyond the scope of this study, these efforts had a tangible positive impact on patient 
experience: ‘from a patient’s perspective, I mean I’ve been a regular visitor to the hospital 
over the past ten years….. and I must say I’ve seen an enormous improvement in the service 
provision’ [Patient and Governor Focus Group Participant, Trust 2]. But there were 
exceptions, sometimes within the same trust. And there were stories depressingly similar to 
those reported to the Francis Inquiry: 
‘Some of the wards are much different from others and it does rely very much on 
particular individuals and particular shifts…we have had two elderly neighbours… 
one of them had dementia… And because we were not next of kin, nobody would talk 
to us about her…I looked at her notes quite often and they would tick that she’d taken 
her medicine.  On her bedside table were these little cups with the tablets still in 
them…You know, if she was thirsty, she was hungry, she wouldn’t ring her bell 
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because she was so confused…So my husband and I used to come in just about every 
night just to make sure that the basics were being dealt with because she would talk to 
us because she knew who we were.  But we, as far as the hospital were concerned, we 
were nothing.  It seems counterproductive…’  [Patient and Governor Focus Group 
Participant, Trust 2] 
We also found that consulting on new facilities, and listening and feeding back to patients on 
their care, was more strongly embedded than involving patients in the co-design of new 
services or on service improvement ideas. Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation, which is 
a classic reference on patient and public involvement (Arnstein 1969) and still widely 
referenced in the healthcare context (see for example Ocloo and Matthews (2016)) , suggests 
that management attempts at involving the public, in their direct care and in organisation and 
service design, can range along a continuum from tokenism through to ceding control. An 
appropriate level of engagement does clearly vary according to circumstances, but our view is 
that, where rung one is nonparticipation and rung eight is citizen leadership and control, most 
trusts are on rung  four or five (consultation and involvement through eliciting feedback 
through surveys,  and including patient representatives on committees). 
The finding from the national survey (see section 5.3 above) that board members themselves 
knew somewhat more about what was important to regulators than what was important to 
patients is an indication of the limits to patient-centredness of boards in today’s NHS. The 
growing financial pressures and continued perceived dominance of a target culture were 
strongly emphasised in the stakeholder interviews and in the extensive text comments in the 
national survey. This provides additional evidence of the extent to which a nascent culture of 
truly patient centred care is under threat unless, as one respondent put it, boards can…  
‘…keep all of the plates spinning….’ [Chair]. 
 
Staff engagement 
As with patient experience, we found much effort had been invested in improving staff 
engagement. These included huddles, Schwartz rounds, CEO with an open door, walk-abouts 
by directors and so on. 
The reported impact of these efforts varied across our case study sites. One of the inhibiting 
factors was the quality of and investment in the middle management cadre. In some of our 
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case study sites, the onus lay too heavily on the executive tier. A further issue commented on 
by staff in one case study site was a lack of discipline and consistency in internal governance 
arrangements, accompanied by erratic internal communications. 
Two particular characteristics constituted excellent staff engagement, as evidenced by good 
NHS Staff Survey results and feedback from managers and staff at three of our case study 
sites: a comprehensive staff health and wellbeing strategy, and opportunities for listening and 
training events that successfully included the whole workforce.  Boards that emphasised one 
of their purposes as reconciling different interests in their organisation were also more likely 
to have staff engagement as a top challenge, which we have interpreted as also a top priority.  
Guidance in the Healthy NHS Board (NHSLA 2013), about which more is included below, 
emphasised the importance of a people strategy that supports comprehensive management 
training and development for all categories and grades of staff. The evidence from the ward 
and department managers survey (see figure 11, section 6.12 in chapter 6 above) conducted at 
three of our case study sites indicates that a comprehensive people strategy remains 
somewhat of an aspiration. In two of the trusts it is remarkable how dispersed the responses 
are, from poor to excellent, to the question about how they rate the opportunities for 
management training and development. 
 
Openness (including Duty of Candour) 
We asked respondents in the national survey for their assessments of the impact of 
implementing the Duty of Candour on various aspects of the organisation and its functioning. 
The overall picture is of marked increases in the openness of the culture and in learning and 
improvement, albeit that these are based on subjective judgements of a complex situation. 
There would also appear to have been some net reputational benefits and increases in patient 
confidence and in whistleblowing. 
In common with other aspects of Francis, some respondents felt that their trust had already 
been practising the values and behaviours of the Duty of Candour. These respondents 
typically perceived little value, although some saw benefits in the greater formalisation and 
an opportunity to reinforce the existing approach. 
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The findings in the case study sites mirrored those in the national survey, and managers and 
staff also confirmed what board directors were saying about efforts to implement the Duty of 
Candour (see figure 12, section 6.12 in chapter 6 above). Training for clinicians in Duty of 
Candour had generally been well organised and support was available. Of all the 
recommendations coming out of the Francis Report, the Duty of Candour is the one which 
appears to have been the most solidly implemented. According to the results in the ward and 
department managers survey in two of the trusts, the board is seen to be materially more 
committed to Duty of Candour (admitting when mistakes happen to patients) than openness 
(allowing concerns to be raised and aired) and transparency (sharing of information). For 
Trust 1 this is robustly and statistically significant  
Our advisory group observed that the Duty of Candour is commonly understood in the NHS 
to be directed at patients but that it was also important for staff, and it was this aspect that 
was still somewhat under-developed. As well as it being a policy which fits the zeitgeist, a 
further reason for the wholesale implementation of the Duty of Candour to patients could be 
that it is explicit, mandated and measurable, and accords with the mantra that what gets 
measured gets done (Peters and Waterman 1984).  
In relation to a culture of openness, our findings are corroborated by the latest NHS Staff 
Survey findings (NSS 2016). Eighty-five percent agreed that their organisation encourages 
staff to report incidents. When incidents are reported, 63% of staff felt that action is taken to 
prevent the incident happening again, and only 6% disagreed that this is the case. Findings on 
unsafe clinical practice were similar, with 70% of staff feeling secure in raising any concerns 
they may have regarding clinical practice. Fifty-eight percent of staff had confidence that 
their organisation would address their concerns if they were raised. Reflecting back on a 
question that arose from the stakeholder interviews, the evidence suggests an approach which 
is generally closer to Alton Towers than to Thomas Cook (as evidenced by two high profile 
recent incidents), in how the NHS handles failures of care. The caveat from the NHS Staff 
Surveys, and corroborated by findings from our case studies, is that some organisations, 
although committed to openness, are not always as adept at acting to address concerns and 
prevent recurrence. 
 
166 
 
Improving the quality of care 
Accounts from the case study sites and from the national boards survey suggest that patient 
safety and patient experience have taken a higher priority than enhancing clinical 
effectiveness. We found from our interviews, board observations and survey of managers that 
a quality improvement culture was not yet comprehensively embedded in any of the trusts, 
although there were a number of examples of good practice and a strong sense in three of the 
case study trusts that there was about to be a big push.  Related to service improvement, the 
ward and department managers survey findings at three of our case study sites provides 
salutary confirmation of this variability in their answers to the question about how much 
front-line staff and managers are encouraged to innovate (see figure 13, section 6.12 in 
chapter 6 above). 
From observations of board and committee meetings and interviews, we gleaned that 
particularly the medical director and other clinical members of the board demonstrated a 
potentially significant, but not always realised, role in raising the sights of the organisation in 
terms of national and international benchmarking. The space for this conversation at board 
meetings was limited, although we did observe and note rigorous debate and data presented 
for assurance at quality committees. 
 
Improving governance 
As described above, boards had established or invigorated committees particularly to obtain 
assurance on matters of patient safety and clinical quality of care. Board governance is about 
setting strategic direction, making investment choices, and accounting to stakeholders as well 
as monitoring performance (Garratt (1997) and see figure 14 below). We noted engagement 
by boards in strategic matters, but the monitoring of progress against agreed strategic 
objectives was not as explicit or as regular as might be expected.  Those boards which 
exhibited a stronger internal locus of control (Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002) also 
maintained a focus on strategy and had a stronger quality outcomes orientation. This 
orientation, based on an exploratory factor analysis explaining 15% of the variation, places 
importance on clinical effectiveness, patient experience, patient safety and to some extent 
staff engagement. Others, who experienced a more external locus of control, (and therefore 
were seemingly more powerless in the face of regulator demands), paid more attention to 
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monitoring national performance targets, finances, A&E performance, workforce shortage 
and to some extent responding to regulators. 
We found that the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement policy has been implemented but was 
a low profile policy in comparison with other initiatives. Not all trusts are checking on 
continuing fitness of directors, according to board secretaries responding to our national 
survey in 2016. The requirement has been interpreted rather literally. We know from events 
during the period of our study that there have been cases (for example at St George’s 
University Hospital Foundation Trust) where the policy has failed to prevent inappropriate 
appointments of individuals. 
 
7.4 Improvements in board leadership 
(Research objective 3: To explore the early intended and unintended effects of the 
different ways in   which NHS hospital trusts and foundation trusts have sought to 
improve board and organisational leadership) 
In this section we examine improvements in board leadership since Francis, using the 
framework offered by the Healthy NHS Board (NHSLA 2013). This is not because we judge 
that this is necessarily the sole source of wisdom on healthcare board governance but because 
this is government guidance that NHS boards have been expected to use.  The guidance 
outlines three roles for boards (strategy, accountability and culture) and three building blocks 
(context, intelligence and engagement). To complement this practical examination, in section 
7.7 below we discuss and offer refinements to the theoretical framework for effective 
healthcare boards, discussed in chapter four, in the light of our findings. 
 
Three roles of boards (from NHSLA (2013)) 
Strategy: We have already noted that the strategy space for NHS boards is not very large and 
this has been pointed out previously in research on healthcare boards (NHS-Confederation 
(2005), Chambers et al. (2013)). There are patterns in the data from the national survey of 
board members that suggest that those boards with a stronger quality outcome orientation 
(instead of concentrating on monitoring performance against targets) are also those who have 
carved out time for strategy and have a stronger sense of an internal locus of control 
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(Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002). Sustainability and Transformation Programmes (STPs) 
were unfolding during the time we were collecting data from our case study sites and we 
noted that boards in all our sites were playing an active system leadership role and 
contributing to improvements in health and care system relationships. 
 
Accountability: We have already noted that boards in our case study were not always 
focussed on monitoring progress against the delivery of strategic objectives, being often pre-
occupied with tracking performance against mandatory targets for example for waiting times 
in A&E, Referral to Treatment Targets (RTT), cancer waits and responding to CQC verdicts. 
This is notwithstanding the view that national targets are useful and reflect legitimate issues 
of patient and staff concern and experiences. 
The NHS Healthy Board and our stakeholders referred to the importance of seeking out 
different sources of evidence to obtain assurance around safety and quality. The work of 
Dixon-Woods and colleagues (2013) emphasises the importance of problem sensing rather 
than comfort seeking. One of our respondents in the national survey talked of the importance 
of ‘the restless board’. Observations from our case study sites indicated variation in both the 
rigour and the maturity of their boards’ approach to sourcing and using relevant data. The 
most diligent boards were using national and international benchmarks, tracking performance 
over time, had CEOs who were focussed on monitoring clinical outcomes, and chief nurses 
and medical directors who were vocal at public board meetings and board committees.  
  
Culture: The NHS Healthy Board notes that the extent to which culture can be defined, 
identified and then deliberately changed is contested within the academic literature (see, for 
example, Davies and Mannion (2013)). There is, however, some agreement on the value of 
encouraging the exploration of culture at every level and modelling desired values and 
behaviours. Boards have a key role in prioritising and supporting this work within the 
organisation. The findings from this study indicate that boards almost universally espoused 
the importance of setting the tone for the organisation. There is some evidence that first-line 
and senior managers also recognise the importance of culture. As one respondent put it: ‘the 
culture in my area of work has changed, this is a slow process but definitely improving…’. 
[First-line Manager, Trust 5].  There remains a challenge in ensuring consistency of desired 
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behaviours in every corner of hospital trusts whilst acknowledging that ward and department 
subcultures as well as hospitals as a whole may, for good reasons, vary because of different 
histories and the nature of the work undertaken. 
 
Three building blocks (from NHSLA (2013)) 
Context: The NHS Healthy Board mentions the importance of boards taking into account the 
full range of key elements of the external environment in shaping strategy and considering 
risks. Our public board and board committee observations, consideration of minutes and 
interviews at our case study sites indicated close familiarity with some areas (the regulatory 
environment, for example). Our national boards survey also found that board members had a 
greater knowledge of what concerned regulators than what was important to their patients. 
From what we could gather, the case study sites were very well sighted on the local and 
national social and economic picture, legislation, political turbulence and all the latest 
government policies (and generally had workable mechanisms for dealing with the plethora 
of guidance which came their way). There was more limited exposure to trends in changing 
public expectations and less discussion of the wider determinants of health which would 
impact on the way in which the public would be using the services of their hospital. 
 
Intelligence: We have already noted above that boards in our case study sites did not always 
succeed in monitoring progress towards meeting their organisation’s strategic objectives. 
They also did not always make extended use of trends, forecasts and systematic 
benchmarking against similar hospitals in England and internationally. There was much more 
detailed data, and more focus, on monitoring operational performance. Good practices in 
exception reporting and triangulation of different sources of data (for example quantitative 
data and patient feedback) were also widely apparent.. Metrics on workforce received 
considerable attention, although here the adage that what gets measured gets done did not 
always ring true, for example more attention was sometimes paid to a scrutiny of sickness 
absence and vacancy rates than to efforts to tackling the causes of these.  
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Engagement: Workforce issues bring us to the third of the building blocks for effective 
boards outlined in the NHS Healthy Board. This guidance emphasises the importance of a 
people strategy that hears, supports and nurtures all staff, and enables and rewards a culture 
of innovation and improvement. Staff engagement is increasingly emphasised and high levels 
are associated with better organisation performance (West and Dawson 2012). Although there 
was considerable reported activity in each, the six trusts varied in their overall staff 
engagement score according to the latest national NHS Staff Survey results. We have also 
discussed patient engagement in section 7.3 above and made an assessment of the level of 
maturity in acute hospitals in this area. We noted that in terms of wider stakeholder 
engagement, there were some encouraging findings about how boards in our case study sites 
were collaborating with their council of governors. Meetings included cordial and robust 
challenges to the board of directors, and there was evidence of inviting governors to 
contribute proactively (i.e. beyond scrutiny) to the work of the trust. This has to be set in the 
context of earlier studies indicating some ambiguity about the role of governors in NHS 
Foundation Trusts (Chambers et al. 2013). Relationships with others in the local health and 
care community varied, with 41% of respondents in our national boards survey indicating that 
poor local relationships was a barrier.  
 
Improving board effectiveness 
The NHS Healthy Board guidance defines the scope of improving board effectiveness as 
board capacity (including composition), capability, disciplines and behaviours. Our view is 
that the reality is more nuanced and that the focus for improving board effectiveness will 
depend to some degree on history, legacy, local circumstances and desired organisational 
strategic priorities. We examine this in more detail in section 7.7 below on the implications of 
this study for theories of healthcare board governance. 
In relation to board composition, the characteristics of improving board leadership from the 
stakeholder comments, national survey and case studies included stability on the board and 
particularly the CEO. Our stakeholders were concerned about a possible cult round the CEO 
and whilst we saw no striking evidence of this in any of our case studies, there was no doubt 
that in five of the trusts this individual was high profile, influential in driving culture change 
and the board, and the organisations were quite dependent on these individuals. We also 
noted the growing influence and contribution made by the chief nurse in five out of six of our 
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case study sites and it may be that the post Francis culture and re-ordering of priorities 
(patient experience, safe staffing and workforce) has given the opportunity for the board 
nurse to have a far greater voice.  
Despite considerable investment, there has been little evidence so far of the impact of board 
development activities beyond increased reported confidence of individual board members 
(Chambers et al. 2013).  This current study suggests that there are links between the 
investment in individual board director development (measured in terms of number of days 
per year) and certain organisation characteristics.  In particular, from our national boards 
survey findings (see section 5.9 above), higher numbers of days of individual board member 
development is correlated positively with greater reported board impacts on staff engagement 
and patient experience, knowing the concerns of patients and staff, and recruitment and 
retention of CEO and executive directors not being barriers to leadership development. There 
may be a virtuous circle at play here: investing to a greater degree in board leadership 
development is associated with board confidence in a quality outcomes orientation rather than 
a regulatory driven performance and access outcomes orientation, a greater sense of internal 
locus of control and an increased ability to recruit and retain board executive leaders.   
We would, however, be wary of positing simple cause and effect. Case study research can 
help to explain patterns but the data is often messy and contradictory and can point in all 
directions. Facing some common challenges (financial, meeting targets, patient safety) and 
some very different ones (coming out of special measures, legacy of failures of care, 
geographical isolation), it was striking how the board leadership of our six case study sites 
exhibited very different corporate personalities. Summing them up each individually in one 
word, in alphabetical order, they were:  classy, courageous, defiant, shiny, ramshackle and 
recovering, with the caveat that these are to give an impression of certain characteristics of 
the cases, and to illustrate diversity, rather than to pass judgement.  
The ‘classy’ trust has pride, self-confidence, a fantastic brand, a non-executive cadre with 
their own distinguished careers, and is extremely focussed on clinical excellence and 
improving staff engagement and loyalty. The ‘courageous’ trust has had opprobrium piled 
upon it by media, been seen as professionally isolated, and is now seen as an exemplar in 
several areas of patient and staff engagement and has built a reputation for living by its 
values. The ‘defiant’ trust is a district general hospital that used to consider itself successful, 
was shocked by external regulatory intervention, has a strong family feel and is somewhat 
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defensive about external criticism.  The ‘shiny’ trust has superb administrative systems and 
processes and an excellent reputation for its staff engagement strategy and for patient-centred 
care. The ‘ramshackle’ trust demonstrates strong commitment to values of staff engagement 
and improving patient experience, but consistent attention to execution and to follow-through 
is lacking. The ‘recovering’ trust is picking itself up after a long period of churn on the board, 
poor staff morale and buffeting by regulators and the media. We therefore believe that the 
findings provide a rich picture of the acute hospital sector in the NHS which is wrestling 
(more or less successfully) with trying to deliver cultural change for well organised and 
compassionate care for patients. 
We therefore suggest that it would be both unwise and also impossible to guide or reduce 
hospitals to a common style or approach for the implementation of policies. This also lends 
weight to our view that a realist approach to understanding the characteristics of effective 
healthcare boards that takes into account different contexts and different priorities is the 
preferred way forward. This is dealt with in more detail in our discussion on implications for 
healthcare board governance in section 7.7 below. 
 
7.5 Financial and non-financial costs  
(Research objective 4: To examine the financial and non-financial costs of developing 
and implementing new policies, processes and actions aimed at improving board and 
organisational leadership) 
A common but not uncontested view from the national survey of board members, and the 
interviews and surveys of ward and department managers at our case study sites was that 
although there were complaints about the bureaucracy involved, the costs of policies and of 
improving leadership and governance (as distinct from staffing) following Francis, they were 
not generally considered excessively burdensome. And the investments were considered by 
most to be worthwhile; in many cases they had been initiated by the trust leadership and there 
was a strong conviction that they were necessary for improved patient experiences and staff 
engagement. There was very little complaint about the drain on resources to enable improved 
leadership and stronger governance. The main costs after 2013 were to ensure safe staffing, 
which is the topic of another research study (Ball et al. forthcoming). These costs were large 
and were experienced as a significant cost pressure for trusts: three of the case study site 
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trusts reported that they prioritised safe staffing over balancing the books which we did 
consider was a deliberate choice made by the board leadership and there were numerous 
references to the resource implications of safe staffing in the national survey responses. 
 
7.6 Barriers and enablers  
(Research objective 5: To explore the enablers of and barriers to implementing different 
approaches to board and organisational leadership) 
The detail of the barriers to and enablers for improving leadership uncovered in the case 
study sites are rehearsed in some detail in section 6.12 above. The main barriers bear a close 
resemblance to those that emerged from our national survey of board members, and to the 
concerns mooted by the stakeholders whom we interviewed in the initial scoping phase of 
this study. In a tough financial environment with high levels of demand on services, the iron 
triangle trade-offs of quality, cost and access dominate (Kissick 1994). As one respondent in 
our national survey put it: ‘There are no weekends or Christmas breaks in our world and the 
pressure to perform miracles with less funding are unabated’ [NED]. 
The preoccupation with CQC visits and verdicts is also evident. There is additionally a 
frustration with the differing messages and positions taken by the different national agencies, 
especially NHS England and NHS Improvement. 
Finally, it is striking how often the contribution of middle management comes up, either as a 
barrier when under-developed or as a facilitator of change when empowered: ‘…..I don't feel 
I can comment very well on this but appearances are that behaviours are more professional 
and representative of the culture and values of the trust.  My main experiences have been 
with what I would refer to as middle management, I feel that sometimes messages get lost at 
this level, almost filtered out from the ground level/front line managers and this is 
frustrating, especially so when there is a lack of experience within the service that they 
represent’ [comment offered about leadership styles and behaviours, in ward and department 
managers survey response from First-Line Manager, Trust 5]. 
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7.7 Implications for healthcare board governance theory 
The outcome of our selected literature review and interviews with key opinion formers led us 
to pursue the following specific lines of inquiry, in relation to composition, focus and 
dynamics of boards, in our analysis of the empirical data in this study:  
i) The particular contribution of clinicians as board members  
ii) The  relevance of stakeholder theory in the healthcare context particularly for 
broader strategizing purposes 
iii) The assuring/improving dichotomy  
iv) Appropriate behaviours for boards 
v) The capability and the effort taken by boards  
These themes are woven into the triadic proposition of high trust – high challenge – high 
engagement for effective boards, which we outlined in chapter 3, and into a realist framework 
that  indicated that boards may do well to focus on different purposes and mechanisms 
depending on variations in circumstances and desired outcomes. The study has provided an 
opportunity to test both the proposition and the framework and thus contribute to a refreshed 
conceptualisation of effective healthcare boards. 
In relation to board composition, we had identified from a number of earlier studies that the 
presence of clinicians (and particularly medical clinicians) on boards was associated with 
higher organisation performance especially in relation to clinical quality and levels of 
hospital mortality. We found in this study (something we had not particularly sought),  that 
the strengthened focus and priority in the post-Francis era on safe staffing, patient experience, 
and patient safety may have provided a platform for the board nurse to have a stronger voice 
and influence on the board. As one described it herself, her job is ‘to prick the conscience of 
the board’   (Chief Nurse, Trust 3). We also noted that an observably close working 
relationship between the medical director and the chief nurse in some of our case studies was 
conducive to board attention on how to improve patient safety and clinical outcomes. 
We found  that a broadly similar  proportion of respondents  in our national survey of board 
members (and we have no reason to suppose that the respondents were atypical of the total 
NHS acute board member population) were of white  ethnic origin as the levels reported in 
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the Kline Report of 2014 (Kline 2014). It was therefore also disappointing that only one of 
our six case study sites demonstrated excellence in the formulation and execution of their 
equality and diversity strategy. West et al. (2015) pointed out the importance of diversity and 
inclusion for staff engagement, wellbeing and positive patient experience. 
The Green Paper on corporate governance issued by the last government (BEIS 2016) 
mooted the controversial idea of worker directors on company boards. This would address, 
strategically, issues of diversity of thought and stakeholder representation. It would bring the 
UK closer to the German model that includes the trade unions on boards and holds to the 
principle of co-determination of decision-making. If adopted in the NHS (leading for once 
rather than copying private sector governance innovations), the worker board director might 
also pave the way to achieving the higher levels of staff engagement required. 
Section 172 of the Companies Act (2006) requires directors to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of shareholders, and in so doing to have regard for the interests of 
workers, consumers and other stakeholders. In the NHS in England, the question of the 
relevance of a stakeholder model for healthcare board governance has increased with the 
advent of hospital foundation trusts and their two tier model of board level governance 
including a council of governors as well as a management board. We found examples in our 
case studies of respectful and productive relationships between the board and the governors. 
The national survey of board members made numerous mentions of governors as external 
stakeholders with whom it was important to build close relations and to whom they were 
accountable. This equation of governors with other external stakeholders, which we also saw 
in the case studies, combined with earlier studies indicating a degree of ineffectiveness and 
ambiguity about the role of governors (Chambers et al. 2013, Mannion et al. 2016),  suggests 
that, in practice, acute hospitals may not yet have embraced the stakeholder model. The 
impact of this may be to take an insufficiently broad, place-based and system leadership 
perspective when formulating strategy, thereby passing up the opportunity to build long term 
organisation value and sustainability.  
The interviews with key opinion formers identified concerns that boards may be pre-occupied 
by seeking assurance around hospital performance against a suite of standards to the 
detriment of enabling improvements and innovations. This relates to the (Garratt 1997) 
conformance/performance dichotomy in the balance of board tasks model that he proposed 
(see figure 14 below). 
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Figure 14: Balance of board tasks 
 
 Short term focus on 
‘conformance’ 
Long term focus on 
‘performance’ 
 
 
External 
Focus 
Accountability 
 Ensuring external accountabilities 
are met, e.g. to stakeholders, 
funders, regulators. 
 Meeting audit, inspection and 
reporting requirements 
 
Policy formulation 
 Setting and safeguarding the 
organisation’s mission and 
values 
 Deciding long-term goals 
 Ensuring appropriate policies 
and systems in place 
 
 
 
Internal 
Focus 
Supervision 
 Appointing and rewarding 
senior management 
 Overseeing management 
performance 
 Monitoring key performance 
indicators 
 Monitoring key financial and 
budgetary controls 
 Managing risks 
Strategic thinking 
 Agreeing strategic direction 
 Shaping and agree long-term 
plans 
 Reviewing and deciding major 
resource decisions and 
investments. 
      
The main functions of boards (adapted from Garratt (1997: 45-47)) 
Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002) argue for balance and organisation ambidexterity to achieve 
strategic competence. Our case study findings suggest, at the same time, the importance of 
excellence in administrative processes and governance structures. Chait et al. (2005) suggest 
that there are three levels (fiduciary, strategic and generative) in institutional public 
governance and boards need to know when to operate in which mode. We would argue that 
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these modes are also building blocks: patients’ and staff trust and confidence is built through 
excellence in basic management practices and this then enables improvement and innovation 
via strategic vision and careful consideration of strategic choices. 
This balancing act around a twin-track focus on strategy and on operational performance 
brings us to appropriate behaviours for boards. Roberts et al. (2005) argue for theoretical 
pluralism, given that evidence about board behaviour suggests that traditional theoretical 
divisions between agency and stewardship theory, and control versus collaboration models of 
the board do not adequately reflect the lived experience of non-executive directors and other 
directors on the board.  The evidence from this study would support this. Holding to account 
(agency theory) and support for (stewardship theory) executive directors are both important. 
And so, is the fulfilment of the other purposes of the board. This is also consistent with 
Storey et al’s (2010) research findings about an association between the level of non-
executive directors’ involvement and organisation performance in the NHS. The findings 
from the national survey suggest that what we call ‘the diligent board’ goes beyond the high-
trust high-challenge high-engagement proposition, to a fuller board repertoire including 
emphases on enhancing the reputation of the organisation (resource dependency theory), 
representing the interests of stakeholders (stakeholder theory) and reconciling competing 
interests (power theory). The boards of organisations with higher care quality ratings had 
statistically significant higher scores for all these purposes as reported by board members. 
The highest scores were for holding to account suggesting that there are dangers in taking the 
foot off the pedal on this board purpose, and the importance of the ‘restless’ board.  
Our findings indicate that our provisional realist framework for effective healthcare boards 
has promise. The knack for board members is to know when and how to be keepers of all 
board purposes and to be able to switch from one mode of behaviour to another in order to 
meet the range of desired outcomes for a successful healthcare organisation. Chapter 8 goes 
into more detail about the roles of the board as conscience of the organisation, shock 
absorber, diplomat, sensor and coach, respectively, according to circumstances and situations. 
We would suggest, however, that our framework, as it stands, needs some modification and 
elaboration (see table 15 below for a proposed revised framework). Our observations of board 
meetings and comments from the national survey of board members indicate that an 
additional column for behaviour mode would be helpful, and also that more than one mode is 
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relevant to each theoretical board purpose. We have provisionally suggested one dominant 
and one secondary mode but we would not rule out additional modes.  
 
 
 
Table 15: Revised theoretical framework for effective healthcare boards 
Theory  Contextual 
Assumptions 
Dominant 
modes of 
behaviour 
Mechanism Intended 
Outcome 
Agency 
(holding 
management 
to account) 
 
Low trust and 
high challenge and 
low appetite for 
risk 
Challenging,  
supportive 
 
Holding to 
account and 
control through 
intense internal 
and external 
regulatory 
performance 
monitoring 
Minimisation of 
risk and good 
patient safety 
record 
Stewardship 
(supporting 
management) 
 
High trust and less 
challenge and 
greater appetite 
for risk 
Collaborative, 
inquiring 
 
Broad support in 
a collective 
leadership 
endeavour 
Service 
improvement and 
excellence in 
performance 
Resource 
dependency 
(enhancing 
the 
reputation of 
the 
organisation) 
 
Importance of 
social capital of 
the organisation 
Ambassadorial, 
curious 
 
Boundary 
spanning and 
close dialogue 
with healthcare 
partners 
Improved 
reputation and 
relationships 
Stakeholder 
(representing 
interests of 
all 
stakeholders)  
 
Importance of 
representation and 
collective effort; 
risk is shared by 
many 
Listening, 
questioning 
 
Collaboration Sustainable 
organisation, high 
levels of staff 
engagement 
179 
 
Board power 
(reconciling 
competing 
interests) 
 
Human desire for 
control 
Courageous,  
probing 
 
Use of power 
differentials 
Equilibrium 
 
Some explanation of the choice of different behaviours for each board theoretical purpose is 
necessary here. First, for the purpose of holding executives to account, it is usual to suggest 
that board challenge is important. We have observed that, particularly on a unitary board such 
as is the case in NHS hospital trust, supporting executives to achieve the highest possible 
levels of patient safety is equally productive and indeed most effective when combined with 
grasp that comes from a close understanding of the data and the issues (our triadic 
proposition). Second, supporting executives to take considered risks, to encourage their staff 
to innovate, and to embed a service improvement culture would suggest behaviours which are 
collaborative and also inquiring (for example to understand risk appetite and what innovation 
and excellence looks like). Third, for the purpose of enhancing the reputation of the 
organisation, an ambassadorial bent is helpful, that is an ability to represent the organisation 
externally, with authority and credibility at the same time as having curiosity about the 
priorities, strengths, interests and challenges of other players in the local and national health 
and care landscape. Fourth, representing the interests of stakeholders requires listening and 
questioning behaviours; the study has found that, although there is a way to go, efforts to 
listen to patients and staff have been strengthened in the post-Francis era. Finally, reconciling 
the conflicting interests of different powerful stakeholders is hard. Internally, there is the 
power of the healthcare professions to deal with, but this study found that it was the influence 
of the national regulatory bodies that boards found hardest to handle. Board members in the 
national survey commented on the difficulties and the distraction of meeting demands of 
regulators. Two of the case study trusts, with very high proportional financial deficits, had 
found a way to negotiate with these bodies to secure protection from external opprobrium and 
to prioritise safe staffing over financial balance. 
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7.8 Synthesis of findings: concluding remarks  
We have already referred to the fact that the Francis Inquiry team received requests from 
distressed members of the public about failings in other trusts, which were beyond the remit 
of the inquiry to investigate. The findings from this research, drawn from our national boards 
survey and the six case studies, confirm that many NHS board members themselves 
recognised that their own organisation needed at the time of the Francis publication report in 
2013 to do significantly better in providing safe, compassionate care, and that some still do. 
We also found that there was huge reported commitment, effort and drive from many boards 
to either set or confirm a new direction for their organisation. 
This study indicates that execution may lag behind commitment in achieving safe, high 
quality, timely and well organised services in some hospitals. Given the paradoxes inherent in 
board work, Cornforth argues for the importance of reflexivity to get a better understanding 
of behaviours, roles and impact (Cornforth 2003). Our approach is also not to argue 
prescriptively but, in line with a realist approach, to offer a framework for boards to draw 
upon to develop a broad leadership repertoire, aiming towards what we would call a ‘full 
board service’ for patients, staff and the public.  
We suggest that boards with a sense of an internal locus of control, who believe that they can 
influence events and situations with their efforts and skill (Hodgkinson and Sparrow 2002: 
198) are likely to have a greater quality and innovation outcomes orientation than those with 
an external locus of control who attribute the fortunes of their organisation more to external 
agencies and forces (ibid) and are likely to have a greater targets and performance outcomes 
orientation.  These authors caution, however, against excessive internality which can lead to 
an illusion of control. This takes us back to the importance of balance of board tasks and 
spread of board purposes. 
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8  Implications for policy practice and future research 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we reflect on the findings and conclusions of our research, setting out the 
implications for health policy and practice – in the UK and beyond - of this analysis of the 
leadership changes made by NHS hospital boards in response to the Francis Inquiry.  
Although this research is based on hospital trusts (as per the commission from the 
Department of Health for this study), we suggest that the findings are for the main part also 
relevant to the boards of mental health, community health and ambulance services trusts. This 
relevance is borne of the fact that the corporate board model used for the governance of 
hospital trusts and foundation trusts in England is also used by mental health, community 
health and ambulance service providers.  Thus the governance model is common, as is the 
wider context of NHS healthcare organisations, albeit we acknowledge that some hospital-
focused aspects of the learning from our research may present some limitations in respect of 
other NHS trusts and foundation trusts.   
The main lessons from this research about how boards are composed and work, their role in 
leading change with the aim of improving quality and safety, and their role in shaping 
organisational culture and behaviours are, we suggest, relevant to all NHS and other health 
care and public sector boards in the UK and overseas that operate with this particular model 
of governance, and to the bodies that regulate them.  We know from our wider research and 
policy analysis work that the Francis Inquiry Report has been read and heeded in many 
jurisdictions beyond England, and its lessons considered by many health care systems in 
relation to the governance of care quality and safety within organisations.  This research 
report on the leadership role of boards is therefore of relevance in the international as well as 
English NHS context. 
   
8.2 The impact of the Francis Report on NHS organisations and boards     
Our research has revealed that the Francis Report represented something of a landmark event 
for NHS organisations in England and their boards. For some this landmark is described as 
having come as a shock, a stark warning of what might happen if they were to fail similarly 
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in relation to quality and safety of patient care. For others the report serves as a point of 
reference in respect of a welcome increase in focus by the NHS on quality, safety and in 
particular regulation of standards of care. For yet others it is regarded as the cause of 
increased ‘regulatory throttle’ and administrative burden, an influential example of a series 
of external reviews considered to have missed the point by calling for too many disparate 
changes. 
It is, however, important to note that it is difficult to disentangle the reported effects of the 
Francis Inquiry Report from other policy initiatives and changes made to health care 
regulation, quality and safety in recent years. Indeed, respondents in our research often linked 
the Francis Report to the other Francis Reports (initial independent investigation into the 
events at Stafford Hospital, and the review of whistle-blowing in the NHS) and to related 
reviews such as those of Sir Bruce Keogh and Don Berwick (see chapter 2 and table 2 for 
more details). This research is based on six case study hospitals and a national survey of 
board members, so is necessarily represents a snapshot of how board members and others 
viewed the Francis Report as they looked back from 2016. 
This research has shown that in 2016-17 NHS boards are placing more emphasis – in board 
meetings, sub-committees and other activities – on quality and safety. Whether boards ascribe 
this to the Francis Inquiry Report in full, part, or at all, is a moot point, although all six of our 
case study hospitals acknowledged the important role of the report in validating and adding 
urgency to such work.   
The most significant impact of the Francis Report on hospital trusts appears to have been the 
investment made in increasing nurse staffing levels, paying more heed to these on an ongoing 
basis, and reaching a corporate conclusion that quality and safety trump financial 
performance This echoes the findings of work undertaken in the first year after the 
publication of the Francis Inquiry Report (Thorlby et al. 2014) where it was noted that the 
balance of an NHS hospital board’s core priorities appeared to have shifted in favour the 
quality and safety of care, even when under extreme pressure in relation to perceived poor 
financial performance.   
The additional major (and increasing) pressure now being experienced by NHS hospital 
boards, and hence requiring significant attention, is that of a very scarce workforce at a time 
of effectively flat funding for the NHS and hence rising deficits (see chapter 2 of this report). 
This runs directly counter to the post-Francis requirement to invest in higher levels of nurse 
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and other staffing (for example medical staff in accident and emergency departments) as a 
way of ensuring a properly patient-focused culture of compassion and fundamental standards 
of care, and our research revealed that boards are very worried about the impact that 
workforce pressures are having on the safety and quality of patients services, and of course 
the need to try and achieve financial balance. Thus there is a sense of Francis Report-related 
progress being halted to some extent – not as a deliberate act, but as a result of a wider 
context of shortages in the supply of staff, and a resulting reliance on costly agency staff 
known to be likely to compromise continuity and safety of care.  
On a more positive note, our research has revealed the many other ways in which the Francis 
Report has led to NHS hospitals reporting that they were concentrating more of their 
management time and resource on matters of quality and safety, and ensuring a broader 
culture of service improvement in response to patient and carer feedback and concerns. One 
example of this is a greater focus on trying to handle patient complaints in more responsive 
and open ways, such as committing to meet with patients and families in person to discuss 
concerns, and doing so as the default position, prior to entering into paper-based 
communication. Likewise, our case study hospitals had adopted new ways of investigating 
and responding to serious incidents, seeking always to demonstrate a Duty of Candour in 
being open with patients and their families, and using different forms of learning events to try 
and ensure that each incident (or group of incidents) can lead to lessons being shared across 
teams, departments or the whole organisation as appropriate. 
 
8.3 The roles of an NHS board post-Francis 
Our analysis of the leadership changes made by NHS hospital boards following the 
publication of the Francis Inquiry Report highlights five areas within which we conclude that 
policy and practice of board governance and working require attention: 
 The board as conscience 
 The board as shock absorber 
 The board as diplomat 
 The board as sensor  
 The board as coach   
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These suggested roles are used as a framework for setting out ways in which NHS boards 
might take action to ensure that they are able to continue to try and meet the challenges set 
out by the Francis Inquiry Report, in particular those in relation to assuring, developing and 
accounting for safe and high quality care within an organisational culture that is supportive, 
compassionate and open to challenge and change. 
 
8.4 The board as conscience 
The findings of this research underline the need for NHS boards to own and honour the 
legacy of the Francis Report in respect of upholding fundamental standards of care, especially 
when the wider context makes this difficult to do, acting in effect as the conscience of the 
organisation. The need for this is seen in the way in which boards have increasingly had to 
resolve a profound tension between sustaining standards of care quality and safety on the one 
hand, and meeting ever more difficult financial targets on the other. This tension was woven 
throughout our survey and case study work, and often felt much more like an impossible and 
demoralising challenge of gargantuan proportions. 
The starting point for a board in being the conscience of the organisation is to be the guardian 
of its values, and the custodian and monitor of its culture. These are fiendishly difficult areas 
to codify and assess, but this research revealed boards that were very aware of the need for 
them to be part of shaping and upholding core values for the organisation, and using these in 
areas such as recruitment, decision-making about investment priorities, response to (and 
learning from) incidents and ensuring approaches such as the effective operation of the Duty 
of Candour. 
For boards, there is therefore a need to be clear about the standards of care quality and safety 
that are sacrosanct for their organisation, and beyond the achievement of nationally-defined 
access and financial targets. Our research revealed that it typically feels that all that matters to 
national bodies is meeting the financial control and the 4-hour A&E waiting time targets. 
Organisations look to their board – and its quality committee - to give a more nuanced and 
bolder set of required standards, and to send out consistent messages about this, within the 
organisation to staff, and more widely to patients, the public and commissioners. For 
foundation trusts, this calls for a sophisticated and mature relationship with trust governors, 
ensuring that there is mutual respect for the setting and upholding of standards for patient 
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care quality and safety. For all trusts, this role of conscience requires attention to a range of 
internal and external relationships, and exhibiting a strong stakeholder orientation in respect 
of board working, something that we explore below in relation to the board as diplomat. 
In this research, financial pressure was cited as the most frequently experienced barrier to 
boards seeking to improve their leadership, and there is no sign that this is going to ease in 
the coming years (Lafond et al. 2017). Thus NHS boards will increasingly find themselves 
confronting priority setting or rationing decisions – something more typically associated with 
commissioners and funders – for they will have to plan and enact major programmes of 
efficiencies, prioritise cases for investment within the trust, and likely decide on contentious 
issues such as pay restraint, staff cuts and the curtailing of previously planned developments. 
To do this, they will need evidence-based frameworks to guide their decision-making, and the 
adoption of deliberative and inclusive approaches to how they will take and account for such 
actions. 
 
Box 12: Focus of the board as conscience of the organisation 
Boards must lead the development, upholding and review of a core set of values for the 
organisation, ensuring that leadership behaviours at all levels of the trust reflect these values. 
Boards must clarify the core care standards of the organisation, including and beyond 
national requirements, and how these will be monitored and acted upon at board and within 
care groups. 
Boards should work in partnership with its governors (where a foundation trust) or other 
community and patient partners to debate, review and seek constantly to improve care 
standards. 
Boards need to have evidence-based frameworks in place for use when planning, prioritising 
and enacting funding decisions and efficiency programmes, to aid transparency in making 
difficult and contested decisions. 
Boards may wish to use deliberative and inclusive approaches to making priority-setting 
decisions, drawing on the research evidence available in this area. 
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It is vital that regulators support boards in their conscience role, being attuned to the difficult 
dilemmas faced in respect of balancing financial and quality/safety pressures, and focusing 
on ensuring that boards have sound local decision-making processes in place, and not 
creating ‘regulatory throttle’ that could skew the decisions made by boards.  
 
8.5 The board as shock absorber 
A theme running through our research, from the initial senior scoping interviews, through the 
board members’ survey and to the case study work, was that of the burden of external 
regulation experienced by NHS organisations, in particular from NHS England, NHS 
Improvement, the Care Quality Commission and local commissioners (clinical 
commissioning groups). It was striking that board members responding to our survey felt that 
they were more aware of the requirements of national regulators than those of staff and 
patients, suggesting that boards find themselves looking upwards to central bodies more than 
inwards to staff, or outwards to patients. 
Boards need therefore to act as a ‘shock absorber’ for the organisation, receiving the attention 
and challenge of multiple national regulators and arm’s length bodies, and interpreting such 
feedback and determining what priority different elements of this should be given – a further 
dimension to the board conscience role described above. This shock absorber role is not 
about dismissing or diminishing important external feedback and challenge, rather it is 
concerned with distilling what is often a huge amount of data and opinion into a clear set of 
organisational messages that can be used by the board and wider trust leadership to guide and 
support needed changes. In this, the board can play a critical role in ensuring that the 
‘regulatory throttle’ described in our research can instead be experienced as helpful 
regulatory appraisal and challenge, used to guide rather than crush. 
We know from the body of research evidence on boards of healthcare organisations that a 
‘triadic approach’ of support, challenge and engagement is desirable, something that one 
would hope to also be the culture and way of working of healthcare regulators.  In a centrally 
managed health system such as the English NHS, regulation always risks being experienced 
as over-bearing and burdensome, and hence the board of a trust has the potential and 
responsibility to act as the absorber of external shock and challenge, and to interpret this into 
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messages and objectives that feel possible, achievable and capable of motivating teams to 
improved performance. 
It is not just in relation to regulators that our research found boards to be acting as shock 
absorber. Other external shocks included the plans of new Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships (district planning areas for the NHS in England) which at times appears to be at 
odds with the aspirations of individual hospital trusts, for example by requiring significant 
scaling back of hospital bed provision to enable more community-based care. In addition, 
cuts made by local government to social care funding and provision were adding to the 
pressures experienced by trusts, as were ‘new care models’ being developed such as extended 
forms of primary care including ‘multi-specialty community providers’. 
In a busy – and for our case studies often frenetic – policy environment where new initiatives 
can appear to shower down on local hospital (and other) trusts, the board is looked to as a 
source of stability that can withstand some of this policy onslaught, sort out what matters 
more for the organisation, and what can be ignored or deferred for the time being. Again, the 
need for board to carry out priority setting comes into play, along with helping to protect the 
organisation, keep it on course, and avoid unnecessary distraction from core priorities of 
ensuring safe, high quality and well-run services. 
 
Box 13: Focus of the board as shock absorber 
Boards can play a critical role in guiding and supporting the executive team in determining 
which aspects of external regulatory feedback is most significant and relevant to the wider 
mission and priorities of the organisation. 
The board can support the organisation in difficult times when subject to sustained regulatory 
scrutiny and criticism, bringing perspective, providing resources, offering motivation and 
encouragement and helping prioritise areas for more immediate – as well as longer term – 
action.  
The board in its stakeholder role can provide vital support to an organisation in helping it to 
think through, negotiate and communicate its position and plans in respect of wider 
developments such as the new care models advocated by the NHS Five Year Forward View, 
and district plans as designed by sustainability and transformation partnerships. 
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The board has a key role to play in setting organisational priorities in relation to which 
aspects of national and local health and social care policy are of most relevance to the core 
mission, sustainability and needs of the organisation and the people it serves. 
Regulators must ensure that as well as expecting that Well-Led boards demonstrate that they 
use the triadic approach that research tells us is vital for boards – to support, challenge and 
engage – they also as regulators adopt this way of working in the way in which they interact 
with health care organisations and boards.  
 
8.6 The board as diplomat 
A theme running through this research was the importance of the board – and its non-
executive and executive members in equal measure – being curious about and attending to the 
diverse range of stakeholder interests and perspectives that have a bearing on the 
organisation. Some of these perspectives are internal to the organisation, for example staff 
members and their representatives, professional groups, patients, carers, foundation trust 
governors, and patient organisations. Others are external, and include: commissioners, other 
health care provider organisations, social care providers, local government, members of 
parliament, the local and national voluntary sector, the media at local and national level, 
health care regulators, the Department of Health and many others. 
For the board of the trust, there is a vital role to play as diplomat, identifying these 
stakeholders, understanding the nature of the existing (or lack of) relationship with the trust, 
prioritising which of these needs particular attention (thus acting again as conscience) and 
planning how best to nurture these.  As a diplomat would skilfully build and extend trusted 
networks of influence and information, so must the healthcare board, and in so doing must do 
this in a way that means that the links forged by individual board members are brought 
together into a coherent, board-focused whole. This will likely necessitate careful attention by 
the chair and chief executive in particular, as overseers of the stakeholder relationships of the 
trust, ensuring that different board members are asked to focus on certain organisations and 
key individuals, and to bring back insights, concerns and issues to the wider board and 
organisation. 
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Professional communications and public affairs support will be required for some elements of 
this ‘diplomacy’ work by the trust, and other elements will be of necessity informal, but 
nevertheless important. The chair and chief executive will need to ensure that there is 
sufficient board development and reflection time to capture and thematise insights from the 
myriad stakeholder interactions that the board will undertake, also identifying where a critical 
relationship is missing or struggling, and working out how this should be addressed.  
This role of the board as diplomat, working out for example how to relate to and operate 
within new sustainability and transformation partnerships (STPs) in the NHS, has 
connections to the next role to be explored of the board as sensor. This role of diplomat is 
about the stakeholder relationships of the board and organisations, sensed by its members, 
and acted upon in a manner similar to that of a country’s diplomat whose role it is to 
represent the country overseas (here organisation in the wider local and national context), 
build and strengthen relationships, spot and address emerging tensions, and translate cultural, 
linguistic and other features that may risk the wider relationship and hence future working 
between the organisation and its partners.   
For an NHS board, its governors as well as board members are critical to this diplomacy role, 
as are its staff, patients and carers. The staff, patient and community engagement work that 
featured so strongly in the fieldwork for this research is a core part of the diplomatic effort of 
NHS trusts and foundation trusts. The knitting together of insights from this work, and taking 
action to develop it further in the context of the organisation’s priorities, is a core function of 
the board.  
 
Box 14: Focus of the board as diplomat 
Boards need to be curious about and attend to the diverse range of stakeholder interests and 
perspectives that bear on their organisation. 
Some of these stakeholder interests will be internal (e.g. staff, patients) and others external 
and at a local, regional and national level. 
The board has a vital role to play as diplomat, identifying, understanding and attending to 
these relationships, setting priorities as to which matter most and when.   
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The chair and chief executive have a key role to play in overseeing the myriad stakeholder 
relationships and helping the board and organisation to read, interpret and decide which ones 
should be acted upon, individually or collectively. 
Professional communications and affairs expertise will likely be needed as part of an overall 
trust approach to its diplomatic work, as will organisational development time and support to 
ensure sufficient sharing of and reflecting on these many stakeholder relationships. 
Regulators should hold boards to account for the extent to which they have diversity of 
membership, engage with and reflect an appropriate range of stakeholder interests, and the 
nature and quality of relationships between the board and its patients, community, staff and 
other stakeholders. 
 
8.7 The board as sensor  
Mary Dixon-Woods and colleagues (2013) point to the vital role of heath care boards in 
being able to sense problems, rather than seek comfort from internal and external data. One 
of the new lines of enquiry that we pursued in this research (based on our updated literature 
review and stakeholder interviews) was that of a board assuming a stronger stakeholder role, 
engaging with others to find out about problems, determine solutions, and seek constantly to 
improve care. As we have noted, we found boards to be marginally more focused on the 
priorities of national and central bodies than those of local staff and patients, albeit our case 
study work revealed many different ways in which hospital boards and wider management 
were seeking to engage staff more actively and work in new and different ways with patients, 
carers and local community groups. 
Indeed, patient and staff engagement were found to be used by some boards as a powerful 
way of shaping priorities for service improvement and change, for example when responding 
to the requirements of national regulators and external reviews and needing to undertake 
major programmes of quality improvement work. The boards of NHS trusts are comprised 
ideally of people of a diverse range of expertise and backgrounds, intended to be able to 
connect with different professions, experience, communities and perspectives. Where they do 
not themselves have such a diversity of connections, they are expected to be able to build 
these through other routes, looking constantly outwards to the community and wider public, 
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inwards to the body of staff and experiences of patients and carers, and sideways to other 
organisations against which the trust can be benchmarked and challenged. This presents a 
major challenge to many boards however, which fail adequately to be representative of their 
local community, particularly in relation to ethnicity and indeed age (Kline 2014);  in 
difficult times where tough decisions need to be made about services and funding, this lack of 
diversity and representativeness makes the board’s role as a sensor of need and priority very 
vulnerable. 
A board therefore needs to be attuned to its role as sensor, and assuring itself of an 
appropriate range of sources of information about its current services, the needs of patients 
and the public for improved or other services, and the ways in which it compares with other 
similar health care organisations locally, nationally, and where appropriate internationally. 
This calls for skill and wisdom in relation to the use of data (both hard and soft sources) and 
ensuring that there is sufficient clinical and statistical expertise available to the board and its 
committees to seek out, interpret, and act on complex and diverse information. The presence 
of trusted and yet appropriately distant patient and community representatives is vital here, as 
with a high-performing body of foundation trust governors who can inform, challenge and 
sense-check a board’s progress in identifying and responding to problems and priorities for 
care. In this way, the board needs to be challenged to be ‘restless’, as was suggested in this 
research as being a vital characteristic of a high performing board. 
 
Box 15: Focus of the board as sensor 
The board has a central role to play in discerning issues and problems, both externally to the 
organisation, and internally through staff and patient engagement. 
The composition of the board should be sufficiently diverse to ensure that it can adequately 
reflect and connect with the perspectives, priorities and experience of the people served by 
the trust, and the staff within the organisation. 
The board needs to have a process by which it can assure itself of having appropriately 
effective means of sensing local problems and issues (within and outside the trust) and doing 
so in a manner that reflects the diversity of the local population and staff. 
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Board members need to have regular and tailored training to ensure that they know what data 
sources to use to notice and evaluate problems and issues related to care quality and safety, 
and also those concerned with other aspects of performance such as finance, workforce and 
activity. 
In identifying and using such data sources, boards need to be sure that they have access to a 
mix of soft and hard data, that such data are quality-assured, and that there is an opportunity 
for regional, national, and where appropriate international benchmarking of indicators. 
The board may wish to undertake regular 360 degree appraisal of its performance – as a 
collective in addition to the individual appraisal that takes place for board members – to 
ensure that it is sensing its own performance and impact, and is able to take steps to change 
and improve as necessary. 
Regulators have a key role to play in sharing good practice across boards and organisations, 
for example in relation to: the format, content and data contained within board papers; 
approaches to undertaking quality improvement work; extent of use of evidence-based 
frameworks for priority setting; and taking transparent and ethical decisions about health care 
funding and delivery in a context of financial constraint. 
 
8.8 The board as coach 
In the troubled and turbulent times observed in our survey and case study research with the 
boards of NHS hospitals in England, it was clear that in relation to the core themes of the 
Francis Report, boards saw their role as one of acting as a coach to the wider organisation. In 
this, we mean as a sports coach, setting ambition and direction, assessing performance, 
agreeing areas for development and improvement, and instilling a restless urge for the 
achievement of higher ambitions. Indeed, the ‘confident and tenacious’ non-executive 
directors cited by Endacott et al. (2013) are part of what is inferred by this metaphor of 
coaching.   
A vital aspect of a board being able to operate effectively in this coaching mode is for it to 
have stability and continuity of membership, something that is typically elusive in the NHS 
where executive directors in particular are subject to regular churn. The wider research 
literature underlines the importance of stability for a board (although not so much that it 
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becomes complacent or fails to be restless) and the work of Jones et al. (forthcoming) regards 
this continuity as an aspect of the ‘quality improvement maturity’ deemed important for 
effective board working. This calls for boards to be attentive to their membership, and 
ensuring an appropriate blend of skills and experience, along with time devoted to team and 
board development. 
In this research, we found evidence of an increasingly important and visible role for the chief 
nurse on NHS boards, thus broadening the interpretation of ‘clinical involvement’ as 
typically considered significant for board performance, and usually meaning medical 
representation. The increased focus on quality and safety, and in particular nurse staffing, 
fundamental care standards, organisational culture and speaking up, all seemed to have 
encouraged boards to focus attention, support and higher status to the role of chief nurse.  
Significant efforts are expected of boards (to set priorities, absorb shock, build and sustain 
networks of stakeholder relationships, sense the environment, and coach for improved 
performance) and this can only occur if the board itself models effective development. We 
know from the research literature that training is required for board members to ensure that 
the right data can be sought, interpreted and acted on, and appropriate approaches to quality 
improvement adopted and followed through. This research revealed significant variation in 
boards’ attention to and investment in training and development for their executive and non-
executive members. Whilst such activity might be regarded as a luxury in difficult financial 
times, we conclude that it is indeed even more important that support and training are given 
to those charged with steering and coaching major public service organisations to sustained 
and improved performance. 
As part of this development and training, boards need to be encouraged and challenged to 
ensure that they are aware of and are using the full repertoire of board purposes and 
mechanisms available to them. Thus they need to be sure that they are able to be the 
conscience, shock absorber, sensor and coach for the organisation, and able to demonstrate a 
mix of stewardship (service improvement), agency (holding to account), stakeholder (staff 
and patient engagement) and resource dependency (building and nurturing external 
relationships). A vital part of being confident and competent in using this wider repertoire is 
having regular and protected time for board development that is both topic and behaviour 
focused. Similarly, providing support and time for board members to be present and visible in 
the wider organisation is important, for our research underlined the value that this is given by 
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staff, governors, patients and others, instilling a sense of ‘we are all in this together’ and of 
the board being connected to its many stakeholders and interests. 
 
Box 16: Focus of the board as coach 
Stability and continuity of board membership should be sought by an organisation, in order 
that it can establish the necessary ‘quality improvement maturity’ needed for higher 
performance and avoid the costs and disruption of too much ‘churn’. 
Whilst stability of the board is important, there is a parallel need to attend to the need for 
‘confident and tenacious’ challenge, and to find ways of ensuring that the board remains 
restless, and focused on benchmarking, questioning and ambitions to develop to the next 
stage.                 
The role of the chief nurse is critical to ensuring high organisational performance in relation 
to quality and safety.  Support should be given to the operation and development of this role, 
seeking to enable clinical involvement and leadership of quality and safety that are broader 
than ‘medical’ and include nursing and other healthcare professions. 
Board training and development – for both executive and non-executive members – is 
critically important in enabling a restless and high functioning board, and requires sustained 
attention and investment, even in a tough financial climate.  
The board and its members need to be skilled in employing a wide repertoire of board 
behaviours and attributes, and their training and development should focus on this at both an 
individual and collective level. 
The board and its members need to seek constantly to find ways of maximising their 
visibility, both within and beyond the organisation. The use of 360 degree board appraisal is 
one way of assessing whether such visibility is happening or not.  
Regulators must ensure that Well-Led board frameworks underpin and inform the activity 
and approach of a board, and are never allowed to become a mere ‘tick-box’ exercise. A key 
element of a Well-Led approach must be to explore the extent to which a board is able to both 
act as coach to its organisation and also be coaching itself, and constantly seeking external 
review, challenge and support. 
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8.9 Limitations of the study 
We consider that there are three main strengths of this study. First, we have deployed mixed 
methods, and sourced evidence from a range of sources within and across the work packages. 
Within the scoping phase, we conducted interviews with key opinion formers and updated 
our literature reviews on healthcare board governance. In work package two, our national 
survey of board members yielded rich data from comments from respondents as well as 
quantitative findings from closed questions. In work package three, we carried out surveys of 
ward and department managers to triangulate findings from interviews, focus groups and 
board meeting observations at our case study sites. Second, with regards to the case studies, 
we were involved over a period (our time at each site lasted between 5-12 months) which 
enabled us to get below the surface, pursue possible lines of enquiry and investigate 
initiatives as they developed and matured, rather than seeing only a snapshot. Third, the 
advisory group contributed extensively to the conduct of the research and the lay membership 
of this group were involved throughout the course of the study from the start. 
Limitations include a response rate from the national survey of only 20%. This is mitigated 
by achieving 90% coverage of all acute and specialist acute trusts in England, but it still 
means that we have to be cautious about drawing conclusions from the results. 
Equally, it is important to acknowledge that although we selected for maximum variety, six 
trusts agreed to open their doors to us for our case study work, but nine others declined, so 
this former group may be (literally) more open to external scrutiny and learning than others. 
In other ways, the six case studies are a small group and they may not be entirely 
representative: it is interesting, for example, that all six have introduced Schwartz rounds, a 
reflective and supportive space for staff to share difficult caring experiences. We estimate 
from data available online on the Point of Care Foundation website (PoCF 2017), that about 
70% acute trusts have so far signed up.  
The other major limitation is that the research focused on board level leadership changes at a 
point in time (between March 2016 and May 2017) and it was not possible (nor was it the 
intention) to arrive at an absolute judgement about changes in quality of patient care, patient 
experience and clinical effectiveness since Francis in acute hospitals. 
There was limited engagement with patients and relatives at case study sites. Recruitment of 
participants for the patient experience focus groups was organised by the trusts and not by the 
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researchers. There is potential here for selection bias, and our learning for future studies 
would be to contact local voluntary organisations to assist with recruitment to avoid this. 
Reported improvements in Duty of Candour, openness, and patient safety are not generally 
derived from the patient perspective, and although a degree of corroboration was gained from 
focus groups, these were limited in number.  
Our meeting observations were generally undertaken by either one or two researchers. In 
retrospect it would have been valuable to invite a lay member of our advisory group to join 
this activity to embed the public perspective more deeply in this study. In addition, although 
extensive fieldnotes were taken, a greater observational component would have been 
beneficial including a structured way of noting teamworking, and information sharing and 
tracking the actions committed to and their impact on frontline staff.  
Furthermore, the national survey data and much (although not all) of the case study material 
is concerned with self-report and therefore there are potential issues with accurate recall and 
social desirability bias. 
We did not manage to obtain much data on the financial costs of the leadership and 
governance aspects of implementing the Francis recommendations. The principal reported 
investment was in increased staffing levels, which is not the main focus of this study. 
A member of our advisory group has suggested that we could have scrutinised more carefully 
the roles and contributions of individuals on boards. The point is well made, given that 
healthcare boards are composed of individuals as well as being collective entities, and the 
importance of board dynamics. We therefore intend to carry out further analyses of the data 
to examine further the roles and contributions of individuals on boards. 
 
8.10 Areas for further research 
Given some concerns about, first, the lack of progress in service improvement strategies 
which work in collaboration with (rather than in consultation with) patients, second, the 
dominance of experts on boards,  and, third, the disappointing data about  a continuing lack 
of diversity, an area for future research includes understanding the impact of the composition 
of the board, including backgrounds, experiences and perspectives of board members, and 
how the council of governors can add value and complementarity. Boards would benefit also 
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from exploring the roll-out and utility of the classification of roles in the healthcare context as 
conscience, sensor, coach, diplomat and shock absorber. Further research to develop and test 
the revised framework for effective healthcare boards is required. The question of how boards 
can exhibit a greater internal locus of control, as policy entrepreneurs and implementers, as 
opposed to policy victims, should be explored.  
The role of middle managers is touched on, and is known to be a longstanding issue in 
hospitals. Further work is needed to understand how to build capacity and capability of this 
cadre. 
The impact of the work and behaviours of national bodies, and in particular regulators, on 
senior leaders in hospitals is a theme that runs through the report.  An important question to 
be addressed is what impact external regulation has on the effectiveness of the NHS in 
achieving the triple goal of improved health outcomes, better patient experience and greater 
value for money and how external regulation can work hand in hand with improved 
organisation level leadership.     
We intend to use the opportunity of the publication of this report in early 2018 to explore 
with stakeholders additional avenues for future research. 
 
8.11 Conclusion 
This research has explored what organisations in the English NHS have done to respond to 
Francis and the lessons to be drawn. The overall purpose was to help policymakers and 
practitioners to understand how leadership and governance of NHS trusts and foundation 
trusts can be improved, how this might enable better management of organisations, better 
staff engagement, and hence safer and higher quality care.  In undertaking and reporting this 
research, we have also drawn out the wider lessons for health care organisations more 
generally, in particular in relation to the governance, leadership and development of the 
workforce, services and culture that combine to create appropriately compassionate and safe 
care.  
The research has also established a revised repertoire of desirable roles and associated 
behaviours for boards, drawing from both the theoretical literature and the empirical 
evidence. Building on the components of the revised theoretical framework for effective 
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healthcare boards outlined in chapter 7, we can now propose links between the five roles for 
NHS boards described above (conscience of the organisation, shock absorber, diplomat, 
sensor and coach) with the behaviours associated with the different theoretical purposes. We 
have therefore amended our revised framework to include these board roles in table 16 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Revised framework for effective healthcare board roles 
Theory  about 
purpose of board 
Contextual 
Assumptions 
Modes  of 
behaviour 
Mechanism Intended 
Outcome 
Agency 
(holding 
management to 
account) 
  
Low trust and 
high challenge 
and low 
appetite for risk 
Challenging,  
supportive 
Board as sensor 
Holding to 
account and 
control through 
intense internal 
and external 
performance 
monitoring 
Minimisation of 
risk and good 
patient safety 
record 
Stewardship 
(supporting 
management) 
  
High trust and 
less challenge 
and greater 
appetite for risk 
Collaborative, 
inquiring 
Board as coach  
Broad support in 
a collective 
leadership 
endeavour 
Service 
improvement and 
excellence in 
performance 
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Resource 
dependency 
(enhancing the 
reputation of the 
organisation) 
  
Importance of 
social capital of 
the 
organisation 
Ambassadorial, 
curious 
Board as 
diplomat 
Boundary 
spanning and 
close dialogue 
with healthcare 
partners 
Improved 
reputation and 
relationships 
Stakeholder 
(representing 
interests of all 
stakeholders)  
  
Importance of 
representation 
and collective 
effort; risk is 
shared by many 
Listening, 
questioning 
Board as 
conscience  
Collaboration Sustainable 
organisation, high 
levels of staff 
engagement 
Board power 
(reconciling 
competing 
interests) 
  
Human desire 
for control 
Courageous,  
probing 
Board as shock 
absorber 
Use of power 
differentials 
Equilibrium 
 
When acting as the conscience of the organisation, also described by one stakeholder 
interviewee in the scoping phase of our study as ‘the guiding mind’, the board needs to 
embrace both challenging and supportive behaviours. This connects with the agency 
theoretical perspective (keeper of values and problem sensing not comfort seeking, at the 
same time as knowing that change comes from being supportive as well as challenging 
management), and also the wider stakeholder perspective, indicative of listening and 
questioning behaviours. Acting as shock absorber, the board needs to demonstrate 
courageous and probing behaviours. This is associated with the board theoretical purpose as 
reconciling competing interests and balancing demands arising from different sources of 
power and influence, both internally (particularly from the different healthcare professions) 
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and externally (from regulators and national bodies). Acting as sensor, the board needs to 
combine agency type behaviours of seeking assurance, with curious and ambassadorial 
behaviours to improve the patient experience and staff engagement. The role of the board as 
diplomat, with accompanying ambassadorial behaviours, relates particularly to the resource 
dependency theoretical purpose of boards. Finally, the board as coach indicates collaborative 
and inquiring behaviours. This connects to the stewardship model for boards. This adds up to 
a framing for individual and collective leadership development for board members to ensure 
they can be the confident, tenacious, competent and rounded individuals that they need to be.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of prompt questions for scoping interviews 
List of prompt questions for scoping interviews 
Thanks for taking part; assurance of confidentiality; themes only will be reported; recording – 
do we have permission? Ask for signed consent if F2F or audio record consent if phone 
interview (see consent form for guidance) 
1. What do you think boards are most concerned about at the moment? What are they 
most focused on? 
2. What do you think are the desirable characteristics of board level leadership in our 
acute hospitals following Francis? 
3. What actions would you expect boards of acute hospitals to have taken following the 
publication of the Francis Inquiry report? 
4. What leadership behaviours do you observe / hear about in practice? 
5.  If there is a difference between 2 and 3, why is there a gap? 
6. How does this relate to the behaviours you observe/experience/hear reported most 
often and least often? Is it one of these? Or a combination? Relate this to the various 
theories about boards: 
agency – holding to account - observe low trust/high challenge behaviours 
stewardship – spirit of collaboration on the board – observe high trust/ 
comrades together behaviours  
resource dependency – observe discussion mainly about external environment, 
relationships and networks 
stakeholder – observe focus on reaching consensus with all interested parties 
power – observe dynamics which are all about who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ 
7. What tools/mechanisms/levers do boards use to achieve their desired outcomes? 
8. What’s the role of the board in improving safety and quality of care to patients? 
9. What difficulties do boards face? 
10. What do you think about the idea of introducing a new role of Chief Quality Officer 
on NHS boards? 
11. What questions should we be asking in our national survey? 
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12. What should be the focus of our inquiry in our 6 case study sites? 
13. Healthy Board 2013 guidance – how has this been used or how would you expect it to 
be used? 
14. Fit and Proper Persons requirement – how has this been used or how would you 
expect it to be used? 
15. Anything else you would like to say about changes in board level leadership in acute 
hospitals after Francis? 
Thanks for your time; we would like to invite you to a stakeholder workshop on 24 
November where we will be presenting findings from these stakeholder interviews and the 
latest evidence on effective healthcare boards 
NC 070915 
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Appendix 2: Survey of NHS board members and board secretaries 2016 
Survey on leadership changes made by boards following the Francis 
report   (Word version of an online tool) 
 
Dear colleague   
 
Thank you for responding to this confidential survey, which should take no longer than 25 
minutes to complete.  The survey has 4 sections:     
1. About you   
2. About the board and its leadership   
3. Policy, leadership development and impact   
4. Implementing specific requirements arising from the Francis report (E.g., duty of 
candour, Fit and Proper Persons test) 
 
If you have any queries, email alan.boyd@manchester.ac.uk 
 
Best wishes 
 
Naomi Chambers Professor of Healthcare Management, Alliance Manchester Business 
School, University of Manchester 
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1. About you 
 
In approximately what year did you become Board Secretary for your current trust? 
 
__________________________ 
 
What is your gender? 
 Female 
 Male 
 Transgender 
 Prefer not to say 
 211 
 
What is your ethnicity? Please select one option 
     
White:  White 
British 
 Irish  Any other 
White 
background 
 
Mixed:  White and 
Black 
Caribbean 
 White and 
Black 
African 
 White and 
Asian 
 Any other 
mixed 
background 
Asian or Asian 
British: 
 Indian  Pakistani  Bangladeshi  Any other 
Asian 
background 
Black or Black 
British: 
 Caribbean  African  Any other 
Black 
background 
 
Any Other 
Ethnic Group: 
 Chinese  Any other 
ethnic group 
  
Prefer not to 
say: 
 Prefer not to 
say 
   
 
 
Were you Board secretary for a different acute or specialist hospital trust when the Francis 
report was published in February 2013? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
2. About the board and its leadership 
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What is the gender and ethnic make-up of the board of your current trust? Please indicate the 
total number of members in each category, including both executive and non-executive 
directors. Give your personal assessment if you do not have official figures to hand   
______ members 
______ men 
______ white (white British, Irish, or any other white background) 
 
In practice, how much do you think the board of your current trust emphasises the following 
purposes?  
Give a figure between 0 and 10 for each.  (1 = Hardly at all; 3 = A little; 5 = Moderately; 7 = 
Quite a lot; 9 = Massively) 
 
______ Holding Executive Directors to account 
______ Supporting the Executive Directors 
______ Enhancing the reputation of the organisation 
______ Representing the interests of all stakeholders 
______ Reconciling competing interests 
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If you were Board Secretary prior to February 2013, how much do you think the board 
emphasised the following purposes prior to the publication of the Francis report?  
Give a figure between 0 and 10 for each.    (1 = Hardly at all; 3 = A little; 5 = Moderately; 7 
= Quite a lot; 9 = Massively) 
Please respond only if you were board secretary prior to February 2013. 
 
______ Holding Executive Directors to account 
______ Supporting the Executive Directors 
______ Enhancing the reputation of the organisation 
______ Representing the interests of all stakeholders 
______ Reconciling competing interests 
 
Please comment on how you think the board of your current trust views its purpose. 
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What influence do you think the Francis report has had on this, either directly or indirectly? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the challenges below, which do you think your current board regards as the most 
important for the organisation?  
Select the top 5 challenges from the list below, and number them from 1 to 5, with 1 being 
the most important challenge. 
Please respond only if you were board secretary prior to February 2013. 
 
Top 5 challenges 
______ Patient experience 
______ Patient safety 
______ Clinical effectiveness of care 
______ Staff engagement 
______ Referral-to-treatment (RTT) times 
______ A&E performance 
______ Infection control 
______ Workforce shortage 
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______ Workforce capability 
______ Finances 
______ Organisation reputation 
______ Organisation viability 
______ Relationship with commissioners 
______ Service reorganisation across the local health and social care economy 
______ Responding to regulators 
 
If you were Board Secretary prior to February 2013, of the challenges below, which do you 
think the board regarded as most important for the organisation prior to the publication of the 
Francis report in February 2013? 
Select the top 5 challenges from the list below, and number them from 1 to 5, with 1 being 
the most important challenge. 
Please respond only if you were board secretary prior to February 2013. 
 
Top 5 challenges 
______ Patient experience 
______ Patient safety 
______ Clinical effectiveness of care 
______ Staff engagement 
______ Referral-to-treatment (RTT) times 
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______ A&E performance 
______ Infection control 
______ Workforce shortage 
______ Workforce capability 
______ Finances 
______ Organisation reputation 
______ Organisation viability 
______ Relationship with commissioners 
______ Service reorganisation across the local health and social care economy 
______ Responding to regulators 
 
Please comment on how your current board views the most important challenges for the 
organisation. 
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What influence do you think the Francis report has had on the priorities of your current 
board, either directly or indirectly? 
 
 
How much do you know about what is important to each of the following groups?  
Give a figure between 0 and 10.    (1 = Hardly anything; 3 = A little; 5 = A moderate amount; 
7 = Quite a lot; 9 = A massive amount) 
 
______ Patients cared for by the organisation, and their families 
______ Staff employed by the organisation 
______ Regulators 
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If you were a board member prior to February 2013, Prior to the publication of the Francis 
report in February 2013, how much did you know about what was important to each of the 
following groups? 
Give a figure between 0 and 10.    (1 = Hardly anything; 3 = A little; 5 = A moderate amount; 
7 = Quite a lot; 9 = A massive amount) 
Please respond only if you were on the board prior to February 2013. 
 
______ Patients cared for by the organisation, and their families 
______ Staff employed by the organisation 
______ Regulators 
 
What influence do you think the Francis report has had on your current board knowing about 
what is important to patients, staff and regulators? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Policy, leadership development and impact 
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How have the following organisation-wide policies or statements developed in your current 
trust since the publication of the Francis Report in February 2013?  
Tick one option in each row   
 Newly 
established 
since 
Francis 
Pre-Francis 
policy has 
been 
formally 
reviewed and 
reissued 
Pre-Francis 
policy is still 
in place; not 
formally 
reviewed 
since 
No 
organisation-
wide policy 
Don't 
know 
Statement of 
common purpose, 
guiding principles, 
values and 
behaviours for the 
board and the 
organization 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Policy on learning 
and improvement 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Policy on listening 
and responding to 
patients 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Policy on how to 
raise concerns 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Policy on complaints 
handling 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Policy on openness 
about patient safety 
incidents 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Policy on improving 
staff wellbeing 
o  o  o  o  
o  
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Which of the following actions to improve board-level leadership has your organisation 
instituted since the publication of the Francis report in 2013?  
 Newly 
established 
since Francis 
Done pre-
Francis; 
formally 
reviewed since 
Done pre-
Francis; not 
formally 
reviewed since 
Not 
done 
Don't 
know 
Hearing and discussing 
patient stories at board 
meetings 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Listening Into Action 
surgeries or events for 
staff led by board 
members 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Other engagement 
activities with frontline 
staff, led by board 
members (please state) 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Regular reports to the 
board on ward-by-ward 
staffing levels 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Collective board 
development days or half 
days (not board seminars 
or briefing sessions) 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Individual executive 
leadership development 
o  o  o  o  
o  
External review of the 
climate in the 
organisation, including 
board-level leadership and 
values 
o  o  o  o  
o  
Other actions (please 
state) 
 
 
 
 
 
o  o  o  o  
o  
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In total, approximately how many days of individual leadership development have you 
participated in during the last 12 months?  
Exclude collective board leadership development sessions, seminars and briefing sessions 
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If you were Board Secretary prior to February 2013, how much impact do you think the 
board of your current organisation has made on each of the following since February 2013? 
Give a figure between -5 and +5 for each.  (-5/-4 = Made it massively worse; -3/-2 = Made it 
quite a lot worse; -2/-1 = Made it a little worse; 0 = Made no difference; 1/2 = Made it a little 
better; 2/3 = Made it quite a lot better; 4/5 = Made it massively better) 
If you don’t know, leave your answer blank 
Please respond only if you were board secretary prior to February 2013. 
 
______ Organisational performance 
______ Patient safety 
______ Patient experience 
______ Patient voice 
______ Board visibility within the organisation 
______ Staff engagement 
______ External relationships with other stakeholders in the local health and social care 
economy 
 
Which of the following has your current board experienced as significant barriers to 
improving its leadership? Tick all that apply 
 Recruitment and retention of Executive Directors 
 Recruitment and retention of CEO 
 Financial pressures 
 Meeting demands of regulators 
 Poor relationships with others in the local health and social care economy 
 Acting on the many reports for boards issued after Francis 
 Other barriers (please state) ____________________ 
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If you were Board Secretary prior to February 2013, please comment on how you think the 
leadership style and behaviours of the board of your current trust have changed since 
February 2013.  
Please respond only if you were board secretary prior to February 2013. 
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If you were Board Secretary prior to February 2013, what influence do you think the Francis 
report has had on the board's leadership style and behaviours, either directly or indirectly?  
Please respond only if you were board secretary prior to February 2013. 
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4. Implementing specific requirements 
What actions has your current organisation taken to implement the Fit and Proper Persons 
Requirement for positions on your board? Tick all that apply 
 Carried out background checks on existing board directors 
 Carried out background checks on new appointments (since the requirement came into 
force in November 2014) 
 Responded to CQC concerns about  directors 
 Other actions (please state) 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 No actions have been taken 
 
Please comment on the impacts of implementing the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement. 
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What has been the impact of implementing the duty of candour on the following aspects of 
your current organisation? Tick all that apply 
 Increased a 
lot 
Increased a 
little 
No change Decreased 
a little 
Decreased 
a lot 
Don't 
know 
Learning and 
improvement 
          
  
Openness of 
the culture 
          
  
Organisational 
reputation 
          
  
Patient 
confidence in 
the 
organisation 
          
  
Number of 
complaints 
          
  
Number of 
litigation 
claims 
          
  
Whistleblowing           
  
Other (please 
state below) 
          
  
 
Please comment on the impacts of implementing the duty of candour. 
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How has your current board implemented the Freedom to Speak Up Guardian role? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What plans does the board of your current organisation have for improving its leadership over 
the next 12 months? 
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Are there any other comments you would like to make about the board level leadership in 
your current organisation? 
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Appendix 3: Development and administration of NHS board members survey 
questionnaire 
The survey questions were devised in order to answer relevant research questions from our 
proposal, bearing in mind findings from the initial stakeholder interviews, existing theories 
about boards and recommendations and guidance from policy documents.  A mix of tick box 
and free text responses were sought in order to facilitate both comparative statistical analyses 
and an understanding of underlying issues and the influence of contextual factors.  We were 
aware of needing to keep the questionnaire short because board members have many 
demands on their time and because of evidence of association between length of survey 
questionnaires and diminishing response rates (Galesic and Bosnjak 2009).   
Comments on the survey questionnaire were sought from Advisory Group members.  
Members were sent a link so that they could view/complete a draft of the survey online.  The 
survey questionnaire was then discussed at a meeting of the Advisory Group, with email 
comments also being received from some group members who were unable to attend.  Later, 
Advisory Group members were also given an opportunity to comment on a final draft of the 
survey and on draft invitation letters. 
Cognitive interviews were conducted in order to make the survey easier to complete and to 
improve the quality of the information collected.  Through the interviews we gained insights 
into how respondents might understand the survey questions, and practical problems they 
might encounter in trying to complete the survey.  Interviewees were personal contacts of 
members of the research team.  5 people were interviewed during between November 2015 
and January 2016: 
1. Medical Director of an acute trust 
2. Former Finance Director of an acute trust 
3. Chair of an acute trust 
4. Board secretary of an acute trust 
5. Non-Executive Director of an acute trust 
The general format of the interviews was that the interviewee was asked to answer some of 
the survey questions.  After each answer, the interviewer asked some follow up questions 
 230 
 
about the thought processes of the interviewee.  Notes were taken and subsequently discussed 
by the research team.  The exact format and conduct of each interview varied, depending on 
the circumstances and preferences of the interviewee, their time availability, which survey 
questions had been covered in previous interviews, and the instincts of the interviewer. 
If a computer with internet access was available, then the interviewee accessed the online 
survey directly.  This was preferable, being closer to the experience of actual respondents.  If 
no suitable computer was available then printed copies of the survey questions were used.  
One interviewee completed the survey online prior to the interview and was asked to recall 
her experiences. 
A set of generic probes were prepared for use by the interviewer as appropriate (table 17): 
Table 17: Interview probes 
Probe Example 
Comprehension/Interpretation What does the term ‘X’ mean to you? 
Paraphrasing Can you repeat the question I just asked in your own words? 
Confidence judgement How sure are you that your answer is accurate? 
Recall How do you remember that information (you provided in 
your answer)? 
Specific Why do you think that (view expressed in your answer)? 
General How did you arrive at that answer? 
Was that easy or hard to answer? 
I noticed that you hesitated - tell me what you were thinking 
 
Particular probes were also identified that might be asked in relation to particular survey 
questions.  For example: 
 After reading the introduction - How does this make you feel about the survey? 
 After being asked if they would be willing to provide the name of a previous trust 
they worked for and to answer questions about it – What were you thinking? 
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 After viewing answer options containing words or phrases that we suspected might be 
interpreted in different ways: 
o What does the term ‘management’ in question 1 mean to you? 
o What does the term ‘competing interests’ in question 5 mean to you? 
o What does the term ‘organisation viability’ mean to you? 
o What does the term ‘management challenge for clinical leaders’ mean to you? 
Various changes were made to the wording of the survey introduction and questions as a 
result of the cognitive interviews.  A few questions were removed because it emerged that 
they might be difficult for some interviewees to answer.  A few additional questions were 
inserted.  There were numerous rewordings of phrases to improve clarity. 
Survey administration 
Names, job titles and email addresses of relevant board members and secretaries were 
identified using Binley’s database.  The database had almost full coverage of Chairs, Medical 
Directors, Nursing Directors and Finance Directors, including email addresses for over 90% 
of people in these roles.  There was almost full coverage of Chief Executives, but only 68% 
of entries specified an email address.  Board Secretaries were harder to identify, as many of 
their job titles did not actually contain the word ‘Secretary’, but we were able to identify 
about 90% of Board Secretaries in the database, and about 90% of these had email addresses 
specified, giving 80-85% coverage by email.  Coverage of Non-Executive Directors appeared 
good, but only about 33% of those listed in the database had email addresses specified. 
In view of these gaps in the database, and the suggestion of one cognitive interviewee that 
phoning the board secretary might be a good way to engage them and to access other board 
members, particularly CEOs and NEDs, we piloted phoning the board secretary.  We did this 
for 9 Trusts, chosen at random, in late December 2015 and early January 2016.  First we 
checked the Trust website to identify the names and roles of any board members who might 
potentially not have been included in our database.  Then we phoned the board secretary to 
inform them about the research and to ask them if they would check and update our list of 
board members and their email addresses.  In some instances this did bring our contact 
database more up to date and produced a commitment from the board secretary to encourage 
board members to respond to the survey.  It was time consuming however.  The Board 
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Secretary was not typically immediately available to speak on the phone, and there was not 
always a person in post.  When contact was made, there was usually a request for further 
information to be emailed through.  Some Board Secretaries did not want to act as 
intermediaries between ourselves and board members, and there was a reluctance to provide 
us with the email addresses when NEDs used their own personal email addresses. 
We decided to continue with this initial phone call approach for 50% of the Trusts, picking 
those where we either had no email address for the Board Secretary, or where the number of 
missing email addresses across all board members was the greatest, in order to maximise the 
benefits for updating our database.  Following contact with the Board Secretary we updated 
our database as appropriate and emailed out survey invitations either directly, or via the 
Board Secretary, as they preferred.  Where we had not been able to make satisfactory contact 
with the Board secretary after at least three phone calls we emailed out survey invitations to 
those people for whom we had email addresses. 
For the remaining 50% of Trusts we proceeded as follows: 
1. An initial invitation email was sent to the board secretary, containing a link for them 
to take the survey, and informing them that in a week’s time we would email them 
survey invitations to forward on to board members for whom we have no email 
address. 
2. In the meantime, we checked the Trust website to identify the names and roles of any 
board members who might potentially not have been included in our database. 
3. 7-10 days after the initial invitation email to the board secretary, we emailed survey 
invitations direct to all board members for whom we had email addresses.  For those 
board members for whom we had no email address, or whose invitation email 
‘bounced’, we emailed their invitations to the board secretary, with a request for them 
to forward on the invitation. 
If people we had emailed directly had not responded to the survey within about 3 weeks, a 
reminder was emailed.  Email invitations and reminders were issued between 24
th
 January 
2016 and 28
th
 April 2016.  A final postal invitation was sent out to people for whom we did 
not have an email address, or who had not responded since their email reminder.  The postal 
invitation contained a link to take the survey online plus a hard copy version of the survey 
and a pre-paid reply envelope in case the person preferred to respond on paper.  Postal 
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invitations were posted between early April and early May and resulted in over 60 additional 
responses.  The survey was closed on 21 May 2016. 
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Appendix 4: Details of multivariate statistical analyses 
Regression summaries – Board emphasis on purposes- current 
Dependent 
variable 
Statistically significant independent variables 
Positive Negative Doubtful (isn’t robust enough 
once Cook is applied) 
Total score 
across all 
purposes 
(using CQC) 
1. Is Good or 
Outstanding  
2. Is NED plus Chair  
1.RTT 
2. Responding to 
regulators  
3. Finances  
 
  
 
Total score 
across all 
purposes 
(using NSS) 
 
 
1. NSS scores 
2. Is NED plus chair 
 
1. Responding to 
regulators  
2. Finances  
 
2. Is nursing director 
3. Is RTT 
4. Is female 
5. Is exec 
 
Holding to 
account score 
(using CQC) 
1. Is Good or 
Outstanding 
2. Clinical 
effectiveness 
 
  
Holding to 
account scores 
(using NSS) 
1. Clinical 
effectiveness 
2. NSS score 
1. Is recent board 
member 
 
Supportiveness 
score (using 
CQC) 
1. Is NED plus Chair 
2. Is Good or 
Outstanding 
3. Workforce shortage 
1. RTT 
2. Finances 
 
Supportiveness 
scores (using 
NSS) 
1. is NED plus Chair 
2. NSS score 
  
1. Finances 
2. Organisation 
reputation 
3. RTT  
1. Workforce shortage 
Reputation 
score (using 
1. Is Good or 1. Finances 1. RTT 
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CQC) 
 
 
Outstanding 
2. Is non-exec 
3. Is nursing director 
4. Infection control 
 
2. Is female 
 
Reputation 
score (using 
NSS score) 
 
 
 
 
1. NSS score  
2. Is non-exec 
3. Is nursing director 
1. Finances 
2. Is female 
4. Clinical effectiveness 
of care 
1. Org viability  
 
Representing 
stakeholders 
score (CQC) 
 
 
1. Is Good or 
Outstanding 
2. Is NED plus chair 
3. Service 
reorganisation 
4. Org viability 
1. Finances  
2. Responding to 
regulators 
 
Representing 
stakeholders 
score (NSS)  
 
1. NSS score 
2. Is NED plus chair 
3. Is nursing director  
1. Responding to 
regulators  
2. Finances 
 
3. Is female 
Reconciling 
interests score 
(CQC) 
 
 
1. Is Good or 
Outstanding 
 
 
1. Responding to 
regulators 
2. Finances  
 
3. Is female  
4. Is exec 
Reconciling 
interests score 
(NSS) 
 
 
1. NSS score 
2. Is NED plus Chair  
1. Responding to 
regulators  
2. Finances  
1. Is female 
2. Is exec 
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Dependent 
variable 
Statistically significant independent variables 
Positive Positive 
doubtful  
Negative Negative Doubtful  
Pre-Francis score 
across all purposes 
(using 2015 NSS 
scores) 
1)Is Good or 
Outstanding (not 
significant for 
NSS scores)  
2) Organisation 
viability  
 1)Responding to 
regulators  
2) Is Nursing 
Director  
 
Pre-Francis score 
across all purposes 
(using 2013 NSS 
scores and pre 
Francis challenge 
scores)  
 
1) Is Good or 
Outstanding  
 
1) Is NED plus 
Chair  
2) Workforce 
shortage  
 
1) Finances 
2) infection 
control 
3)Is Nursing 
Director  
 
1) A&E 
performance 
2) is CEO (added 
post Cook) 
Pre-Francis score 
across all purposes 
(using 2013 & 
2012 NSS scores 
and pre Francis 
challenge scores)  
 
1) Is Good or 
Outstanding  
 
1) Is NED plus 
Chair  
2) 2) Workforce 
shortage 
 
1) finances  
2) infection 
control 
3) is Nursing 
Director  
1) Is CEO (added 
post Cook) 
2) A&E 
performance 
 
Difference post 
minus pre-Francis 
scores across all 
purposes  
 1) Organisation 
reputation 
2) Patient 
experience 
(became 
significant once 
Cook was 
applied)   
  
Difference post 
minus pre-Francis 
scores across all 
purposes (using 
2013 NSS scores 
and pre francis 
challenge scores) 
 
 
1) Finances  
 
1) Organisation 
reputation 
  1) Workforce 
shortage 
Regression summaries: Emphases on purposes - pre Francis, and current-pre Francis 
comparison 
 
Regression summaries: Emphases on purposes - pre Francis, and current-pre Francis 
comparison 
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Difference post 
minus pre-Francis 
scores across all 
purposes (using 
2013 & 2012 NSS 
scores and pre 
francis challenge 
scores) 
1. Finances  
 
1. A&E 
performance 
2. Is Female 
(added post 
Cook) 
2. Organisation 
reputation 
 
 
 
 
1.Workforce 
shortage  
 
Difference - 
accountability 
1) Is Board 
secretary 
2) Service 
reorganisation 
across the local 
health econ 
   
Difference - 
supportive 
1) Is CEO 
2) Patient safety 
challenge 
 
1)Patient 
experience 
  
Difference - 
reputation 
  1)Patient 
experience  
2) NSS scores 
(not significant 
for CQC rating) 
 
Difference - 
stakeholder 
  1) Is Medical 
Director 
 
1) Is Finance 
Director 
Difference – 
reconciling 
interests 
1) Organisation 
reputation  
2) Staff 
1) Workforce 
shortage 
(became 
significant once 
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Further analyses 
Report 
GENDER 
Holding 
Executive 
Directors to 
account 
Supporting the 
Executive 
Directors 
Enhancing the 
reputation of the 
organisation 
Representing 
the interests of 
all stakeholders 
Reconciling 
competing 
interests 
Femal
e 
Mean 7.4318 7.1364 6.9771 6.5086 6.3771 
N 176 176 175 175 175 
Std. Deviation 1.68892 1.71169 2.02273 2.00536 2.20645 
Male Mean 7.7012 7.4315 7.4066 7.0083 6.8257 
N 241 241 241 241 241 
Std. Deviation 1.36701 1.55070 1.57076 1.65326 1.89811 
Total Mean 7.5875 7.3070 7.2260 6.7981 6.6370 
N 417 417 416 416 416 
Std. Deviation 1.51519 1.62516 1.78532 1.82423 2.04303 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Holding Executive Directors 
to account 
Between Groups 7.384 1 7.384 3.233 .073 
Within Groups 947.671 415 2.284   
Total 955.055 416    
Supporting the Executive 
Directors 
Between Groups 8.862 1 8.862 3.375 .067 
Within Groups 1089.848 415 2.626   
engagement 
 
Cook was 
applied) 
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Total 1098.710 416    
Enhancing the reputation of 
the organisation 
Between Groups 18.702 1 18.702 5.937 .015 
Within Groups 1304.058 414 3.150   
Total 1322.760 415    
Representing the interests of 
all stakeholders 
Between Groups 25.318 1 25.318 7.731 .006 
Within Groups 1355.721 414 3.275   
Total 1381.038 415    
Reconciling competing 
interests 
Between Groups 20.401 1 20.401 4.934 .027 
Within Groups 1711.789 414 4.135   
Total 1732.190 415    
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Appendix 5: Interview topic guide for case study sites 
Semi-structured interviews in 6 x case study sites 
(n= 12; board members, commissioners, staff and patient representatives, Healthwatch, 
trust advisers) 
Interview topic guide – please note this is a guide and the precise choice and sequencing of 
questions will vary depending on the role and background of the participant 
1. What is your role in this organisation; how long have you been involved here? 
2. As far as you know, what are the priorities of the board of this organisation? How 
does the board handle ‘policy thickets’ i.e. all the various policies and guidance that 
they are required to respond to? 
3. What in the external environment is constraining or influencing the board at the 
moment? 
4. What mechanisms do the board use to hear the voices of all the different 
stakeholders with an interest in this hospital? 
5. As far as you know, what board-level actions have been taken and what board 
processes have been put in place to implement the recommendations from the 
Francis Inquiry?  
6. What do you think are the barriers to implementing Francis? 
7. How has the Francis report impacted on frontline staff in wards and departments?  
8. How well do you think frontline staff are aware what the Francis Report was about? 
9. What are the costs of implementing Francis have been in terms of investment in 
leadership and culture change? 
10. Can you give an example of a recent patient safety or patient experience issue that 
the organisation has been tackling? What is the story here? 
11. What part do patients play in service redesign and service improvement? Can you 
give an example? 
12. What part do frontline staff play in service redesign and service improvement? Can 
you give an example? 
13. How does the board decide what goes in the private and public section of the 
agenda? 
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14. Can you describe how the board and the top management team communicates with 
the rest of the organisation? 
15. What structural changes have been made to improve communication flows through 
the organisation for staff and for patients? 
16. How embedded is the approach to quality improvement – systematic service 
improvement - use of service improvement tools and technologies? 
17. Can you describe how complaints are handled at the trust? Have changes been made 
to the complaints policy recently? 
18. Can you describe the policy for hearing about staff concerns? ( Freedom to Speak 
Up) 
19. As far as you know, how has the Duty of Candour requirement changed things? What 
has been the financial cost to the organisation? 
20. As far as you know, how has the Fit and Proper Persons Requirement been 
implemented? What has been the financial cost to the organisation? 
21. How has the culture - the way things are done round here changed over the past 
three years?  
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Appendix 6: Focus group discussion topic guide for case study sites 
 
 
 What do you think are the main leadership challenges facing this hospital? 
 
 What is your opinion of the commitment of this organisation to the principles of 
openness, transparency and candour as recommended in the Francis Report? 
 
 What is the culture of this organisation? i.e. the way things are done round here 
 
 What changes have taken place in the last three years in relation to the patient 
experience of care here? 
 
 How does the board of the hospital take into account the views of patients receiving 
care? 
 
 How do the clinical teams make use of the views of patients? 
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Appendix 7: Ward and department managers’ survey 
 
Q1.1 FRANCIS REPORT RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
This survey seeks to gather information about how your Trust has responded to the 
Francis Report, for example by putting patients first, developing a culture of care, 
encouraging openness and transparency, having effective leadership and accountability, 
empowering staff and working in partnership, and improving quality and innovation.   
 
This survey is being undertaken as part of national research by an independent team of 
researchers funded by the Department of Health, and with the support of (person), (role). 
 
We have sent this questionnaire to all ward, department and unit managers in your 
organisation.  
 
Your responses to the survey will be confidential. They will be seen only by the 
academic research team members, and neither you nor your Trust will be named in any 
of our reports. 
 
The questionnaire goes up to Q3.23; please press the purple >> button at the bottom of 
pages to continue. 
 
Thank you for your time.    
 
Professor Naomi Chambers     
Alliance Manchester Business School,      
University of Manchester,     
Booth Street East,     
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Manchester.     
M13 9SS     
naomi.chambers@manchester.ac.uk 
 
 
Q2.1 What is your job title? 
 
Q2.2 How would you describe your position? 
 First-line manager 
 Senior manager 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 
Q2.3 Which Directorate do you work in? 
 
Q2.4 In what year did you start working at this Trust? 
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Q3.1 What do you see as the most important 5 challenges for the Trust? 
Please drag 5 items from the list to the box. 
Put the most important challenge at the top - you can reorder items within the box by 
dragging them: 
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Q3.2 How familiar would you say that staff in your ward/department/unit are with the 
recommendations of the Francis Report published in 2013 on:  
putting patients first, developing a culture of care, encouraging openness and transparency, 
having effective leadership and accountability, empowering staff and working in partnership, 
and improving quality and innovation? 
 Not at all 
familiar 
Somewhat 
familiar 
Mostly 
familiar 
Completely 
familiar 
Don't know 
            
 
 
Q3.3 Comments about staff familiarity with the recommendations of the Francis report: 
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Q3.4 What changes have taken place in the last three years in your ward/department/unit? 
Tick all that apply: 
 Got worse Stayed the same Improved 
Quality of patient 
experience has: 
    
  
Staff morale has:     
  
Investigation of 
serious incidents has: 
    
  
Relationships with 
other local health and 
care organisations 
has: 
    
  
Involving patients in 
planning and decision 
making has: 
    
  
Other change (please 
specify) 
    
  
Other change (please 
specify) 
    
  
Other change (please 
specify) 
    
  
 
 
Q3.5 Comments about changes in your ward/dept/unit: 
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Q3.6 Over the last 2 or 3 years, how much action you have taken as a manager to implement 
the following recommendations arising from the Francis Inquiry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.7 Comments on the actions you have taken: 
 
Q3.8 What have been the additional staff costs and other financial costs of your actions? 
 
 
 
 
 249 
 
Q3.9 What other resource implications have there been from actions taken by the Trust to 
implement the Francis Inquiry recommendations? (For example have there been new 
committees, working groups, new governance processes, other calls on management time?) 
 
Q3.10 What do you think are the barriers to improving leadership in this Trust at the level of: 
your ward/department/unit: 
your Division/Directorate: 
your Trust's Board: 
 
Q3.11 What do you think has helped to improve leadership in this Trust at the level of: 
your ward/department/unit: 
your Division/Directorate: 
your Trust's Board: 
 
Q3.12 To what extent are front-line staff and managers encouraged to innovate to do things 
differently, by allowing them freedom to make decisions and to take reasonable risks 
 
 
 
  
 
Q3.13 Comments about encouragement to innovate: 
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Q3.14 How do you rate the opportunities for management training and development for staff 
in this Trust? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.15 Comments about opportunities for management training and development: 
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Q3.16 In your experience, how visible are the Board members  (the executive directors e.g. 
Medical Director, Chief Nurse, Finance Director and non-executive directors, the Chair and 
the Chief Executive) to staff in your ward/department/unit? 
 
 
 
 
 
______   
 
Q3.17 Comments about visibility of Board members: 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.18 In your experience how strongly is the Board and senior management committed to the 
following: 
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Q3.19 Comments about Board and senior management commitment: 
 
Q3.20 In your experience, to what extent do the Board and senior management team reflect 
and model the values of the Trust in their leadership style and behaviours?  
 
 
 
 
 
______   
 
Q3.21 Comments about leadership style and behaviours: 
 
Q3.22 In your own words, please describe the change in culture ('the way things are done 
around here') at your Trust over the last 3 years 
 
Q3.23 Please add any other comments you would like to make about changes made at this 
Trust over the last 3 years 
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Appendix 8: Coding framework for case study transcripts 
(high level Francis themes in underlined italics as the main codes) 
NB 5 research objectives (ROs): 
1. To identify the different ways in which hospital boards have sought to implement the 
recommendations on leadership in response to Francis  
2. To identify which mechanisms used by boards of NHS trusts and Foundation Trusts 
have led to improvements  
3. To explore the early intended and unintended effects 
4. To examine the financial and non-financial costs of developing and implementing 
new policies, processes and actions for improving board and organisational leadership 
5. To explore the enablers and barriers in improving board level leadership 
  
Code   Relates to ROs 
Headings for chapter on case 
study findings 
Francis Report 
 1 How the trusts responded 
Impact of the 
inquiry report 3  ‘ 
Actions taken as a  
consequence of the 
inquiry report 1 ‘ 
Unintended effect 
(s) 3 ‘ 
Costs of Francis 
4 
Costs of implementing 
changes 
 
Putting patients 
first 1 
Board efforts in relation to 
putting patients first 
Patient complaints 1 and 2 ‘ 
Patient safety 1 and 2 ‘ 
Patient experience 1 and 2 ‘ 
Role of 
HealthWatch 3 ‘ 
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Culture and values 
 1 
Organisation culture ( 
including degree of openness) 
Openness 
 1 ‘ 
Duty of candour 
1 and 2 and 3 
Board efforts in relation to 
putting patients first 
Freedom to Speak 
Up 1 and 2 and 3 
Board efforts in relation to 
staff engagement 
Media interest and 
relations 3 Main local contextual issues  
 
  
Accountability 1 How the trust responded 
Fit and Proper 
Persons 
Requirement 1 and 3 ‘ 
 
  
Improving 
leadership 
 1 and 5 
Composition, role and 
behaviours of the board 
Composition of the 
board 2 ‘ 
Effectiveness of the 
board 2 ‘ 
Board 
dynamics/tone 2 ‘ 
Role of the CEO 2 ‘ 
Role of the board 2 ‘ 
Role of 
subcommittees 2 ‘ 
Role of the chair 2 ‘ 
Non executive 
challenge 2 ‘ 
Non executive 
support 2 ‘ 
Role of governors 2 ‘ 
Workforce 1 and 2 ‘ 
Enablers 
5 
Enablers and barriers to 
implementing Francis 
recommendations 
Barriers 5 ‘ 
Quality/finance 
tension 
4 and 5 
Progress on quality and 
safety/ Organisation 
culture/Enablers and barriers 
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Empowering staff 
 1 and 3 
Board efforts in relation to 
staff engagement 
Listening to staff  1 and 2 and 3 ‘ 
Schwartz rounds 2 ‘ 
Staff engagement 2 ‘ 
Improving quality 
 1 
Involvement of staff and 
patients in quality and service 
improvement  / Culture 
Service 
improvement 2 and 3   ‘ 
Measuring quality 2 and 3   ‘ 
   
 
  
Innovation 1  Culture/ Trust priorities 
Change 
programme 2 ‘ 
Involvement in 
research 3 ‘ 
 
  
Policy context 5 Enablers and barriers 
STPs/new models 
of care 5 ‘ 
Regulators 5 ‘ 
Control of system 
service pressures 5 ‘ 
Government 
policies 5 ‘ 
Commissioners 5 ‘ 
 
Naomi Chambers 160317 
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Appendix 9: National voices assessment of patient and public involvement in research 
study 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT ON NHS BOARD LEADERSHIP CHANGES FOLLOWING 
THE FRANCIS REPORT:   
AN ASSESSMENT OF PATIENT AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROJECT 
 
 
Summary 
National Voices was asked to review the patient and public involvement in a 
research project investigating changes in NHS board leadership in the wake of 
the Francis Inquiry.  This paper sets out a framework against which the 
involvement was assessed.   
We found that the approach taken was well-motivated, authentic and broadly 
fit for purpose.  It has had some impact on the conduct of the research.     
We suggest a small number of ways in which it could have been strengthened 
(and still could) and we draw a few implications for the wider health research 
community. 
 
 
Introduction 
National Voices was commissioned in early 2017 to carry out a short assessment of 
the arrangements for patient and public involvement in this project.  The exercise 
fulfilled a commitment in the research team’s original application to the funder, the 
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) to ‘make arrangements for an 
organisation such as National Voices to assess how closely we are operating against 
principles of best practice in involving patients and the public’. 
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National Voices3 is the national coalition of health and care charities in England, with 
expertise and experience in patient and public involvement.  
 
 
How National Voices’ assessment was carried out. 
This was a short piece of work conducted by me, Jeremy Taylor, the CEO of 
National Voices in the spring of 2017.  My activities included attending a project 
workshop, exchanges with project leader Professor Naomi Chambers, semi-
structured telephone interviews with a sample of members of the research team and 
advisory group, including the lay chair of the advisory group, reading relevant 
documents and then drafting an assessment based on this evidence and drawing on 
National Voices’ knowledge and understanding of good practice in involving citizens 
in health matters.    
This report was shared with the interviewees in draft. Their reactions were reflected 
in the final document.  Most of the work was done in April and May 2017. 
Interviewees shared their views with me in confidence and this report accordingly 
does not attribute any comments to individuals, with the exception of comments 
made by Professor Chambers who commissioned this work. 
 
 
What does good involvement look like? 
There is a large and diverse range of activities in the spheres of health services and 
research that constitute ‘involvement’, ‘engagement’ or ‘participation’.  (These terms, 
for all practical purposes, are synonymous).   There is a correspondingly large body 
of literature and guidance on the involvement of patients and citizens in health 
                                                 
3
 http://www.nationalvoices.org.uk/  
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matters, and more broadly on matters of citizen participation in decisions taken in the 
public and private sectors.   
‘What good looks like’ is determined by a combination of principle, evidence and 
context.  It can be difficult to distil.  For one thing, the literature reflects a number of 
distinct if overlapping strands, including: 
 Citizenship and democracy: a concern with participation as an aspect of 
citizenship rights and responsibilities (including in relation to the publicly 
funded and collectively-owned NHS) 
 Consumerism:  a concern with voice as an aspect of consumer rights 
 Equality and fairness:  a moral drive to hear and incorporate the voices of 
the disadvantaged and excluded   
 Impact on outcomes: a practical and empirical interest in the impact of 
patient and citizen involvement on the nature and quality of decision making 
and the resulting health outcomes (ranging from the narrowly clinical to the 
more broadly experiential) 
 Social value:  a concern with growing the capacities of individuals and 
communities to take part, take charge and make their own decisions 
For this exercise, I have approached ‘what good looks like’ from three angles which 
together distil much of the wisdom contained in the literature. 
 Purpose and impact:  was there clarity about the purpose of involving 
people; was it a reasonable purpose; did the activities undertaken fulfil the 
purpose and have a meaningful impact? 
 People:   who got involved?   Were they the ‘right’ people? 
 Power:   how much influence did the people involved have?  Where did it lie 
on a spectrum from mere tokenism to complete control?  Was there genuine 
partnership working or co-production? 
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How did the research team involve patients and the public? 
NIHR imposes a requirement on applicants that they must demonstrate how patients 
and the public are involved in research projects.  It is for applicants to decide how to 
do this. 
 
Planning  
The intentions of the research team are summarised below, based on extracts from 
their application to NIHR.  
‘We have selected the model of a patient-led advisory group to ensure that 
the research is shaped around the ultimate concerns of patients and their 
families, which is that the organisation treating them is well-managed, well led 
and is able to create a climate for providing compassionate and clinically 
competent care. In this we are mindful of Arnstein’s ladder of participation 
(Arnstein, 1969) and are desirous of moving the level of patient and public 
involvement up the rung from ‘consultative’ to ‘in control’. 
‘Chaired by a patient, the group will inform the development of research tools 
and site selection, specifically how we assess boards’ approaches to 
incorporating and listening to the voice of patients and their carers’ 
‘The application has been tested with a patient representative.’   
‘We have set aside a budget to ensure that patient members of the advisory 
group are remunerated in accordance with INVOLVE principles’ 
‘We will ensure that there is appropriate training and we will also make 
arrangements for an organisation such as National Voices to assess how 
closely we are operating against principles of best practice in involving 
patients and the public.’ 
‘This approach will benefit the research by ensuring that lay wisdom is at the 
heart of the process. The findings will also be sense-checked by the patient-
led advisory group addressing the all-important ‘so what’ question.’ 
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‘Patient representatives will contribute to project scoping (WP1), and survey 
design (WP2 and WP3). In WP3 (case studies), patient representatives will be 
interviewed in each site. PPI colleagues will participate in both project 
workshops.’ 
 
Execution 
Broadly, the arrangements for patient and public involvement followed the original 
plans, with the patient-led advisory group as the key mechanism for involvement.  A 
public call for advisory group members was issued in June 2015, including one 
patient chair and three lay members. Expressions of interest were invited, there was 
a sifting and interviewing process, and the advisory group was constituted by autumn 
2015.   In the end four lay members were appointed in addition to the chair, though 
one was subsequently unable to contribute for personal reasons. 
Since then there have been two meetings of the advisory group and two larger 
stakeholder meetings, including the advisory group members. There have also been 
several exchanges outside the formal meetings, for example commenting on draft 
questionnaires by email. 
At the time of writing this report, a further engagement with the advisory group, to 
shape the final outputs of the project, is still awaited. 
Compared with original stated intentions, there was less patient and public 
involvement in the project scoping stage and in the case studies. 
  
Purpose and impact 
What was good  
There was general agreement that a patient-led advisory group, bringing ‘lay 
wisdom’ to bear on the project, was an appropriate mechanism, serving an 
appropriate purpose and that it had made an impact. 
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Interviewees in their own words mirrored the intentions set out in the original 
application:  
 To keep the project grounded 
 To widen the perspectives brought to bear 
 To keep the project focussed on what really matters to patients and avoid 
getting too preoccupied with issues of structure and governance. 
 To provide a touchstone   
Interviewees were able to cite several specific ways in which the presence of a 
patient chair and lay members had made an impact.   Examples cited were:   
 Influenced the detailed conduct of the research, including the survey and the 
methodology for investigating the case study sites.     
 Influenced the stance of the project on specific themes such as ‘patient 
stories’ at board meetings, the role of Foundation Trust governors, and 
Healthwatch.  
 Provided challenge to academic viewpoints, ensuring that there was a healthy 
tension – or ‘positive discomfort’ – between more academic and more ‘lay’ 
concerns 
 Helped avoid ‘capture’ by the case study sites, ensuring sufficient 
independence 
 Encouraged engagement with healthcare professionals, ensuring a sufficient 
staff voice alongside the lay voices. 
Overall, the involvement of lay people has made a modest but significant impact on 
the conduct of the research so far.  The impact had been ‘in line with expectations’.  
It had not ‘fundamentally changed the project’ but had kept it grounded, ‘kept pulling 
it back’ to the concerns of patients.   This had been done as well as possible, given 
the limitations.  
One interviewee noted that the leadership of Professor Chambers had been 
important in ensuring that the arrangements were authentic, added value and 
avoided tokenism. Professor Chambers herself affirmed that, not least because of 
the subject matter of the research, she had been determined that the project should 
‘model good practice’.  
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What can be questioned? 
The patient and public involvement in the research did not fully live up to the original 
intentions. There was little involvement in the project scoping and in the stages prior 
to establishing the advisory group.  Nor was there much PPI in the case studies. The 
research team relied on the trusts in question to nominate patients and lay people to 
be involved. The advisory group itself had little say in this process.  
While patients and lay people had a strong voice on the advisory group, an advisory 
group itself is not the most powerful of mechanisms for involvement.  It is not 
necessarily party to all decisions.  And its advice does not have to be followed.  (That 
said, there was general agreement that this advisory group did have a meaningful 
role.   One respondent thought that it behaved more like a steering group). 
It was noted that the resources for involvement, including honoraria for the lay 
participants, were modest. While the chair received £900, the other lay members 
received £300 for their time in travelling to and attending four meetings and engaging 
in email contact between times.  In that context: ‘Not much money for patient voice!’ 
(to quote one participant) seems fair comment.   
Some of the interviewees expressed a sense that the vision for patient and public 
involvement might have been too narrow (partly a consequence of limited patient 
and public involvement at the stage of putting the bid together). 
 ‘There could have been a more ambitious plan in the original bid’.     
  ‘Is there a more meaningful way of involving people?’ 
 ‘Do we have enough knowledge of other forms of involvement? More creative, 
imaginative?’ 
And there were one or two specific proposals: 
  ‘Would an IPSOS Mori poll or focus group have been more valuable than 
getting people to sit through a load of meetings?’ 
  ‘Should there have been a lay person on the research team itself?’ 
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People  
What was good? 
There was unanimous approval of the open and criteria-based recruitment process 
resulting in the appointment of four lay members, including one patient chair.  Open 
recruitment is good practice.  Some of the interviewees contrasted this favourably 
with other research projects in which the patient or lay participants had been chosen 
in an opaque and incontestable manner as a result of prior association with the 
researchers.   
One of the lay participants commented that they had not experienced an open 
recruitment process before and would not have found out about the opportunity 
otherwise.   
The lay participants were thought to be good – having the skills and qualities 
necessary to perform their roles. 
 
What can be questioned? 
The interviewees raised three areas of relative weakness. 
 Whether there should have been more diversity among the lay participants, in 
particular to better represent more ‘ordinary’ patient and lay perspectives.  
‘Look outside, look wider – we could have had a more diverse and livelier 
bunch’. 
 Whether there were enough lay participants.  Four were appointed but only 
three were able to contribute, and of these just two played the most active and 
continuing roles. 
 Whether patients from the case study sites could have been more 
meaningfully involved. 
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Power 
What was good 
Respondents were unanimous that lay involvement in the advisory group had been 
an appropriate mechanism for bringing patient voice to bear on the project.  There 
was praise for the decision to have a lay chair, which was seen as a creative and 
relatively unusual arrangement in health services research.  Most agreed that the lay 
participants had had an equal voice in the proceedings. 
 ‘Having a lay chair sends an important message’. 
 ‘It was a relationship of equals -   not ‘them and us’. 
 ‘There was equality of voice – we felt listened to and looked after’. 
  ‘Comments were warmly welcomed and taken on board.’ 
  ‘(The research team) put a lot of effort into it.’ 
  ‘There was effective challenge especially from the [Chair] and (one other lay 
participant)’ 
  ‘As good as I’ve seen in a research project’. 
 
What can be questioned 
Respondents noted that key aspects of the application process and project design 
significantly limited the scope for patient and public involvement.  
 ‘Time constraints in the bidding process meant that time for thought and 
coproduction was lacking.’ 
 ‘There should have been more thought and consultation (eg with chair) on 
designing patient voice input through whole project at the outset and 
allocating sufficient budget to it’ 
 ‘There was not much lay involvement in study design or application. By the 
time the lay people arrived, the key decisions had been set in stone’. 
Some limited concern was expressed about whether the lay participants had been   
equipped to play a sufficiently strong role.  Had they had enough training and 
briefing?  Would more clarity on the rules of engagement might have helped?  Did 
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they find it daunting being on the group with bunch of professors?  It is not clear that 
these worries were borne out in practice. 
One participant said they ‘felt in limbo’ in the period following the formal meetings but 
before the final outputs of the study.  Were they still needed? Would they be involved 
in the final stages?  There was a felt need for more communication and to know what 
impact the lay members had made and that it had been valued.   
 
Conclusions  
A lay-chaired advisory group, with chair and other lay members recruited through 
open competition, has been an appropriate channel for bringing patient voice to bear 
on this research project, and has had some impact on the project. 
The lay members are felt to be equal members of the group and have been 
responsible for demonstrable changes to the conduct of the research which 
interviewees were able to articulate clearly. 
The impact achieved by the lay participants is a reflection of the people involved and 
the mechanism chosen. It has also been a consequence of the attitudes and 
behaviours of the research team.  With Professor Chambers leading by example, 
they set a positive tone for patient and public involvement in the project, ensuring 
that the advisory group had a meaningful role and that the lay people had equal 
voice within the group.  In other hands, similar arrangements could have been 
formulaic or tokenistic. 
The jury is still out on how effective the patient and public involvement has been 
overall, since the project is not yet complete. 
Could there have been stronger patient and public involvement? 
In principle, definitely.   This was not co-production.  Patients and the public did not 
get a say in setting the research priorities, they did not co-design the project or the 
application.  They did not get a say in determining how patients and the public 
should be involved!  They had little involvement in the case studies.   
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The contribution of the lay people was channelled along lines set before they arrived 
and it made change at the margin, rather than in fundamentals. A lay-chaired 
advisory group is not a particularly radical arrangement. The fact that it can be seen 
as cutting edge in the health research world perhaps says more about the 
conservatism of that world than about the innovativeness of this project. 
A small number of competent lay people were recruited to the advisory group who 
are well suited to expert partnership work.  That takes a special kind of person. 
There was not a diversity of voices representing lived experience of illness and 
disability and the diversity of England’s communities.     
In practice, given the constraints of time, process and resource faced by the 
researchers, and given the intended purpose of the patient and public involvement, 
aiming for the highest possible levels of co-production, diversity and inclusion would 
have been disproportionate and probably not achievable.   
In fact, the chosen arrangements seem broadly fit for purpose. Nevertheless, the 
research team could have: 
 Done more to integrate patient and public perspectives into the design of the 
study and the application to NIHR 
 Recruited a larger number of lay people to the advisory group, in particular to 
hedge against attrition 
 Found supplementary ways of bringing insight from a wider cross section of 
the public and from people with lived experience of ill health and disability, 
especially given the desire to keep the project ‘grounded’ and able to ask the 
‘so what’ questions 
 Exerted more say over the patient and public involvement in the case studies, 
rather than leaving that to the relevant NHS trusts. 
Given that the project is not over, there is still time for the research team – together 
with the advisory group – to strengthen the impact of patient and public voices on the 
final outputs of the study. 
 
Wider implications 
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Much of this assessment applies to the particular research project in question and is 
not necessarily generalizable.   Nevertheless, a few issues arose that might have 
wider relevance for researchers wishing to involve patients and the public in their 
work, and for organisations funding research. 
 
Implications for research teams 
 Leadership for patient and public involvement – the willingness to take it 
seriously, do it properly and embed it in research – is important at all stages of 
the project from conception to completion.  It is  probably just as important as 
the particular methodologies chosen. 
 Think carefully how patients and the public can be involved at the start: 
in the scoping, design and application processes. 
 The particular methodologies will be determined by purpose, context 
and practicalities, including resources. 
 Researchers should always challenge themselves in the following ways: 
‘What impact do we want to see from involving people? Are we being 
inclusive enough? Are we working in partnership? Are we involving people 
early enough?’   
 Patients and citizens can contribute in a variety of ways.   Researchers 
need to be clear about their purposes and approaches.  The people whose 
experiences of healthcare you want to understand may not be the same as 
the people you want to engage as expert partners.  Defaulting to inviting 
people to meetings might not elicit all the contributions you need. 
 Evaluating the quality and impact of your patient and public involvement 
is good practice.  It is a hedge against researchers defaulting to tokenistic 
mechanisms and it is a way of helping the research community as a whole 
learn from its successes (and failures).  (As author of this assessment I have 
an obvious interest to declare, though this point was also made in the 
interviews). 
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Implications for research funders 
A clear theme of this assessment was that there was limited scope for patient and 
public involvement at the stage when the application was being developed (with the 
consequence that various features of the project were not readily amenable to 
change later on). 
Three aspects of NIHR’s application process could be seen to serve as constraints in 
this regard: 
 Their timescales 
 Their willingness (or assumed willingness) to cover the costs of co-design with 
patients and the public in the application phase 
 The specificity they require about approach and methods in the application 
(which limits the scope for co-designed changes later). 
One worthwhile outcome of this assessment would be some engagement with NIHR 
and the wider research funding community on the scope for increasing the degree of 
patient and public involvement at the scoping, design and application phases of 
research, taking account of the factors listed above, and any others. 
 
 
 
 
Jeremy Taylor 
National Voices 
23 May 2017 
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Appendix 10: Summary of findings from publications arising from research study on ‘Effective Board Governance of Safe Care’ 
(Mannion et al, 2016) 
  Author/date  
 
 
 
Aim of study/paper Type of study/method  Type of 
organisation 
Impact of board  Factors affecting board 
performance  
Board 
processes  
(2016) Mannion, 
Freeman, Millar and 
Davies 
 
‘Effective Board 
Governance of Safe 
Care: A theoretically 
underpinned) cross-
sectioned examination 
of the breadth and 
depth of relationships 
through local case 
studies and national 
surveys’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aim of the study is to 
generate theoretically-
grounded empirical 
evidence on the 
associations between 
board practices, 
patient safety 
processes and patient 
centred outcomes. 
Three stands to the research: 
 
1. Narrative systematic review 
in order to describe, interpret 
and synthesise key findings 
and debates concerning board 
oversight of patient safety-124 
publications were deemed 
relevant for detailed review. 
Conducted between Dec 2011 
& Dec 2014. 
 
2. In-depth mixed methods 
case studies in four 
organisations used to assess 
the impact of hospital board 
governance and external 
incentives on patient safety 
processes and outcomes- 
observations of board 
meetings and interviews were 
used. Conducted between 
Sept 2012 and Sept 2014. 
 
3.Two national surveys 
Survey in NHS 
acute and 
specialist 
hospital trusts 
in England. 
Case studies 
took place in 
four NHS FTs  
1. Boards of governors 
are generally perceived as 
well meaning. They were 
also considered largely 
ineffective in helping to 
promote and deliver safer 
care for their 
organisations. Meetings 
frequently resembled 
seminars for information 
sharing, rather than a 
formal board meeting 
 
2. Board of governors 
seemed to serve a useful 
educative role and 
community linkage role, 
but with limited challenge 
or holding of executive to 
account.  
 
3. Did not find any 
statistically significant 
relationship between 
board attributes and 
1. Results from the 
national survey show a 
high proportion of 
desirable characteristics 
and board related process 
that research says may be 
associated with high 
performance- all having 
quality sub-committees 
and proactive procedures 
in place to address 
patient safety  and 
explicit objectives relating 
to improving patient 
safety. 
 
2. Development and 
implementation of a clear 
corporate strategy and 
operational plan is a key 
facilitator in enabling 
effective board 
governance  
 
3. Stability of board 
1. Most 
boards 
allocate 
considerable 
time to 
discussing 
patient safety 
and quality 
related issues. 
The survey 
found that 
hospital 
boards were 
using a wide 
range of hard 
performance 
metrics and 
soft 
intelligence to 
monitor their 
organisation 
with regard to 
patient safety, 
including a 
range of 
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undertaken about board 
management in NHS acute 
and specialist hospital trusts in 
England- first was issued to 
150 trusts in the financial year 
2011/12- received 145 replies- 
second survey data gathered 
between May 2012 and April 
2013- 334 received  
responses.  
process and any patient 
safety outcome 
measures.  
 
4. There was a significant 
relationship between 
staff ‘feeling safe’ to raise 
concerns and ‘feeling 
confident’ that their 
organisation would 
address those concerns  
membership and strong 
committed clinical 
leadership are important 
facilitators of patient 
safety governance.  
 
4. Other barriers included 
perceived lack of 
engagement among 
senior medical staff, and 
problems and disputes 
over the validity and 
reliability of summary 
performance indicator 
data.  
clinical 
outcome 
measures.  
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Studies that use research from above study 
  Author/date  
 
 
 
Aim of study/paper Type of study/method  Type of 
organisation 
Impact of board  Factors affecting board 
performance  
Board processes  
(2015a) Mannion, 
Davies, Freeman, Millar, 
Jacobs, Kasteridis 
 
‘Overseeing oversight: 
governance of quality 
and safety by hospital 
boards in the English 
NHS’ 
Aims to contribute to an 
understanding of 
hospital board 
composition and to 
explore board oversight 
of patient safety and 
health care quality in the 
English NHS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two national surveys 
about board 
management in NHS 
acute and specialist 
hospital trusts in 
England- 334 responses 
across both surveys 
(66% response rate). 
First survey in 2011/12. 
Second online survey 
undertaken in 2012/13. 
NHS acute 
and specialist 
hospitals 
trusts 
1. English NHS boards 
largely hold a wide range of 
attitudes and behaviours 
that might be expected to 
benefit patient safety and 
quality.  
1. There is scope for 
improvement as regards to 
formal training for board 
members on quality and 
safety, routine morbidity, 
reporting at boards and 
attention to the 
interpersonal dynamics 
within boards. 
1. 90% of boards have 10-15 
members. 
 
2. No significant difference 
in board size between trusts 
of different types. 
 
3. Clinical representation on 
boards was limited (for 
about two-thirds of trusts, 
board members with a 
clinical background made-
up less than 30% of 
members.  
(2015)  
Freeman, Millar, 
Mannion and Davies  
 
‘Enacting corporate 
governance of 
healthcare safety and 
quality: a dramaturgy of 
hospital boards in 
England’  
Applies a dramaturgical 
framework to explore 
scripting, setting, staging 
and performance, in the 
four case studies  
Article draws on 
qualitative data from 
overt non-participant 
observation of four NHS 
hospital foundation trust 
boards in England. 
Hayer’s analytical 
framework to qualitative 
data collected through 
overt non-participant 
observation at four case 
4 NHS 
Foundation 
Trusts 
 1. Operationalising the 
governance of patient safety 
largely in terms of assurance 
through retrospective use of 
performance data to alert 
the board of poor 
performance encourages 
under reporting  and does 
not indicate how to address 
deficiencies. Specific 
responses noted at the sites 
1. All of the case study sites 
sought to provide strategic 
assurance by establishing 
organisational structures 
and processes for reporting 
safety-related information 
throughout the organisation 
and to the board. 
 
2. Case study sites exhibited 
governance behaviours 
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study sites. Cases were 
selected on the basis of 
their performance 
trajectory over the last 
three years on a range 
of safety and quality 
indicators selected from 
Dr Foster database for 
2011. 
included: challenge and 
blame by NEDs at Skye; 
interpretive work by the 
CEO to forestall at Arran; 
and framing targets as 
unrealistic and requiring 
challenge of regulators. 
 
2. Findings highlighted the 
challenges board members 
face in terms of scripting 
and staging, especially when 
decisions pass 
unchallenged, unremarked 
or even unnoticed. A better 
understanding of these 
issues may feed into revised 
training and induction 
processes for board 
members. 
 
3. While summary reporting 
of quality indicators is 
important, local processes 
of organising that make it 
possible for non-executive 
board members to use such 
information to hold 
executives to account 
sensitively are required.  
variously related to agency 
and stewardship theory. 
 
3. While the amount of time 
devoted to discussing 
patient safety has been 
identified as potentially 
important, the article draws 
attention to the fact that 
boards used their time 
differently.  
 
4. While similar levels of 
performance indicator data 
relating to infection control 
were available at each site, 
differences in use were 
significant and related to 
the practices legitimated 
within each setting.  
(2013)  
Ross Millar, Russell 
Mannion, Tim Freeman 
and Huw Davies 
 
‘Hospital Board 
A narrative review of 
empirical research to 
inform the debate about 
hospital boards’ 
oversight of quality and 
patient safety. 
Lit review, search 
identified 122 papers for 
detailed review 
published after 1990 
Hospitals 1. Empirical studies linking 
board composition and 
processes with patient 
outcomes have found clear 
differences between high 
and low performing 
1. Effective board oversight 
is associated with well 
informed and skilled board 
members 
 
2. External factors, such as 
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Oversight of Quality 
and Patient Safety: A 
Narrative Review 
and Synthesis of Recent 
Empirical Research’  
hospitals.  regulatory regimes and the 
publication of performance 
data, might also have a role 
influencing boards. 
 
3. Strong and committed 
leadership that prioritises 
quality and safety  and sets 
clear and measurable goals 
for improvement has  an 
impact on performance.  
(2015)  
Ross Millar, Tom 
Freeman and Russell 
Mannion  
(Birmingham search)  
 
‘Hospital board 
oversight of quality and 
safety: a stakeholder 
analysis exploring the 
role of trust and 
intelligence’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper aims to offer 
critical reflection on the 
relationship between 
hospital board oversight 
and patient safety. The 
paper analyses the 
potential dangers and 
limitations of 
approaches to hospital 
board oversight that is 
too narrowly focussed 
on a risk-based view of 
organisational  
performance. 
The article draws on ten 
interviews with key 
informants and policy 
actors who form part of 
the ‘issue network’ 
interested in the 
promotion of safety in 
the NHS. The research 
purposely selected 
interviewees on the 
basis that our research 
required a range of 
stakeholder perspectives 
that interacted across 
multiple interest groups. 
The sample included the 
Department of Health, 
Monitor, CQC and a 
national patient safety 
agency.  
Health 
Foundation, 
NHS 
Confederatio
n, DH, NHS 
Litigation 
Authority, 
Monitor, 
CQC, NPSA 
 1. Suggested that, in 
hospitals, debates about 
patient safety often took 
second or third place behind 
efforts to ensure that 
hospital finances and central 
performance targets were 
met. 
 
2. Boards are challenged by 
the regulatory environment 
that is designed around 
meeting the governance and 
risk based set by Monitor 
and CQC. 
 
3. Faith placed in external 
targets was largely 
connected to a lack of skills 
and understanding to make 
sense of patient safety 
issues and concerns. 
 
4. Limited knowledge and 
understanding of patient 
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safety among board 
members, particularly non-
executives, also meant they 
were often inhibited in 
challenging and posing 
critical questions about 
safety issues and concerns. 
This was exemplified by 
non-executives who tended 
not to have a clinical or 
operational background in 
healthcare.  
 
5. The role of chair was 
central to allowing open 
discussion at board 
meetings by encouraging 
members to raise salient 
issues. Non-executive 
directors were seen to be 
important of they could 
actively challenge executive 
decisions and hold the 
board to account. 
  
6. Enhancing the 
intelligence available to the 
board about hospital 
performance could be 
gained by members seeking 
to ‘triangulate’ hard 
performance data with 
different information 
sources. 
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Appendix 11: Summary of six papers from updated literature review 
 Author/date  Aim of study/paper Type of study/method  Strengths and 
limitations  
Impact of board  Factors affecting board 
performance  
Board processes  
(2013)  
Ruth Endacott, Rod 
Sheaff, Ray Jones, 
Valerie Woodward 
 
‘Clinical focus and public 
accountability in English 
NHS  trust Board 
meetings’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To what extent is there 
clinical focus in Board 
meetings in three types 
of NHS Trusts to 
consider the 
implications for public 
accountability  
1. Content analysis of 
published minutes of 
board meetings from 
105 randomly selected 
NHS trusts in 2008/09. 
 
2. Structured 
observation of 24 board 
meetings in a qualitative 
subsample of eight of 
the above trusts in 
2008/09. 
Limitations- 
 
1. FTs were still 
adjusting to their new 
roles and to having two 
boards. 
 
2. The study doesn’t 
look at the impact of 
board makeup on 
clinical outcomes but 
instead looks more at 
the way composition 
affects effectiveness in 
procedures, etc.  
 1. Some chairs are 
notably better at 
encouraging discussion, 
debate and 
contributions.  
 
2. Where NEDs (clinical 
directors) were 
confident and tenacious, 
there was greater depth 
and discussion of all 
issues, including clinical 
matters such as serious 
untoward incidents  
(SUIs). 
1. Discussion in board 
meetings driven heavily 
by current government 
policy initiatives. 
 
2. Meetings were 
generally chair led with 
the conduct of the 
meetings determined by 
the direction provided 
by the chair.  
 
3. Where members of 
the public had a formal 
representative role, the 
content and frequency 
of questions posed was 
variable.  
(2014)  
Kline, Roger 
 
‘The snowy white peaks 
of the NHS: a survey of 
discrimination in 
governance and 
leadership and potential 
Report considers the 
extent of the gap 
between diversity 
apparent in the 
workforce and local 
population, and that 
visible among trust 
leaderships and senior 
FOI requests were made 
to all London trusts in 
order to determine 
ethnic composition of 
boards. Data on 
comprehensive data on 
trust board membership 
by ethnicity in 2006 was 
Strengths- 
 
1. Robust data that 
shows disproportionate 
recruitment number of 
white board members.  
 
Limitations- 
Leadership boards that 
are significantly 
unrepresentative of 
their local communities, 
such as NHS Trust 
boards, will have more 
difficulty ensuring that 
care is genuinely patient 
 1. The data 
demonstrates that there 
remains a very 
significant gap between 
the composition of trust 
boards and national NHS 
bodies, and the rest of 
the workforce and the 
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impact on patient care 
in London and England’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
management. compared with 2014.  
1. No new evidence for 
the impact on better 
care of more 
representative board- 
assumptions on this 
taken from previous 
studies.  
centred.  local population to 
whom services are 
provided. 
 
2. The proportion of 
London NHS Trust board 
members from a BME 
background 
is 8%, an even lower 
number than was found 
in 2006 (9.6%). 
 
2. Two-fifths of London’s 
NHS Trust boards had no 
BME members 
(executive or non- 
executive) on them at 
all, whilst over half of 
London’s trust boards 
either had no 
BME executive members 
or no BME non-
executive report 
members. 
 
3. The proportion of 
women on boards is 
40%; whilst this is a 
slight improvement on 
past figures, the 
proportion is still well 
below that of the NHS 
workforce or the local 
population.  
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(2015)  
Dixon-Woods, Baker, 
Charles, Dawson, 
Jerzembek, Martin, 
McCarthy, McKee, 
Minion, Ozieranski, 
Willars, Wilkie and West 
 
‘Culture and behaviour 
in the English National 
Health Service: overview 
of lessons from a large 
multimethod study’  
 
 
 
 
 
Aim to examine culture 
and behaviour in the 
English NHS  
Mixed methods, 
including interviews, 
surveys, ethnographic 
case studies, board 
minutes, and publically 
available datasets 
narratively synthesised 
data across the studies 
to produce a holistic 
picture.  
▸107 interviews with 
key, senior level 
stakeholders from 
across the NHS and 
beyond; 
▸ 197 interviews from 
the ‘blunt end’ 
(executive and 
board level) of NHS 
primary care and acute 
organisations, 
through to the ‘sharp 
end’ (frontline clinicians) 
where staff care for 
patients; 
▸ over 650 h of 
ethnographic 
observation in hospital 
wards, primary care 
practices, and accident 
and emergency 
units; 
▸ 715 survey responses 
from patient and carer 
organisations; 
▸ two focus groups and 
Limitations-  
 
1. Synthesis of findings 
was interpretive and 
narrative and did not 
use a formal protocol. 
Others might reach 
dissimilar conclusions or 
interpretations in the 
data.  
1. Consistent with the 
findings of the Francis 
Inquiry, boards were 
identified as particularly 
influential in setting the 
overall direction and 
demonstrating the 
commitment and 
organisational priority 
given to quality and 
safety. 
 
2. Given that many 
systems required 
significant improvement, 
it was disappointing that 
we found a clear trend 
of decreasing levels of 
board innovation, 
especially in relation to 
quality and safety. 
 
3. Observations, 
interviews and surveys 
all emphasised the 
importance of high 
quality management in 
ensuring positive, 
innovative and caring 
cultures at the sharp 
end of care. 
 
4. A strong focus by 
executive and board 
teams on their role in 
identifying and 
 1. Questionnaire of 
board members showed 
that they rarely stated 
clear board objectives 
that were challenging 
and measurable.  
 
2. Found worrying 
evidence of boards 
failing to set clear goals 
for themselves as boards 
and for their 
organisation.  
 
3. The research confirms 
the importance of high 
quality intelligence (not 
just data) and making 
that intelligence 
actionable.  
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10 interviews with 
patient and 
carer organisations; 
▸ team process and 
performance data from 
621 clinical 
teams, drawn from the 
acute, ambulance, 
mental health, 
primary care and 
community trust 
sectors; 
▸ 793 sets of minutes 
from the meetings of 71 
NHS trust 
boards from multiple 
sectors over an 18-
month period, including 
detailed analysis of eight 
boards’ minutes. 
addressing systems 
problems was powerful 
in supporting cultural 
change that delivered 
benefits for patients, 
and our observations 
and interviews identified 
many examples of 
impressive gains being 
made by the sharp and 
blunt ends working 
together around 
unifying goals. 
 
5. Consistent with 
Francis’ findings, good 
management is as 
important as good 
leadership. 
(2015)  
Thomas Tsai, Ashish Jha, 
Gawande, Huckman, 
Bloom and Sadun 
 
‘Hospital Board and 
Management Practices 
are strongly related to 
hospital performance on 
clinical quality metrics’  
Aim to examine the 
relationship among 
hospital boards, 
management practices 
of front-line managers, 
and the quality of care 
delivered. 
Collected data from 
surveys of nationally 
representative groups of 
hospitals in the US and 
England.  
 
Primary data set was the 
healthcare component 
of the World 
Management Survey 
specific to the US and 
England. This data was 
then merged with data 
from a 2009 survey of 
US boards of trustees 
and 2010 survey of 
Limitations-  
 
1. Non-random subset of 
hospitals so may not 
necessarily be 
representative.  
1. Hospitals with more 
effective management 
practices provided 
higher quality care. 
Higher rated hospital 
boards had superior 
performance by hospital 
management staff.  
1. Hospitals with boards 
that paid attention to 
clinical quality had 
management that better 
monitored quality 
performance.  Hospitals 
with boards that used 
clinical quality metrics 
more effectively had 
higher performance by 
hospital management 
staff on target setting 
and operations 
 
2. Boards with a higher 
attention to quality had 
1. High quality hospitals 
were more likely to have 
better management 
processes related to 
operations, monitoring, 
target setting, and 
human resources than 
low quality hospitals. 
Management scores 
were significantly higher 
in hospitals with boards 
that paid greater 
attention to quality and 
that were more likely to 
adopt effective practices 
related to the use of 
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English boards of 
trustees. Data on 
hospital characteristics 
were then merged from 
the 2011 American 
Hospital Association 
annual survey and the 
NHS’s HSCIC data. This 
data was then finally 
merged with hospital 
quality data from CMS 
Hospital Compare for US 
hospitals and CQC data.  
 
Quality of care variables- 
UK- quality rating 
programme ‘overall 
quality services’ score 
from the CQC (2009 
survey of English boards 
and 2010 survey of US 
boards of trustees). 
the highest 
management practices 
in monitoring quality. 
Second, hospitals with 
effective board practices 
that centred on the use 
of quality metrics 
showed a greater 
association with 
management scores in 
the domains of target 
setting and operations.  
 
data on clinical quality 
metrics.  
(2015)  
Rod Sheaff, Ruth 
Endacott, Ray Jones and 
Val Woodward 
 
‘Interaction between 
non-executive and 
executive directors in 
English National Health 
Service trust boards: an 
observation study’  
Aim to compare the 
non-executive directors’ 
roles and interests in, 
and contributions to, 
NHS trusts boards’ 
governance activities 
with those of executive 
directors, and examine 
non-executive directors’ 
approach to their role in 
board meetings. 
Non-participant 
observations of three 
successive trust board 
meetings in eight NHS 
trust in England 2008-
09. 
Strengths- 
 
1. Adds to evidence 
about governance and 
processes stewardship 
in NHS boards by 
focussing roles, interests 
and relationships 
 
Limitations-  
 
1. Does not study the 
practical consequences 
for the rest of the study 
1. Article argues that 
avoidable patient deaths 
and mistreatment at 
mid-staffs shows that 
the NHS has no room for 
complacency on being 
able to challenge what 
managers say. 
1. Non-exec board 
members in holding the 
exec team to account at 
board meetings were 
variable.  
 
2. The pattern of NED 
behaviours was on 
balance more indicate of 
an active, strategic 
approach to governance 
than of passive 
monitoring or rubber 
stamping.  
1. Observational data 
revealed 6 types of 
questioning tactic; 
supportive; lesson 
learning; diagnostic; 
options assessment; 
strategy seeking; and 
requesting further work. 
Patterns of behaviour 
were more indicative of 
an active, strategic 
approach to governance 
than of passive 
monitoring or ‘rubber-
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organisations for their 
org behaviour and 
accountability  
stamping’. 
(2015)  
Gianluca Veronesi, Ian 
Kirkpatrick and Ali 
Altanlar  
 
‘Clinical Leadership and 
the changing 
governance of public 
hospitals: implications 
for patient experience’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aim to: 
 
1) Investigate whether 
increased participation 
of clinical professionals 
on hospital boards has 
had a positive impact on 
performance- focus on 
patient experience 
different from previous 
study that focusses on 
clinical and financial 
outcomes. 
 
2) Questions whether 
any impact of clinical 
participation on boards 
is moderated by 
organisational 
differences between 
hospitals and specifically 
if they are granted 
higher formal autonomy 
in their governance.  
Quantitative data 
analysis  using three 
sources:  
 
1) Annual data NHS 
Trust Inpatient Survey 
(06-09) 
 
2) Original database of 
governance information 
at the board level 
 
3) Series of publically 
available data including 
the CQC hospital ratings 
and hospital activity 
indicators.  
 
Strengths- 
 
1. Uses patient 
experience data which 
has an advantage over 
performance indicators 
as these often fail to 
capture quality in the 
sense of impact or 
outcome. Patient 
experience data has also 
been found to be 
influenced by the quality 
orientation of senior 
management teams. 
 1. Significant positive 
effects of the 
percentage of clinical 
directors on overall 
patient experience 
scores. 
 
2. Having five or more 
clinical directors instead 
of two had an even 
greater significant 
positive impact on 
patient experience. 
 
3. There was no 
significant finding 
between patient 
experience scores and 
organisational status (an 
FT or not). However, the 
results do find that FTs 
with more clinical 
professionals on their 
board, patient 
experience outcomes 
are higher. 
 
4. The significant 
relationship between 
clinicians on the board 
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and patient experience 
disappears if the trust is 
not an FT. 
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Appendix 12: Representativeness of respondents to the national survey 
 
We issued survey invitations to a total of 1896 board members and board secretaries, 
excluding individuals from our database who we discovered were no longer in place (E.g., 
because they had resigned or retired).  381 respondents completed the whole survey (response 
rate 20%), with an additional 57 respondents (3%) answering some of the survey questions.  
At least one full response was received from 139 (90%) the 154 NHS hospital trusts and 
foundation trusts in England at that time. 
Response rates were higher among board secretaries (31%) than among board members 
(19%) (see table 18).  Response rates were particularly low among Finance Directors (11%).  
Board member response rates differed between regions of the country, ranging from 14% in 
London up to 26% in East of England (Chi-square=18.6, df=8, p=0.02).  Response rates also 
tended to be lower as the size of the trust (number of beds) increased, although this was a 
relatively weak effect. 
 
Table 18: Survey responses by role 
Crosstab 
 
Response to survey invitation 
Total 
Did not 
respond or 
fully complete 
the survey 
Fully 
completed the 
survey 
Role Board Secretary Count 106 48 154 
% within Role 68.8% 31.2% 100.0% 
Chair Count 115 43 158 
% within Role 72.8% 27.2% 100.0% 
CEO Count 120 39 159 
% within Role 75.5% 24.5% 100.0% 
Finance Director Count 149 19 168 
% within Role 88.7% 11.3% 100.0% 
Medical Director Count 118 42 160 
% within Role 73.8% 26.3% 100.0% 
Nursing Director Count 130 28 158 
% within Role 82.3% 17.7% 100.0% 
Non-Executive Count 777 162 939 
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Director % within Role 82.7% 17.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 1515 381 1896 
% within Role 79.9% 20.1% 100.0% 
 (Chi-square = 35.8, df=6, p=0.000) 
There were no statistically significant differences in response rates between different types of 
trust (acute, specialist; foundation, non-foundation), between trusts with different CQC Well-
Led Ratings, or between female and male board members (Chi-square test, p>0.05).  Whether 
or not the board secretary had agreed to forward on emails to board members did not appear 
to affect response rates. 
13 out of 34 (38%) of board member respondents from the London region were female.  This 
is similar to the 40% figure found in a previous survey (Kline, 2014).  3 out of 34 (9%) of 
board member respondents from the London region were from black and ethnic minority 
backgrounds, again similar to the 8% figure found by Kline. 
118 out of 331 (36%) of all board member survey respondents who specified their gender 
were female.  The proportion of women performing each board role varied widely (see table 
#2).  Most Directors of Nursing were female, as were board secretaries.  Most Finance 
Directors were male, and about two thirds of Chairs and Non-Executive Directors.  
Approximately half of Chief Executives were female.  Only 20 out of 328 (6%) of board 
member respondents were from BME groups. 
 
Table 19: Gender of respondents completing the whole survey, by role 
Crosstab 
 
What is your gender? 
Total Female Male 
Role Board Secretary Count 35 13 48 
% within Role 72.9% 27.1% 100.0% 
Chair Count 13 30 43 
% within Role 30.2% 69.8% 100.0% 
CEO Count 18 21 39 
% within Role 46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 
Finance Director Count 2 17 19 
% within Role 10.5% 89.5% 100.0% 
Medical Director Count 9 33 42 
% within Role 21.4% 78.6% 100.0% 
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Nursing Director Count 23 5 28 
% within Role 82.1% 17.9% 100.0% 
Non-Executive 
Director 
Count 53 107 160 
% within Role 33.1% 66.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 153 226 379 
% within Role 40.4% 59.6% 100.0% 
(Chi Square=60.6, df=6, p=0.000). 
 
184 out of 331 (56%) of all board member survey respondents joined their current board after 
February 2013.  A higher proportion of these more recent board members (10%) were from 
BME groups than was the case for board members who had been on the board for a longer 
period (1%).  The gender breakdown was similar between more recent and longer serving 
board members.  Chief executive respondents were more likely to have been longer serving 
than board members in other roles.  74% of CEO respondents had joined the board before 
March 2013, whereas only 40% of board members in other roles had joined their board 
before March 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
